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Introduction 
 
As we commemorate the 100th anniversary of the First World War a wealth of 
archival material and scholarly contributions have entered the public domain allowing 
for lively discussions on various aspects of the war. While many commemorations 
highlight the individual national sacrifice made, Hew Strachan has stressed the 
importance of remembering the Great War in comparative terms which emphasise the 
wars’ international dimension.1 This also includes an examination of those countries, 
such as Spain, which remained neutral throughout the conflict. Wartime neutrality, a 
long neglected subject in the history of the First World War, has begun to be included in 
more recent examinations of the war. Caught in the middle. Neutrals, neutrality and the 
First World War,2 a collection of essays edited by Johan den Hertog and Samuël 
Kruizinga, gives a multi-faceted and multi-national overview of the subject which had 
hitherto only been addressed to such an extent in Nils Ørvik’s The decline of neutrality 
1914-19413 and in Neutral Europe between war and revolution, 1917-1923 edited by 
Hans Schmitt.4 
A general history of the war also addressing the subject of neutrality is Other 
combatants, other fronts: competing histories of the First World War, which examines 
aspects of Dutch and Swiss neutrality.5 In addition, the subject is included in the most 
                                                 
1Hew Strachan, ‘Lest we forget the worldwide war’ in The Telegraph, 28 Jul. 2014, available at 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/world-war-one/10994592/Lest-we-forget-the-worldwide-war.html) (5 
Aug. 2014). 
2Johan den Hertog & Samuël Kruizinga (eds), Caught in the middle. Neutrals, neutrality and the First 
World War (Amsterdam, 2011). 
3Nils Ørvik’s The decline of neutrality 1914-1941, with special reference to the United States and the 
northern neutrals (London, 1971). First published in 1953. 
4Hans Schmitt (ed.), Neutral Europe between war and revolution 1917–23 (Charlottesville, 1988). 
5James Kitchen & Alisa Miller & Laura Rowe (eds), Other combatants, other fronts: competing histories 
of the First World War (Cambridge, 2011). 
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recent reference works on the war, A companion to World War I6 and The Cambridge 
History of the First World War.7 As Kruizinga points out, previously the issue of 
neutrality had only been dealt with within national studies rarely published in English.8 
Therefore, recent efforts in the field allow for a comparative and transnational approach 
to the topic. By examining the relationship between a belligerent and a neutral state, 
such as Spain and Germany, the importance of neutrals during wartime becomes 
evident. Such an examination also demonstrates the effects of war on neutrals, which 
often found themselves under substantial political and economic pressure. In addition to 
that, the study of the links between one of the main belligerent powers and a smaller 
neutral state allows for the analysis of the belligerent’s wartime aims from a perspective 
hitherto less investigated. 
In Spain the First World War coincided with a period of great domestic turmoil 
amidst the rapidly decreasing importance of the country on a global stage. The various 
competing factions within Spain aligned themselves with either one of the belligerent 
blocs, causing a split amongst Spanish society which in turn allowed the Entente and the 
Central Powers to exert their influence on the country. Given Spain’s military and 
economic weakness, as well as its domestic troubles, the country’s declaration of 
neutrality at the outbreak of the First World War was hardly surprising. Although the 
decision to opt for neutrality was initially met with widespread support amongst 
Spaniards, it quickly became a contested issue causing great public debate. Various 
Liberal and Conservative governments struggled to meet demands by both warring 
parties and maintain neutrality at the same time. While Britain and France were able to 
exert economic pressure on Spain, threatening to withhold vital coal exports, Germany 
offered the possibility of gaining colonies and the opportunity to lead peace negotiations 
                                                 
6Jean-Jacques Becker, ‘War aims and neutrality’ in J. Horne (ed.), A companion to World War I 
(Chichester, 2010). 
7Samuël Kruizinga, ‘Neutrality’ in J. Winter (ed.), The Cambridge history of the First World War, ii: The 
State (Cambridge, 2014), pp 542-75. 
8Ibid. 
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at the end of the European conflict. Looking at Spanish-German relations during the 
First World War sheds light on the extent to which these external pressures on Spain 
increased during the war and accelerated its domestic instability, contributing to the 
ongoing civil strife the country was experiencing in the 1920s and 1930s. 
While there are many general histories of Spain examining the first half of the 
twentieth century which also address the period of the First World War9, albeit in a more 
superficial manner, Francisco Romero Salvadó’s Spain 1914 – 1918. Between war and 
revolution was the first major publication in English solely dedicated to Spain’s war 
years. Against the backdrop of the general crisis in Europe, the author outlines Spanish 
domestic politics and argues that the European conflict led to ideological militancy, 
economic dislocation and social struggle in Spain. According to Romero Salvadó, 
Spain’s policy of neutrality did not help to save the existing regime but only cast doubt 
over the administration’s authority. The debate over belligerence or neutrality further 
deepened existing divisions within Spanish society. One chapter of the book deals with 
Spain’s international affairs and outlines the pressures on the administration caused by 
German as well as Allied expectations. Like Romero Salvadó, Manuel Tuñón de Lara 
also points out the importance of the First World War by arguing that the economic, 
ideological and political consequences of the war strongly affected the historical process 
in Spain.10 The importance of an examination of Spain’s experience of the Great War 
also contributes to a better understanding of the wider causes of the Spanish Civil War 
which Romero Salvadó addresses in The foundations of civil war. Revolution, social 
conflict and reaction in liberal Spain, 1916 – 1923.  
Other Spanish historians have followed Romero Salvadó’s footsteps and turned 
their attention to the First World War, attempting to combat the stereotype that Spain’s 
                                                 
9See for example, Raymond Carr, Spain 1808 – 1939 (Oxford, 1966). Sebastian Balfour, The end of the 
Spanish empire, 1898 – 1923 (Oxford, 1997). José Alvarez Junco & Adrian Shubert (eds), Spanish history 
since 1808 (London, 2000). 
10Manuel Tuñón de Lara, Poder y sociedad en España, 1900-1931 (Madrid, 1992), p. 28. 
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neutrality meant the war simply passed without having an effect on the country – an 
assumption often encountered whenever this dissertation’s topic was raised. In the most 
recent publication on Spain during the Great War, España en la Gran Guerra: Espías, 
diplomáticos y traficantes, Fernando García Sanz even argues that Spain was not neutral 
at all but an economic belligerent which played a decisive role during the war. García 
Sanz’s work is part of a research project on Allied intelligence in Spain during the First 
World War which seeks to examine Spanish neutrality in an international context.11 
Another result of this project is Carolina García Sanz’s book on Gibraltar during the 
First World War,12 as are Eduardo González Calleja and Paul Aubert’s monograph on 
the intelligence war fought by the belligerents in Spain13 and the contributions by 
Fernando García Sanz, Eduardo González Calleja and María Dolores Elizalde Pérez 
Grueso to the special edition of the Revista de Historia Militar on modern and 
contemporary information services.14 All these important contributions highlight how 
Spain became a battleground for the belligerents despite the country’s neutrality.  
However, while the above mentioned works mainly examine the Allied effort in 
Spain, and are so far only published in Spanish, current investigations into Germany’s 
campaign on the Iberian Peninsula are still outstanding. It is in fact to say that in 
contrast to the numerous investigations on the connections between Spain and Germany 
during the Second World War, much less research has been conducted on Spanish-
German relationships during the First World War. Although important ground work has 
been done by German, Spanish and American historians, providing an excellent starting 
                                                 
11‘Espionaje y relaciones internacionales: los servicios de información aliados en España durante la 
Primera Guerra Mundial’, Principal Investigator: Fernando García Sanz (BHA2002-01143). 
12Carolina García Sanz, La primera guerra mundial en el estrecho de Gibraltar: Economía, política y 
relaciones internacionales (Madrid, 2011). 
13Eduardo González Calleja & Paul Aubert, Nidos de espias: España, Francia y la Primera Guerra, 
1914-1919 (Madrid, 2014). 
14M. D. Elizalde Pérez Grueso, ‘Los servicios de inteligencia británicos en España durante la Primera 
Guerra Mundial’ in Revista de Historia Militar, xlix (2005), pp 237–258. F. García Sanz, ‘Información, 
espionaje y contraespionaje en España durante la Primera Guerra Mundial’ in Revista de Historia Militar, 
xlix (2005), pp 147–178. E. González Calleja, “Nidos de espías’: los servicios de información franceses 
en España durante la Primera Guerra Mundial’ in Revista de Historia Militar, xlix (2005), pp 179–226. 
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point for this investigation, an analysis encompassing diplomatic, military, political, 
social and cultural relationships between Spain and Germany during the First World 
War is still outstanding.  
The works that deal directly with Spanish-German relations between 1914 and 
1918 are Ron M. Carden's German policy toward neutral Spain, 1914 – 1918, Lilian 
Gelos de Vaz Ferreira's Die Neutralitätspolitik Spaniens während des Ersten 
Weltkrieges, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der deutsch-spanischen Beziehungen 
and Jens Albes’ Worte wie Waffen. Die deutsche Propaganda in Spanien während des 
Ersten Weltkrieges.15 In addition to that is Benedikt Rüchardt’s work Deutsch–
Spanische Beziehungen 1898–1931, surveying German-Spanish relations from the end 
of the nineteenth century until the 1930s.16  
 Carden’s book provides a good general overview of Spanish-German relations 
during the First World War. Following the chronology of the war, he centres his 
narrative around Spanish domestic events and focuses on the actions of some influential 
individuals such as the German ambassador to Spain, Prince Maximilian von Ratibor 
und Corvey, and the Spanish King Alfonso XIII. Carden’s analysis reveals the extent of 
the network between both countries to a certain degree but does not consider in great 
detail how this network was set up and maintained throughout the war. Other questions 
that are left unanswered are how the flow of information was organised between the two 
countries and whether information was mainly exchanged through the country’s 
respective ministries for foreign affairs and embassies or whether informal channels 
between politicians and diplomats existed. Another important aspect that needs to be 
included is an examination of the role of the German community in Spain and how their 
                                                 
15Also see Michael Campbell, Triumph of the word: The German struggle to maintain Spanish neutrality 
during the First World War (Madison, 1989). Campbell and Carden mainly used German diplomatic 
records available in US archives. They did not utilise files of the German embassy at Madrid or those of 
the Auswärtige Amt news department. Neither Spanish nor British archival material were consulted for 
their studies. In comparison Benedikt Rüchardt and Lilian Gelos de Vaz Ferreira deliver a more thorough 
analysis of German activity in Spain during WWI. 
16Benedikt Rüchardt, Deutsch–Spanische Beziehungen 1898–1931 (Freising, 1988). 
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self-mobilisation contributed to the German war effort. In what circles did the German 
diplomats socialise? Were there social gatherings organised by the embassy, if yes who 
took part in them? How did the embassy exert its influence on local politicians? Since 
Carden did not consult Spanish sources for his investigation, the picture of Spanish-
German relationships during World War I remains incomplete. For his research he 
mainly utilised published German records available in the United States; those however, 
do not include the records of the German embassy in Madrid or the files of the news 
department of the Auswärtige Amt, the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The lack of 
Spanish as well as British records leaves his investigation one sided and open to further 
research. 
 Similar problems can be encountered in Lilian Gelos de Vaz Ferreira's work Die 
Neutralitätspolitik Spaniens während des Ersten Weltkrieges, unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der deutsch-spanischen Beziehungen. The author focuses her main 
attention on Spain’s policy of neutrality during the First World War as well as the 
country’s domestic politics before and during the conflict. Particular attention is given 
to German-Spanish relations. However, these are not analysed in great detail and the 
links between both countries, as well as German activity in Spain, are only outlined 
superficially. Similar to Carden's investigation, Vaz Ferreira's work follows the 
chronology of the war and is centred around reactions to the policy of neutrality within 
Spain. While she has used extensive German records, very few Spanish archival sources 
have been consulted.  
 In contrast to the works by Carden and Vaz Ferreira, Jens Albes book on German 
press propaganda in Spain during World War I draws on a large variety of archival 
records, including German, Spanish, British, French, Austrian and Italian sources. 
Therefore it provides an excellent starting point for further investigations into all 
aspects of German propaganda activity in Spain. Albes outlines the main institutions 
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that organised German propaganda in Spain and explains in detail how they operated. 
Furthermore, he juxtaposes German propaganda activity with French and British efforts 
to influence Spanish opinion. In addition to press propaganda, which is the main focus 
of this study, Albes also details briefly the use of film propaganda by Germany and the 
Allies. This analysis, however, is done in a superficial manner and calls for further 
investigation in particular in relation to cultural propaganda employed by Germany. 
While Albes details the work of German businessman August Hofer, who ran the 
German news service for Spain in Barcelona with support of the German embassy in 
Madrid and the Auswärtige Amt, the analysis of Hofer’s work can be expanded further, 
especially in view of portraying the German community in Spain.  
Benedikt Rüchardt, in Deutsch–Spanische Beziehungen 1898–1931, charts 
Spanish foreign politics, emphasising the country’s interactions with Germany from the 
time of the Spanish-American War until the establishment of the Second Spanish 
Republic in 1931. Rüchardt primarily focuses on official diplomatic and trade relations 
between both countries employing Spanish and German archival material. His 
examination of the years of the First World War looks at violations of Spanish neutrality, 
the impact of U-boat warfare on diplomatic relations between Spain and Germany and 
incidents of German propaganda and espionage activity. Given the longer time span of 
his investigation, the network that existed between both countries during the war is not 
considered in great detail and also does not include a look at the informal channels 
which enabled German propaganda and espionage activity in Spain.  
Therefore what remains to be considered is how the various networks between 
Germany and Spain during the war were set up and maintained. Who were the main 
protagonists on the German and Spanish side that facilitated communication at an 
official and unofficial level? In particular, the unofficial effort carried out by the 
German community in Spain, which was very actively involved in spreading pro-
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German propaganda all over the country, serves as an example for self-mobilisation 
which often took place during the war without official initiatives. While Jens Albes has 
provided an excellent analysis of the German propaganda effort in Spain during the 
First World War, his investigation is further expanded in this study by looking at the use 
of cultural propaganda in greater detail and by examining how the propaganda network 
was maintained logistically. In addition to that, Spanish journalists and newspaper 
editors who cooperated with Germany are identified and it is established how the 
Auswärtige Amt and other propaganda institutions built up contacts with them. Since the 
propaganda effort in Spain was largely organised by private German residents, who 
worked hand in hand with the embassy and consulates, the correspondence of the 
embassy as well as the wartime account of private propagandist August Hofer have 
helped to shed light on how the German propaganda campaign in Spain was 
orchestrated.  
Many of the private German propagandists had been living in Spain prior to 
1914 and were therefore able to make use of their pre-existing business connections in 
the Spanish publishing world. Similarly German diplomats in Spain were fully 
integrated into Spanish upper class society at the outbreak of the First World War and 
enjoyed a good reputation. Led by Ambassador Maximilian von Ratibor und Corvey, 
they aggressively pursued pro-German elements of Spanish society in the hope Spain 
would maintain a neutrality benevolent to Germany. Since the diplomats had to be 
careful not to compromise their position, it is interesting to examine how they tried to 
exert their influence on Spanish public opinion by establishing a good relationship with 
King Alfonso XIII and also by using the Spanish envoy to Belgium, the Marquis de 
Villalobar. An extensive examination of German diplomatic files available in Berlin at 
the Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes has also revealed that Spanish politicians 
from various political spectra were in close contact with the German embassy in the 
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hope to further their own agenda. Spanish archival material has yielded very little useful 
information for this investigation. Given Spain’s official neutrality during the war it is 
hardly surprising though that collaboration with one of the belligerents was not 
officially documented. However, Spanish newspapers as well as contemporary accounts 
and memoirs have been of great benefit in completing the picture of German diplomatic 
activity in Spain during the war.  
An aspect hitherto overlooked by other investigations into Spanish-German 
relations during the First World War is the role played by the German military and naval 
attachés. Arnold Kalle and Hans von Krohn had the official task of informing the 
Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL – German High Command) and admiralty on military 
matters relevant to the war effort. Military attaché Kalle was also responsible for 
keeping King Alfonso XIII, whom he had a friendly relationship with, updated on the 
course of the war. Unofficially Kalle and Krohn organised an intelligence service 
network which sought to disrupt the Allied war effort by agitating strikes, damaging 
Allied property, spreading pro-neutrality propaganda amongst Spanish workers and 
infiltrating workers organisations. In order to cover their tracks, a third man, who took 
charge of organising the German information service, was brought to Spain. This was 
no other than Wilhelm Canaris, later the head of Hitler’s military intelligence service 
Abwehr, who also played an important role in Spanish-German relations during the 
Spanish Civil War and the Second World War. During the First World War Canaris built 
up an extensive intelligence network in Spain which relied on German as well as many 
Spanish collaborators. However, it is mainly his intelligence work carried out during the 
Third Reich and his fall from grace, leading to his execution for treason in 1945, which 
have made Canaris a particularly attractive subject for historians.  
Michael Mueller, in his biography Canaris: the life and death of Hitler’s 
spymaster, arguably goes into more detail about Canaris’s career during the First World 
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War than his other biographers. Most accounts of Canaris’s life largely focus on his 
spectacular escape from internment in Chile in 1915, after the ship he had served on as 
an officer had been sunk by the British, and then swiftly move on to his career and 
activity under the Nazis in the 1930s and 1940s. Mueller, on the other hand, briefly 
outlines some of the tasks Canaris was entrusted with in Spain during the First World 
War, namely the setting up of information centres. He also provides some detail on how 
Canaris managed to reach Spain in 1916 and what difficulties he encountered when 
attempting to leave the Iberian Peninsula again at the end of that year. Heinz Höhne in 
Canaris: Patriot im Zwielicht points out Canaris’s position vis-à-vis the German service 
attachés Kalle and Krohn, while also offering some useful information on the 
competitive behaviour between the naval and military attaché. However, both Mueller’s 
and Höhne’s account lack detail of Canaris’s actual activity in Spain, and they do not 
outline the network he was able to build up. This shortcoming is addressed in this 
investigation and Chapter 5 provides a detailed overview of the various German 
intelligence outposts in Spain during the war as well as an outline of who were the 
middlemen working for Canaris, Krohn and Kalle, and how they communicated 
information.   
While some of Germany’s collaborators were revealed in the Spanish press, 
causing outrage over the extent of German interference in Spanish affairs17, it has until 
now not been clear how the German information service in Spain operated. The 
surviving archival material of the German admiralty, today available at the 
Bundesarchiv Freiburg, has allowed for a reconstruction of German covert activity 
during the war greatly complementing the above mentioned work done by Spanish 
historians on Allied information services in Spain during the First World War. This 
                                                 
17See for example, Francisco Romero Salvadó, Spain 1914 – 1918. Between war and revolution (London, 
1999), pp 166-9. E. González Calleja, “Nidos de espías’: los servicios de información franceses en 
España durante la Primera Guerra Mundial’ in Revista de Historia Militar, xlix (2005), pp 179–226. 
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aspect of Spanish-German relations makes it particularly clear that despite neutrality 
Spain was not shielded from the effects of war.  
The debate over neutrality divided Spanish public opinion and what some 
termed a civil war of words ensued, especially amongst Spanish writers and 
intellectuals. While the majority of Spanish intellectuals fell into the pro-Allied camp of 
the Francófilos (or Aliadófilos), some, like the writer Pío Baroja and playwright Jacinto 
Benavente, openly declared their support for Germany and also collaborated with the 
German administration. This public debate between Spain’s supporters of the Allies and 
the Central Powers has already been highlighted in Fernando Diaz-Plaja’s Francófilos y 
Germanófilos. Los Españoles en la guerra Europea and more recently in España en la 
Primera Guerra Mundial. Una movilización cultural by Maximiliano Fuentes Codera.18 
While Diaz-Plaja analyses the divsions within Spanish public opinion without greatly 
considering the impact of the European war as a catalyst for the debates amongst 
Spanish intellectuals, Fuentes Codera positions his investigation within the wider 
framework of cultural mobilisation during the First World War. This approach, rarely 
applied to a neutral state during wartime, will be continued in this investigation by 
looking at the works produced by pro-German Spaniards during the war. How those 
works were utilised by the German administration for the purpose of cultural 
propaganda will add to the findings of Fuentes Codera. The self-mobilisation of Spanish 
intellectuals and writers during World War I also stresses the total aspect of the war and 
shows that, despite Spain’s neutrality, Spaniards were not left unaffected by the process 
of a wider cultural mobilisation in Europe. 
German propagandists used their pro-German writings praising German culture, 
science and social institutions in order to promote a positive image of Germany in Spain 
                                                 
18Also see Gerald Meaker, ‘A civil war of words: the ideological impact of the First World War on Spain, 
1914–18’ in Hans Schmitt (ed.), Neutral Europe between war and revolution 1917–23 (Charlottesville, 
1988), pp 1-56. Paloma Ortiz-de-Urbina, ‘La Primera Guerra Mundial y sus consecuencias: la imagen de 
Alemania en España a partir de 1914’ in Revista de Filología Alemana, xv (2007), pp 193 – 206. 
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and to combat the negative, militaristic portrayal put forward by the Allies. 
Germanophile intellectuals like Baroja and Benavente formed an anomaly amongst 
Spanish supporters of Germany, who were mainly found amongst the conservative 
political circles such as the Carlist Party, the military and the Spanish Catholic Church. 
By analysing the writings of Baroja and Benavente produced during the war, it becomes 
evident that these writers viewed Germany as a model for progression which would rid 
Spain from its backwardness. Other Germanófilos hoped a German victory would 
ensure the maintenance of the status quo and keep modernising forces at bay. By 
promoting a positive image of Spanish culture in Germany, German propagandists 
attracted some Spanish collaborators who felt that Spanish culture had not been 
sufficiently appreciated by Britain and France for example. This aspect of cultural 
propaganda, previously unexplored, adds to our understanding of the complex picture of 
Spanish-German relations during the war and explains how the collaboration of groups 
which should have been opposing each other came about. 
The investigation will begin with an introduction to Spain’s internal situation 
and the tumultuous circumstances the country found itself in at the outbreak of the First 
World War. In order to understand why various often politically opposed groups in 
Spain decided to collaborate with the German administration during the Great War, we 
will firstly have to understand the process of political and social reform which began in 
the nineteenth century, impacting on the privileges of the ruling elite and mobilising 
those previously excluded from power. The Napoleonic invasion of 1808 and the Carlist 
Wars facilitated the growth of the army, while the liberal reformers of the Cortes of 
Cadiz introduced wide-ranging reforms in the Constitution of 1812 which attacked the 
privileges of the land-owning elite and the Catholic Church. A growing anti-clericalism 
throughout the nineteenth century also explains why large sections of the Spanish 
Catholic Church chose not to come to the defence of Catholic Belgium when its 
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neutrality was violated in 1914 but instead opted for siding with Germany. Preventing 
the further growth of liberal ideas associated with the Allies seemed to have been of 
greater importance to the Spanish clergy.  
The army also pursued its own agenda in the aftermath of the defeat to the 
United States in the Spanish-American War of 1898 for which it was largely blamed. 
After the war and the loss of the last overseas colonies, the army, now with a great 
officer surplus, insufficiently equipped and in desperate need for modernisation, began 
to feel alienated from the state due to the public backlash it had to suffer following the 
military defeat in 1898. The last remaining colonial territories in North Africa became 
of great importance to the Spanish army as well as the crown. As we will see in 
Chapters 4 and 5, collaboration between Germany and Spanish military personnel, and 
indeed the Spanish king himself, was motivated by the desire to re-gain some territory 
for the empire. Spain’s weak economic and military position did not allow her to 
negotiate aggressively with France and Britain in colonial matters. Therefore, more 
subversive strategies to restore Spain’s former empire were sought out which Germany 
happily facilitated in an attempt to undermine the Allied war effort.  
The young King Alfonso XIII, who had begun his reign under difficult 
circumstances in 1902 just shortly after the humiliating defeat to the United States, was 
keen to re-establish Spain amongst the greater European powers and restore some of its 
former glory. Alfonso wanted to play an active part especially in diplomatic relations 
and hoped the position of neutrality he maintained throughout the First World War 
would be looked upon favourably after hostilities had ended. However, he was also 
acutely aware that Spain needed to strengthen her army and also extend her colonial 
empire in order to keep up with the development of the great powers. Since those needs 
were not necessarily compatible, Alfonso’s position towards the belligerents was often 
ambivalent, something which will be closer examined in Chapter 4.  
14 
 
With the outbreak of the First World War the various oppositional movements 
that had emerged throughout the nineteenth century were now gathering momentum. 
Chapter 1 will outline the development of the political opposition from Republicans, 
Socialists and Regionalists, as well as the intellectual opposition as represented by the 
Generation of 98. The Canovite system19 that had put an end to military coups and 
introduced some stability in Spanish domestic affairs at the end of the nineteenth 
century was coming under severe pressure from those various oppositional groups in the 
aftermath of the lost Spanish-American War in 1898. Accelarated by the First World 
War, internal political pressure was growing while the economic situation was 
worsening. Against this backdrop Chapter 1 will provide the basis for an understanding 
of the motivation behind Spanish-German collaborations during the war.  
Chapter 2 examines the German propaganda effort in Spain, especially focusing 
on the mobilisation of private residents and their contribution to the war effort. The 
extensive network set up by the German propagandists in Spain not only permeated 
Spain’s publishing world but also reached into Spanish politics. How it was set up and 
organised throughout the war, despite the considerable logistical, financial and political 
difficulties German propagandists faced, will be outlined in this chapter. The German 
propaganda campaign in Spain was a joint endeavor carried out under the supervision of 
the embassy and the Auswärtige Amt but heavily reliant on private enterprises. An 
overview of the main private services as well as all official German propaganda 
institutions in Spain will be given, devoting some special attention to the German news 
service for Spain, a private service run by Barcelona based businessman August Hofer. 
The intermingling of official and private activities often lead to confusion regarding 
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Castillo, referring to the agreed rotation (turno pacífico) in government between the Conservative and 
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who was responsible for what and also expressed itself in quarrels over how much 
authority could be given to privateers.  
In an attempt to overcome the Allied blockade and cope with the loss of 
communication cables, which had been cut at the beginning of the war, German 
propagandists had to employ a lot of ingenuity in order to physically get propaganda 
material into Spain and receive news from Germany. Their work was also hindered by 
Allied pressure on Spain which increased during the war, attempting to keep Spanish 
neutrality benevolent to the Entente. A brief examination of Allied propaganda 
operations in Spain, however, will highlight how the war of words between both 
belligerents merely served to further deepen divisions between Spain’s Francófilos and 
Germanófilos. Relying on their several Spanish supporters, German propagandists 
sought the cooperation of newspaper editors, journalists, writers and intellectuals and 
successfully managed to infiltrate the Spanish publishing world which allowed them to 
influence public opinion in Spain.  
Chapter 3 will examine in detail the confrontation between Spain’s 
Germanófilos and Francófilos and explain how this debate was used by Germany for 
purposes of cultural propaganda. A war of the manifestos which ensued in the Spanish 
press between the supporters of Germany and those of the Allies will serve as the 
backdrop for an analysis of the various arguments brought forward in support for either 
of the belligerents. In order to understand why some prominent Spanish writers and 
artists chose to lend their services to the German propaganda machine, Chapter 3 will 
examine the works produced by those pro-German Spaniards during the war. Since the 
debate between the Germanófilos and Francófilos was part of a wider debate on the 
regeneration of Spain started at the end of the nineteenth century, the views of the 
Spanish Catholic Church, also a supporter of the Central Powers, will be touched upon 
in this chapter as well. While the clergy admired the hierarchical structure of German 
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leadership and saw it as a defender of the monarchy and order, the question of how the 
Spanish Catholic Church justified their support for a Protestant power at an ideological 
level is worth further examination, especially in the light of Franco-Belgian Catholic 
propaganda. This will help to further illustrate how Germany’s support for opposing 
forces within Spain allowed for an increasing instability in the country. 
An analysis of official activities carried out by German diplomats in Spain will 
be given in Chapter 4. Introducing the main protagonists of the German diplomatic 
corps in Madrid and Barcelona, the assessment will particularly focus on the work of 
the embassy at Madrid, which functioned as the nerve centre of all German activity in 
Spain. Similar to the propaganda effort, political and diplomatic work had to be carried 
out with the help of Spanish collaborators. A closer examination of who these 
collaborators were and why they worked with the German administration will reveal 
that, surprisingly, they came for various political backgrounds ranging from 
monarchists, Carlists to Liberals and Republicans. In their pursuit to influence Spanish 
public opinion and ensure an upholding of neutrality, German diplomats often resorted 
to means which breached the rules of diplomacy and threatened to compromise their 
position in Spain as well as damage official relations between both countries.  
The overzealous approach taken by the German ambassador and his men, 
employing bribery, coercion, and not even shying away from covert activity and 
assassination plots, needs to be viewed in the context of Allied economic dominance in 
Spain. The country’s reliance on trade with France and Britain did not permit overtly 
pro-German policies or even an open approximation towards Germany by Spanish 
governments. Therefore, German diplomatic activity tried to ensure an enforcement of 
strict neutrality in order to avoid Spain joining the Allied cause. As the war dragged on, 
this became increasingly difficult, especially with view to Germany’s policy of 
unrestricted submarine warfare and its impact on Spain. The dominant position gained 
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by the German high command during the First World War also affected the work of 
German diplomats in Spain, who had to relegate political needs to military demands.  
This development could also be observed in the growing importance of the role 
of the service attachés throughought the First World War. Their position changed from 
that of advisors to active agents of war. Chapter 5 will provide a closer look at German 
intelligence activity on the Iberian Peninsula and North Africa. Due to geographical 
distance, economic blockade and Allied economic dominance in Spain, Germany could 
not develop close official ties with the country but instead pursued a course of sabotage 
in order to undermine the Allied war effort. The German military and naval attachés 
used the growing dissatisfaction amongst Spanish workers, who did not benefit from the 
country’s wartime boom, to stir up strikes in mines delivering to the Allies and to spread 
pro-neutrality propaganda portraying the Entente as an interventionist force trying to 
drag Spain into the war. Another way of sabotaging the Allied war effort was by 
supporting rebellious tribes in French Morocco, an activity which was largely organised 
from Spain. All files relating to German covert activity in Morocco were destroyed 
immediately after the First World War. The files that did survive, however, show an 
involvement of the German military personnel at Madrid who carried out their 
operations even with the knowledge of King Alfonso XIII. Morocco, the main colonial 
enterprise left for Spain to pursue, also became the source of contention for Spanish 
officers stationed on mainland Spain who had to put up with a worsening of living 
conditions while the introduction of promotion by merit favoured their Africanista 
colleagues. The military juntas, quasi trade unions set up to defend officers’ interests, 
also sought the help of the German administration in Spain, an aspect of German-
Spanish relations which will be explored in Chapter 5 as well.  
In addition, the chapter will provide a detailed overview of the organisational 
structure of the German intelligence services in Spain during the war, showing the 
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extent of the network as well as revealing its participants. As mentioned before, due to 
the exposure of some of Germany’s covert activity in the Spanish press, other 
investigations of Spain during the First World War have highlighted some of those 
espionage scandals and some of the key figures involved. Romero Salvadó, for 
example, details the German embassy’s dealings with anarchists and a collaboration 
with the Barcelona police chief. The Spanish historians involved in above mentioned 
research project ‘Espionaje y relaciones internacionales: los servicios de información 
aliados en España durante la Primera Guerra Mundial’ have also uncovered a number of 
German agents who were active in Spain during the war. But since those investigations 
do not include German archival material and primarily consider the work of the Allied 
intelligence services in Spain, this study can complete the picture of German covert 
activity in the country at the time of the First World War.  
For this investigation the reports produced by military attaché Kalle and naval 
attaché von Krohn have been an invaluable source in reconstructing German activity in 
Spain during the First World War. Although the majority of German army records have 
not survived, vital information relating to Spain can still be found in the diplomatic 
archives of the Auswärtige Amt since the service attachés were officially required to 
send their reports through diplomatic channels via the embassy. The records produced 
by the naval attaché in Spain are held in the military archives of the Bundesarchiv in 
Freiburg which also holds any files relating to Wilhelm Canaris’s activity in Spain 
during the First World War. Thanks to the examination of those records this study can 
provide a detailed overview of the hierarchical structure of the German intelligence 
service in Spain as well as a clear outline of how the key figures of the service 
communicated information. In addition a map has been created, highlighting all German 
naval intelligence centres in Spain in order to show the extent of the network.  
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German activity in Spain during the First World War highlights how the concept 
of total war also extended into neutral territory. This becomes particularly evident in the 
covert operations carried out by the German military personnel stationed on the Iberian 
Peninsula. The disregard German military planners had shown for Belgian neutrality at 
the outbreak of the First World War is also clear to see in Germany’s behaviour towards 
neutral Spain. The country, due to its geostrategic important position and its ability to 
supply the Allied war industries, quickly became a target for the OHL. Neutrality might 
have prevented Spain from sending troops to the frontlines, war, however, entered the 
country nevertheless as is illustrated by Germany’s aggressive behavior towards the 
neutral state. 
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Chapter 1 
Spain in the nineteenth and twentieth century –  
From Disaster to World War 
 
 At the outbreak of the First World War the Spanish constitutional monarchy was 
in crisis. Dissatisfaction with the ruling elite had begun to increase after Spain’s 
disastrous defeat in the Spanish-American War of 1898, which not only resulted in the 
loss of the country’s last overseas colonies, but also made the decline of the former 
European power painfully obvious to all Spaniards. Spain had lost its former glory and 
status; now, a minor player in Europe, it had been surpassed by more developed and 
modern nations like Britain, France and Germany. While demands for reform were 
growing stronger, the ruling elite – which had established a thinly disguised oligarchy 
based on a system of electoral fraud, patronage and bribery – tried to maintain the status 
quo. As the reform movement gathered momentum and groups previously excluded 
from power demanded to have their say in domestic politics, a stable running of the 
country became increasingly difficult. Internal tensions and factional infighting that 
plagued Spain from the end of the nineteenth century would become even greater during 
the war and bring the country close to a revolution. 
 In order to gain a better understanding of Spanish-German relations during the 
First World War, we need firstly to examine Spain’s domestic situation as well as her 
international standing at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth 
century. This will help us to understand what motivated various groups within Spanish 
society and amongst the ruling elite to collaborate actively with the German 
administration during the conflict. It will also shed light on Spanish wartime neutrality 
which, despite avoiding an active military participation, did not shield the country from 
the effects of war. This chapter will begin by tracing back the roots of Spain’s social 
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unrest and demands for reform to the nineteenth century. This time period saw the first 
introduction of liberal reforms in the Constitution of 1812 against the backdrop of 
unrest that was created by the Napoleonic invasion. The dominant position of the 
Spanish Catholic Church was coming under attack and the State frequently had to call 
on the army to deal with disturbances and maintain order. At the end of the nineteenth 
century the Canovite system sought to establish some order after decades of military 
coups and revolutionary overthrows. This period of relative tranquillity, however, was 
shattered with the defeat in the Spanish-American War. 1898 marked not only a military 
failure but also the end of the once great Spanish empire.  
 The debate that was sparked by what became known as El Desastre – The 
Disaster – will form the second part of the chapter. We will look at the reaction from 
intellectuals and their ideas for a regeneration of Spain as well as the challenges posed 
to the regime by regionalism and an emerging republican movement. Changing attitudes 
amongst the military, which became increasingly isolated from Spanish society in the 
aftermath of the Disaster, will also be considered. With the loss of large parts of her 
overseas empire, Spain’s colonial ambitions were almost exclusively focused on 
Morocco. How Spanish foreign policy was tied up in the intense power struggles 
between France, Britain and Germany on the eve of the First World War will form part 
of the discussion in this section of the chapter. The public backlash against any new 
colonial enterprise, which culminated in the Tragic Week of 1909, will lead us into the 
third part of our analysis, which focuses on Spain’s situation during the First World War. 
 Although Spain remained neutral throughout the entire duration of the war, 
neutrality was a hotly debated issue in Spanish society. How the conflict between 
Germanófilos and Francófilos developed and what arguments were brought forward for 
and against entering the war will be discussed. Spain’s wartime neutrality will also be 
put into context with the position of neutrals during the First World War in general. 
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Many neutrals found it impossible to maintain a completely impartial neutrality and 
were pressured from both warring parties either to join the war on their side or show a 
benevolent neutrality towards them. In Spain the debate regarding neutrality highlights 
an increasing instability of the country’s domestic situation during the First World 
which could not be halted by various governments. How the different governments tried 
to deal with an ensuing economic crisis, worsening living conditions and an attempt at a 
revolutionary overthrow in the summer of 1917 will also be outlined.  
 
Challenges to the established order 
 
 The demand for social and political change that came to the fore during the 
period of the First World War had its origin in the previous century. In nineteenth 
century Spain we can observe numerous attempts to introduce liberal reforms which, 
however, were often hampered by the country’s social and economic under-
development as well as a highly unstable political situation. Spain’s crisis arguably 
began with the French invasion of 1808, which was followed by prolonged periods of 
civil war and revolution. Against this backdrop the liberal reformers of the Cortes of 
Cadiz tried to create a new, modern Spain. However, their ideas were not shared or 
understood by the majority of Spaniards.1 Some of the reforms though, such as the ones 
introduced in the Constitution of 1812, were the source of inspiration for liberal 
reformers across the globe.2 That document created a constitutional monarchy which not 
only limited the powers of the Crown but also established civil rights, personal liberties, 
freedom of trade and industry and a separation of powers.3 The constitution also 
attempted to introduce property rights based on contracts by abolishing seigniorial 
                                                 
1Raymond Carr, Spain 1808 – 1939 (Oxford, 1966), pp 94-5. 
2Stanley Payne, The collapse of the Spanish Republic, 1933 – 1936. Origins of the Civil War (Yale, 2006), 
pp 1-2,  
3Isabel Burdiel, ‘Myths of failure, myths of success: New perspectives on nineteenth-century Spanish 
liberalism’ in The Journal of Modern History, lxx, no. 4 (1998), pp 892-912. 
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jurisdictions.4 Such wide-ranging changes to the foundations of the State were met with 
internal opposition while in the Spanish colonies the breakdown of authority in Spain 
gave way to a creole revolution eventually leading to the loss of the empire which, as 
Raymond Carr states, was the main consequence of the crisis of 1808.5 The War of 
Independence, as Spaniards referred to the struggle against Napoleon, fuelled Spain’s 
liberal reformers, who singled out the Catholic Church which they blamed for the 
country’s backwardness – a clash between Catholicism and liberalism was emerging.6 
 As already stated, the reforms attacking the foundations of Spanish society often 
created great internal strife and contained potential for even further conflict. In 
particular, the Spanish Catholic Church experienced an attack on its dominant position 
and ecclesiastical reforms introduced at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
attempted to limit the Church’s influence. With the Napoleonic invasion came the 
abolition of the Inquisition and the suppression of religious orders. While affirming 
Catholicism as ‘the only true religion’ of the Spanish nation, article 12 of the 
Constitution of 1812 also stated that the nation would protect religion through ‘wise and 
just laws’. This was interpreted by some as giving the Cortes a legal basis for enacting 
changes in the Church and implementing reforms.7  
 The absolutist regime installed by a military coup d’état in 1814 gave the Church 
a brief respite and allowed for the removal of priests who had supported ecclesiastical 
reforms. But this only produced further resentment against the hierarchy.8 As political 
upheaval continued in Spain, another liberal revolution in 1820 resulted in a further 
drifting apart between state and religion. Although the Constitution of 1812 had 
advocated a cooperation between constitution and altar, more extreme liberal groups 
                                                 
4Raymond Carr, Spain 1808 – 1975 (Oxford, 1982), p. 100. 
5Ibid., p.101; p. 105. 
6Ibid., p. 116. 
7William J. Callahan, ‘Church and State, 1808-1874’ in José Alvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert (eds), 
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(known as the exaltados), who had gained power by mid-1821, favoured a state-
imposed introduction of ecclesiastical reforms. To pay off the national debt, the property 
of religious orders, more than 800 monasteries and friaries, was sold.9 Between 1820 
and 1823 the Cortes passed legislation which allowed for the suppression of religious 
orders such as the Jesuits, the Benedictines and the Cistercians. The Franciscans and 
Dominicans experienced a reduction in their personnel as well as in the number of their 
houses.10 The reforms introduced in that period were largely rejected by the Church and 
in some regions priests evenly actively fought against them. The State, on the other 
hand, was willing to resort to physical force in order to enact the envisaged reforms. 
After the restoration of Ferdinand VII to the throne in 1823, most of the liberal 
ecclesiastical legislation was annulled, although the Inquisition was not reinstated. The 
Church was now able to return to its traditional organisation as well as recover its 
privileges and wealth.11  
 With the death of Ferdinand VII in 1833, however, changes to the institutional 
foundations of the Church could no longer be halted. Political conditions in Spain also 
created a climate of hostility towards the Church which exploded in the 1830s and saw 
violent attacks on religious orders in 1834 and 1835 in Madrid, Zaragoza and 
Barcelona. The worsening of economic conditions in the cities had brought on a 
political radicalisation of the urban population which resented the religious orders for 
their defence of absolutism. Many monks and friars fled their residences when 
confronted with public outbursts of violence directed towards them.12  
 The selling off of Church land continued until late 1830 and a decree in October 
1835 abolished male regulars. In 1843 the tithe was replaced by a state salary which was 
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paid to bishops and parish priests.13 Reforms went even further suggesting the creation 
of a national Church and a limited contact between the papacy and the Spanish Catholic 
Church. Such wide-ranging steps, though, were not taken and an agreement with Rome 
was reached only in the Concordat of 1851, which stipulated that any changes to the 
traditional organisation of the Spanish Catholic Church had to be agreed with the 
Vatican. The government ensured financial support for the clergy and accepted the 
restoration of some male religious orders. Most importantly, the Concordat outlined that 
the State could not implement or promote any religious reforms.14 It also proved that the 
Church was still an important power player in Spain, one whose support was required 
for the running of the State.15 The Church’s role in late nineteenth century Spain was 
particularly dominant in the education system as well as in the welfare sector. Nuns, 
monks and friars worked in schools, poorhouses and hospitals as well as welfare and 
charitable organisations.16  
 Another important institution, and one of the country’s main power brokers that 
underwent profound structural changes as a consequence of the French invasion and the 
War of Independence, was the Spanish army. The need to bolster the army to counter 
Napoleon’s attack led to an increase in its size by the integration of volunteer guerrilla 
forces. While the officer corps had been a reserve of the aristocracy, this changed after 
1808 with the admittance of volunteers from various social classes. Promotion through 
merit rather than rank and seniority also created divisions within the army between 
those newcomers, who had benefited from reforms and were therefore more favourable 
towards liberalism, and those aristocratic officers who remained loyal to the monarchy.  
 The Constitution of 1812 had given the king, as commander in chief, the right to 
declare war and confer ranks while the Cortes was responsible for passing legislation 
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regarding discipline, promotions, salaries and training in the army. Leaving military 
matters in the hands of politicians was another contentious issue between the army and 
the emerging new State.17 To defend their own interests, officers were now willing to 
take action against the State and joined forces with political powers who they hoped 
would be able to bring about political changes favourable to the position of the army. 
The military uprising, the pronunciamiento, became a prominent feature of nineteenth 
century Spain from 1820 onward.18 The liberal regime, on the other hand, lacking 
popular support in the countryside and being divided into more moderate and extreme 
factions, became increasingly reliant on military power to secure and strengthen its 
position against internal enemies.19 Throughout the nineteenth century the role of the 
Spanish army was largely reduced to dealing with internal disturbances and maintaining 
domestic order.20  
 The First Carlist War from 1833 to 1839 established the army as a political 
arbiter in Spain. The country’s subsequent political instability allowed the army to 
cement its position as a power-broker. In the period from 1840 to 1868 Spain was 
almost exclusively governed by generals.21 As reaction to any opposition or public 
disorder a state of martial law was frequently declared.22 The army continued to 
increase in size due to ongoing civil strife and war in the nineteenth century and 
throughout the 1860s and 1870s it acted as an autonomous pressure group. Expansion in 
personnel meant military budgets were mainly spent on paying officers’ salaries instead 
of investing in modernising equipment and training,23 which resulted in a 
technologically under-developed army with a large officer surplus. After a short-lived 
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Republican experiment in 1873, the Bourbon monarchy was restored, thanks to the 
military coup of Martínez Campos in December 1874, and the responsibility for the 
restoration government was handed over to Cánovas del Castillo who attempted to 
introduce some stability. 
 The functioning of the government in late nineteenth century Spain was 
facilitated by the so-called turno pacífico. Presided over by the king, two dynastic 
parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, agreed to rotate in government. In order to 
achieve political stability and guarantee the seamless functioning of the turno, the party 
chosen to form a government needed to know in advance if it would have a sufficient 
majority in parliament, and equally, the party resigning from government needed 
assurance that that was only a temporary measure. To achieve this, the political system 
relied on electoral manipulation.24  
Although Cánovas put an end to the military pronunciamento, he failed to 
remove the army from Spanish politics altogether. He often resorted to the appointment 
of generals as prime ministers since disagreements within the Conservative Party did 
not allow him to stay in office continuously. With the approval of Cánovas the king 
appointed his favourite generals, which appeased the quarrelling sections amongst the 
Conservatives and left the often politically inexperienced generals to shoulder the blame 
for any administrative changes.25 Unable to resolve their disagreements, the political 
regime resorted to using generals by putting them in charge of transition governments 
no politician was able or wanted to preside over. As a result of this tactic, some political 
generals left the Conservative Party to join the Liberals.26 At the same time the regime 
continued to employ the army in times of public unrest and political leaders became 
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increasingly convinced of the army’s vital role in maintaining order.27 Due to the army’s 
indispensable part in repressing mounting class struggle at the end of the nineteenth and 
beginning of the twentieth century, the regime avoided any confrontation with the 
military leadership and tried to keep generals on its side through promotions, senate 
memberships as well as political and financial rewards.28  
 At local level the turno system relied on the caciques, or power-brokers, who 
managed affairs primarily by pursuing their own interests, promoting their friends and 
keeping down their enemies. Caciquismo created a political culture which was 
dominated by personal interest and lacked in a development of political ideas based on 
long-term goals and objectives. Some have argued caciquismo transformed the 
constitutional Spanish monarchy into an oligarchy, others have argued it provided a 
necessary link between an indifferent electorate and the politicians, the only link 
between the countryside and the city, the people and the State.29 The focus on short-
term, personal gain meant that political parties were lacking a coherent ideology and 
were often seen as loose alliances.30 Alvarez Junco has described the political parties of 
the Restoration period as associations or clubs which were inactive over long periods of 
time and only galvanised themselves during elections. Ideological matters only received 
little attention and the focus was often on immediate political matters only.31  
 Despite Spain being a constitutional monarchy since 1875, with a legally 
established democratic system that granted universal male suffrage, actual power was 
held by the governing elite and privileged groups like landowners, bankers and 
industrialists. The Canovite system, however, operated successfully and without facing 
major opposition from the 1870s to the 1890s. This was largely enabled by an 
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underdeveloped Spanish society. High levels of illiteracy, as well as poor transport and 
communication links, led to an apathetic and demobilised population. The governing 
parties made no serious effort to appeal to the masses and instead represented only the 
interests of the small elite which controlled political life. There was no major distinction 
in the political agenda of both parties, although it can be said that the Conservatives 
stressed their clericalism while the Liberals emphasised the defence of civil liberties. 
The political opposition did not pose any serious threat to the regime, which also 
benefited from a relatively stable economy. 
 This temporary period of calm in Spanish politics was to be threatened by events 
in Spain’s overseas colonies which began to demand independence at the end of the 
nineteenth century. The great political instability and conflict caused by the breakdown 
of the ancien régime and the country's transition to a modernised, liberal state and 
society, also resulted in Spain’s decline as a colonial power. The great Spanish empire of 
the early modern period had been lost to a large extent by 1825. Civil wars, military 
uprisings and revolutions did not permit a stable foreign policy and with a focus on 
internal problems colonial interests were not sufficiently addressed.32 Spanish colonial 
expansion was particularly rivalled by growing British economic and naval power. The 
loss of Gibraltar to Great Britain in 1704 and the recovery of the territory by Spain 
would occupy Spanish diplomats for centuries to come. Franco-Spanish alliances were 
rendered null and void after the French Revolution and the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, 
which resulted in an almost complete destruction of the Spanish navy. This made it 
impossible to defend a widespread overseas empire.33 By 1825, with the exception of 
Cuba and Puerto Rico, all of Spain’s American colonies had achieved political 
independence.  
                                                 
32Enrique Moradiellos, ‘Spain in the world. From great empire to minor European power’ in José Alvarez 
Junco & Adrian Shubert (eds), Spanish history since 1808 (London, 2000), pp 111-20. 
33Ibid. 
30 
 
 Spain’s slow process of modernisation also resulted in the country being side 
lined in international politics. Industrialisation had not advanced as quickly as in other 
European countries, making her a less attractive partner for alliances with the greater 
powers. The preoccupation with domestic affairs, as well as the country’s 
underdevelopment, also prevented the adoption of strong foreign policies.34 While 
towards the end of the nineteenth century the Great Powers were pursuing their 
imperialist ambitions, smaller powers had to abandon their plans of expansion and in 
the case of Spain, were facing increasing difficulties to hang on to their old colonies.35 A 
struggle for independence in the Spanish colony of Cuba first broke out in 1868 and 
developed into a ten-year war between the Spanish army and Cuban insurgents. Though 
the Spanish army managed to contain the uprising temporarily, a final insurrection 
broke out in 1895 and led to the intervention of the United States in the conflict. The 
Spanish government, which treated colonial matters as a domestic issue, ultimately 
failed to respond effectively to tensions arising in the colonies.36 In 1898 the Spanish 
army and navy were defeated and Spain lost her colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam 
and the Philippines to the United States.  
 Although the Spanish-American War became known in Spain as the Disaster, it 
did not have any immediate political consequences or usher in an era of economic 
depression and financial crisis. With the repatriation of colonial capital and the expenses 
and insecurities brought on by the war now gone, Spain was able to join the wave of 
expansion other European countries had begun to experience in the mid-1890s. Some 
regions of Spain even saw great industrial growth. Asturias and the Basque country 
especially benefited from a rise in exports and the repatriation of colonial capital which 
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led to an increase in investment.37 The end of the Spanish-American War allowed the 
Spanish government to set up economic reforms that promoted technical change.38 
 However, as Pamela Radcliff assessed, the Spanish-American War certainly 
caused a crisis of confidence and marked the beginning of a challenge to the established 
hierarchy and authority.39 While large sections of Spanish society had supported the 
country’s effort in Cuba in a display of patriotism, in the face of defeat that attitude 
change dramatically and was expressed in disaffection and a mobilisation against the 
government and established powers. The bad state of the returning troops as well as the 
government’s plans to recover the war debt in a short period of time were met with 
consternation.40 Equally the Spanish Catholic Church was viewed as culprit in the 
colonial conflict and criticised for attempting to increase its control over Spain’s 
political and social life.41 Not only did the war cause a loss in confidence in the regime, 
it also deeply affected the national consciousness.42 It brought a stark end to the illusion 
that Spain was still a great imperial power which stood apart from other nations.43 
Alvarez Junco assessed that Spain had become a third rate power long before the 
Spanish-American War during the reign of Ferdinand VII when the vast majority of the 
American empire had been lost. The defeat in 1898 simply exposed the rhetoric of 
imperial grandeur.44 In an era where the possession of colonies was viewed as a sign of 
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a strong nation,45 the loss of its last overseas colonies severely undermined Spanish 
national identity.  
 In the aftermath of the Disaster various ideas to reform Spanish politics were 
gaining support and dissent against the corruption of the Restoration system was 
growing. Although criticism had been voiced before the war, the discussion on reasons 
for Spain’s decline and the search for ways of reforming the country became more 
urgent after the loss of the colonies. Not so much the defeat itself but the way in which 
Spain’s military inferiority had been exposed was what was especially humiliating and 
in turn led to a debate amongst Spanish intellectuals regarding what they considered 
Spanish decadence.46 Educated middle-class reformers, some of whom had studied in 
Germany, formed the group that would be referred to as the Generation of 98. The 
cacique system of patronage had excluded the middle classes from political 
participation and, as well as that, denied them any privileges. But at the beginning of the 
twentieth century they were seen as the group that would initiate change in Spain. 
Regenerationism, as the reform movement became known as, envisaged a 
‘Europeanisation’ of Spain following the examples of Britain, France and Germany.47  
 Amongst their most prominent protagonists of the Generation of 98 were Miguel 
de Unamuno, Joaquín Costa, Ramón del Valle-Inclán, Pío Baroja, José Martínez Ruiz – 
better known under his pseudonym Azorín, Antonio and Manuel Machado, Ramón 
Pérez de Ayala, José Ortega y Gasset, Ángel Ganivet and Ramiro de Maeztu. According 
to Donald Shaw, Spain was in a state of ideological disorder by the time of the 1880s.48 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the Generación del 98 was not a uniform group which 
produced a coherent set of ideologies or ideas outlining practical guidelines for Spain’s 
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regeneration, but rather a loose collective of thinkers who prioritised the spiritual 
reformation of the country above everything else.49 The name, Generation of 98, was 
coined by Azorín in 1913, but not all members of the group used that title or referred to 
themselves as part of a larger intellectual movement.50  
 This cultural response to the Disaster, however, was not unique to Spain and can 
be seen as being part of a wider European trend at the end of the nineteenth and the 
beginning of the twentieth centuries which saw a stronger engagement of intellectuals in 
public debates.51 Therefore, it can be said that in Spain the Disaster merely served as a 
catalyst for a reformist movement which already had begun in the first half of the 
nineteenth century with the introduction of liberal legislation in 1812. In their search for 
a new national identity, the intellectuals of the Generation of 98 were influenced by 
German philosophers such as Hegel, Krause, Nietzsche and Schopenhauer.52  
 Krausism especially had been very popular in Spain from the second half of the 
nineteenth century. During the revolutionary period of 1868 to 1873, freedom of the 
press and opinion facilitated a climate of open-mindedness which led to the importation 
of new ideas to Spain.53 Krausist philosophy mainly advocated a freedom of conscience 
and investigation, choosing tolerance over doctrine and reason over dogma. Its ideas 
were based in religion and a Christian rationalism which was expressed in a liberal 
political attitude that rejected and condemned any form of violence and injustice and 
instead sought to establish a society in which all individuals and groups lived together 
harmoniously. In Spain Krausism was seen as a way of life and a way of reforming 
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Spanish culture, customs and Spanish society in general. This reformation was to be 
achieved by firstly transforming the individual. Given this approach to societal change it 
is not surprising that Krausism evolved towards a pedagogical movement which 
attempted to established social and educational reforms.54  
 Education in Spain, firmly in the hands of the Church, first received new 
impulses with the establishment of the Institución Libre de Enseñanza (Free educational 
institution), founded in 1876 by Francisco Giner de los Rios. Giner de los Rios was also 
influenced by Krausism and his schools operated independently from the State and 
Church. Indeed, most reformers saw education as the main tool to regenerate Spanish 
society and facilitate progress. The anti-clericalism of the liberal intellectual reformers 
was not as much directed towards the political and economic power of the Spanish 
Catholic Church as towards the Church’s ethical and ideological role which, as they saw 
it, obscured the path of Spain’s historical progress.55 The practices of the Church were 
also attacked in the Ateneo, a cultural institution for Spanish intellectuals, in which the 
influence of Krausism and positivism were felt at the turn of century. At the end of the 
nineteenth century, after the Spanish-American War, the Ateneo became an important 
centre for generating public opinion regarding the country’s regeneration.56 
 The Spanish intellectuals of the Generation of 98 were questioning the status 
quo by opposing the political system as well as the Church, but mostly criticised the 
unreflective, apathetic attitude of the Restoration society.57 Although Spain was facing 
very real problems after 1898, such as poverty, economic under-development, social 
injustice, political corruption, regional separatism, inadequate education and a lack of 
investment, the intellectuals of the Generation of 98 saw the origin of those problems in 
a crisis of ideas and individual – as well as national – beliefs. Their conviction was that 
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a change in people’s attitudes had to occur before a change of social and economic 
circumstances.58 Spanish decadence, as Azorín remarked in 1912, was the result of 
several wars, a general aversion to work, an abandonment of the land and a lack of 
intellectual curiosity. For Azorín everything bad originated in the absence of critical 
thinking and analysis.59 Republican politician Manuel Azaña was equally damning in 
his assessment of Spanish attitudes in 1911. Addressing the ‘Spanish problem’, Azaña 
accused his countrymen of having no belief in themselves or in Spain’s destiny, but only 
believing in their own misery.60 Faced with a humiliating defeat in 1898, such 
pessimistic voices were not uncommon. Some saw the reason for the colonial failure in 
the Spanish race which, they argued, was lacking a capacity to adapt to modern 
civilisation and showed indifference towards science and learning. Regenerationism, 
however, had a more positive outlook overall and hoped to achieve a transformation of 
the country through the introduction of educational and cultural reforms.61  
 However, Regenerationism was not a uniform movement with a coherent set of 
ideas on how to reform the State. While some, like conservative politician Antonio 
Maura, advocated a revolution from above, others like socialists, anarchists, republicans 
and Catalan nationalists, were in favour of more radical action which sought to break 
the dominance of the turno parties and allow a wider political participation.62 During his 
‘long government’, between 1907 to 1909, Maura failed to introduce wide-ranging 
social, economic, administrative and political reforms which he had hoped would avoid 
a revolution from below. The long-term reform programme was to be implemented by 
parliamentary means and required breaking the cacique system. Maura identified 
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political corruption as embodied by caciquismo as Spain’s main evil.63 Similarly, 
Manuel Azaña argued that the greedy fiscal policies of the State only served to crush the 
weakest in society, leading to poverty and emigration. For him the country’s economic 
problems stemmed from an inadequate exploitation of its natural resources. Like many 
other reformers of the time he was convinced a focus on education was the only way to 
allow Spain to catch up with the development of other European nations. The existing 
education system, according to Azaña, had only contributed to disorder and confusion 
rather than producing able reformers.64   
 In truth, some educational reforms were introduced in the first decade of the 
twentieth century. In 1900 the Ministry for Public Instruction and Fine Arts was created, 
initially led by members or sympathisers of the Institución libre de la enseñanza.65 In 
1907 the Committee for the expansion of scientific studies and investigations (Junta de 
Ampliación de Estudios e Investigaciones Cientificas), presided over by Santiago 
Ramón y Cajal, was founded and in 1910 the Centre for Historical Studies was 
established, especially improving university education.66 In 1900 the government 
included the costs for primary education and teachers’ pay in the budget and a year later 
a new curriculum for primary education was introduced.67 Although these reforms had 
an effect on the country’s illiteracy numbers, figures overall still remained high. 
Analphabetism in the last twenty-five years of the nineteenth century was reduced from 
67% to 55%. By 1920 that number was further reduced to 39% owing to the educational 
reforms introduced in the wake of the Disaster.68  
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 Despite a lively debate, not much actual progress was made in terms of political 
and social reforms. Writer Pío Baroja was particularly damning in his assessment on the 
impact of the Generación del 98 when he said that it had no influence in Spain 
whatsoever.69 Antonio Maura, one of the most important Regeneration politicians, also 
failed in his attempt to integrate the masses into politics.70  
 While the process of modernisation accelerated in some parts of Spain from 
1890 onwards, other regions remained under-developed, which was also a reason for the 
political instability Spain was facing at the beginning of the twentieth century. The 
uneven distribution of what social and economic change took place led to the creation of 
a gap between the modernised and the less developed areas of Spain, which also 
hindered political stability.71 The established ruling order began to crumble and protests 
that had already existed before the Disaster were now gaining in strength. Regionalist 
tendencies in the Basque Country and in Catalonia were coming to the forefront and 
gathering momentum.72 Spain’s imperialist ambitions had held the various regions 
together and colonial expansion provided a common goal. The loss of the last overseas 
colonies, however, called national unity into question.73 Catalonia was greatly affected 
by the loss of the colonies; Cuba in particular had been a market for Catalan textile 
goods. In the aftermath of the Disaster the dominance of the dynastic parties in this 
region was in decline and Regionalists as well as Republicans were taking charge of 
Catalan politics.74 
 To the Catalans the Spanish-American War had highlighted the regime’s 
inability to defend the interests of the region and they were beginning to stress the 
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difference of their national identity to that of Castile.75 According to the Catalan 
movement, Catalonia’s (as well as Spain’s) future depended on a change in political 
structures. At the general elections in May 1901 a new Catalan party, the Lliga 
Regionalista, presented itself to the electorate for the first time. The Lliga brought 
together leading representatives of Catalan industry as well as former members of the 
Unió Catalanista, a federation of different Catalan associations. Mainly representing the 
moderate and conservative Catalan middle class, the Lliga’s aim was to gain autonomy 
for Catalonia rather than establishing a separate state.76 Although the Lliga gained in 
popularity and was politically represented in Barcelona, it did not appeal to the working 
classes, who saw Catalanism as a bourgeois and clerical movement.77 Despite their 
shared criticism of the regime and similar ideas for reforming the country, Catalans and 
Republicans failed to come together at the beginning of the twentieth century. As 
Sebastian Balfour argues, this was mainly due to the dominance of class issues 
prevalent in the two movements.78  
 Opposition towards the regime from the emerging Republican movement was 
also directed against the Church which, together with the monarchy, was seen as the 
reason for Spain’s under-development. According to the Republicans, a modern and 
democratic Spain could only be established along secular lines in a society where its 
citizens were able to take part in the democratic process, undermining the dominance of 
the traditional elites.79 At the end of the nineteenth century anti-clericalism was what 
propelled the Republican movement into Spanish politics and initiated an attack on the 
Church hitherto unseen. Populist Republicans such as Vicente Blasco Ibáñez and 
Alejandro Lerroux seized the moment to establish Republicanism as a political force in 
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Spain. This was facilitated by a new electoral law in 1890 and a rising urban working 
class which was outside the sphere of control of the cacique system.80  
 The Republican movement, which greatly benefited from the popular discontent 
created by the Disaster, was represented by Republicans and Socialists. As outlined 
before, the Republicans were already gaining a foothold in Catalan politics and together 
with the Lliga challenged the dominance of the dynastic parties. The Republican Party, 
however, did not present a united front and was divided by various ideological 
groupings. With the end of the First Spanish Republic in 1874 the Republicans had split 
into a number of parties and, as a result, they did not present a united political 
opposition. Local leaders, like Alejandro Lerroux in Barcelona, who formed and led the 
Radical Republican Party in 1908, sought to reform the movement.81 
Joining with the Socialists in 1909 further split the party and radical Republicans 
like Alejandro Lerroux were gaining the upper hand within the labour movement.82 The 
Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) and its trade union, the Unión General de Trabajadores 
(UGT), advocated Marxist ideas and had their followers in the areas of Castile, Asturias 
and the Basque Country. Another current within the labour movement was Anarcho-
Syndicalism, dominant in Catalonia, Levante and Andalusia.83 This movement was 
represented in the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT) formed in October 1910. 
Although the moderate Syndicalists were the dominant force within the organisation, 
the CNT remained more militant than the UGT, favouring direct action and rejecting 
parliamentarian politics.84 Due to its internal divisions the Republican-Socialist 
movement did not yet pose a serious challenge to the Restoration system. Although the 
Catalan regionalists were gaining in influence, they were also too weak to implement 
lasting changes.  
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 A third oppositional force arising after the Spanish-American War was the army, 
which, as has been shown, had been a dominant power in nineteenth century Spain. 
Although the turno system had replaced the army as a catalyst for political change, the 
military still played a vital part in maintaining order in times of growing public unrest.85 
However, the army’s political influence was declining after 1898 and officers were left 
disillusioned when blamed for the defeat in the Spanish-American War. Although 
initially after the war, between July 1898 and February 1899, press censorship was 
imposed to ensure a respectful treatment of the military in the aftermath of the 
humiliating defeat, it was not until long though before the heated debates in the Cortes 
became public.86 Being largely made responsible for the loss of the colonies by Spain’s 
political elite directly contributed to a feeling of discrimination and offence amongst the 
military.87 It also led to the development of anti-militarist feelings within Spanish 
society and a distant and dismissive attitude towards the country’s armed forces, 
particularly from the intellectuals.88  
 In addition, the Disaster revealed structural problems in Spain’s armed forces. 
Although reforms were attempted, the Spanish army remained poorly trained, inefficient 
and over-staffed. The same was true for the navy, which had lost most of its capital 
ships at the hands of superior US forces.89 Investment in arms and equipment was seen 
as a first priority by the officer class. Although high-ranking officers enjoyed generous 
pay, lower ranking officers such as lieutenants had to content with a far smaller 
income.90 The average salary of a lieutenant was not sufficient enough to support a 
family and with the re-introduction of promotion by merit in 1910 the only way of 
accelerated progression was by volunteering for service in Morocco. At home the ruling 
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regime, in the absence of an adequate police force, still relied on the military to defend 
it against growing agitation from workers, regionalists and other political opponents.91  
 Above army internal issues, the military was also concerned with the state of 
Spanish domestic politics in general and increasingly viewed itself as the only 
institution capable of reforming the country. Its confidence in the regime had been 
shattered with the defeat in 1898, for which officers blamed the government. The 
challenges posed to the social and economic structures of the State by the working class 
and regionalist movements were viewed as a great threat.92 While becoming 
increasingly isolated from the rest of Spanish society, the army became a defender of 
the monarchy rather than the regime.93  
 While the need for reforming Spanish society was evident, there was an 
uncertainty as to which group had the competency to bring about the necessary changes. 
Faith in the governing elite had been considerably damaged and it was doubtful whether 
those in power were able and willing to implement essential reforms. The newly formed 
government of Prime Minister Francisco Silvela was therefore facing a great challenge 
in March 1899. Like his successor Maura, Silvela embarked on a conservative reform 
programme attempting to exact a revolution from above. The two men sought to reform 
local government and remove caciquismo.94 Silvela’s finance minister, Raimundo 
Fernandez Villaverde, focused his attention on correcting the increased reliance on 
indirect taxation by introducing taxes on salaries, shares and net company profits. Cuts 
in public expenditure were not welcomed by the military, which hoped for renewed 
investment in the Spanish army. By raising taxes, Villaverde had also angered 
businessmen and large parts of the middle classes who reacted with violent protests, 
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leading to shop closures and refusal to pay taxes in many parts of Spain.95 Having lost 
the support of the middle classes, as well as having failed to restore order and stability, 
Silvela resigned from politics in October 1903. He was succeeded by Antonio Maura, 
who had been minister of the interior in Silvela’s government. Under Maura Spanish 
domestic politics were becoming even more strained and the Liberals, who did not 
believe Maura would break with the old oligarchical rule, aligned themselves with the 
Republicans.96 
 
Spain’s international position before and during the First World War 
 
 While the tense domestic situation remained the main focus of the government, 
foreign policy, even though not dominant, still featured in Spanish politics. Spain’s 
isolationist position was seen as a contributing factor in the loss of the country’s last 
overseas colonies.97 Subsequent governments therefore sought to remedy the 
shortcomings of international policy in the hope of regaining some territory and to 
secure mainland Spain. Expansion of the Spanish protectorate of Morocco was seen by 
many as the last opportunity to add a substantial colony to the former empire. As the 
Count Romanones later stated, ‘Morocco was for Spain her last chance to keep her 
position in the concert of Europe.’98  
 Despite the loss of colonies and the country’s declining importance amongst the 
world powers, Spain, due to its geo-strategically advantageous situation, still had a role 
to play in the imperialist expansion plans of the Western countries. Spanish activity in 
Morocco intensified after 1898 but depended heavily on France and Britain, which also 
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had an interest in the country.99 Spain’s military weakness did not allow for the 
development of an aggressive colonial strategy and therefore she had to be content with 
what the greater powers left her. The treaty of 1898 was seen as a humiliation and a 
disaster for Spain, essentially furthering the slow breakup of the Spanish colonial 
empire.100 The Spanish-American War was also part of an increased colonial expansion 
of the greater powers which had begun in the 1870s. Established colonial empires like 
Britain and France had to compete with the interests of new powers such as the United 
States, Germany and Japan. In this intense climate of competition Africa in particular 
became the focus of European colonial aspirations. Smaller nations like Spain, Italy and 
Portugal were often drawing the shorter straw when it came to the distribution of 
territories.  
 Morocco, situated at the entrance and exit to and from the Mediterranean, held 
an important strategic position. For the British it was vital to limit French influence in 
North Africa in order to protect Gibraltar and not lose control of the Straits. Therefore 
Spain’s colonial ambitions in the region were useful to British foreign policy since they 
prevented French dominance over the area. France, on the other hand, was keen to 
extend her sphere of influence in order to fight off Germany’s commercial interests in 
North-West Africa. In the Entente Cordiale of 1904 between France and Great Britain, 
French and Spanish influence in Morocco was marked out respectively after France had 
to give way to English pressure which insisted on a Spanish presence in the area. Given 
Spain’s difficulties in their former colonies Cuba and the Philippines, France was not 
convinced Spain would be able to administer a Moroccan protectorate effectively.101 
However, Spain’s interests in Morocco were recognised and formalised in a subsequent 
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treaty in October 1904. The territory Spain was granted amounted to 20% of the whole 
of Morocco.  
 As Sebastian Balfour has argued, a Spanish presence in North Africa also 
ensured that neither France nor Britain possessed direct control over the Straits of 
Gibraltar, which also suited Germany. Berlin now began to show an interest in Spain in 
an attempt to undermine the Entente Cordiale.102 German diplomats, who had kept a 
close eye on Franco-Spanish negotiations over Morocco, assessed that a Spanish 
withdrawal from North Africa would quite possibly lead to a breakdown of the 
monarchy and usher in a republic in Spain. In the event of this happening, they also 
feared that Italy would soon follow suit which would bolster France’s position in the 
south of Europe. This scenario was not advantageous for Germany and therefore 
German diplomats wished for the southern entrance to the Mediterranean to be under 
Spanish rather than French control.103 Germany began to present herself as a defender of 
Spanish interests as could be seen in the Kaiser’s 1904 visit to Vigo, where he met King 
Alfonso XIII.104  
 The young king had just taken over the throne in 1902 at the age of only 16. His 
mother, Maria Christina of Austria, had acted as regent until then. When handing over 
power to her son the queen was hopeful that the difficult times had been overcome and a 
new era of tranquillity was lying ahead of Spain.105 This, however, was far from the 
truth and Alfonso’s reign was made difficult not only by the onset of a world war but 
also by increasing domestic instability which threatened to undermine his rule. The 
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young king had enjoyed a military education and often intervened directly in military 
matters as well as showing initiative in the country’s external affairs. Although his 
interventions were not as far-reaching as those of Wilhelm II or the Russian tsar, they 
were not always unproblematic. While Alfonso often did not wish to seek the approval 
of his ministers in military appointments, his interventions usually fell in line with the 
general policies of the State when it came to international matters.106 The king took on a 
very active role not only in the conception of external policies but also in carrying out 
these policies, assuming the role of a diplomat and ambassador for the Spanish state. He 
frequently negotiated directly with foreign representatives over the details of trade 
agreements and other treaties.107 The meeting between the Kaiser and Alfonso XIII in 
1904 was not welcomed by all of Spain’s political elite. A divide, which was to widen 
during the First World War, was already emerging between those advocating a closer 
alliance with Germany and those favouring the Entente Cordiale.  
 Although Spain did not play a major part in Germany’s foreign policy at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the Spanish-American War raised German attention 
to Spain’s plight since a redistribution of colonies had an impact on global power 
balances. The German government stayed neutral during the conflict, but German 
public opinion was sympathetic with the Spanish cause.108 As a monarchy with an 
oligarchical rule that favoured traditional values, Spain might have seemed more 
familiar to Germans rather than the progressive democratic system of the newly 
emerging power, the United States. The late nineteenth century also saw an expansion of 
German activity on the world market; this included, by extension, the establishment of 
German companies in Spain. Electro technical companies like AEG and Siemens-
Schuckert-Werke not only founded subsidiaries in Spain but also played a substantial 
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part in building up the electricity supply of the major Spanish towns. Krupp Werke 
supplied the Spanish army with canons and facilitated mining.109  
 In addition to German economic activity in Spain prior to the First World War, a 
German community existed that established various organisations and institutions which 
served to keep it together and maintain a cultural identity abroad. Some of the 
community’s emblematic institutions, such as the German schools, also aimed at 
spreading German culture.110 Furthermore, as diplomatic documents show, the German 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Auswärtige Amt) kept files on Spanish journalists and 
generals from 1900 onwards, noting a pro-German stance amongst some influential 
Spaniards. The First World War intensified this interest and German activity in Spain 
became widespread.  
 For Spain’s colonial ambitions Germany’s aggressive behaviour in the First 
Moroccan Crisis had the advantage of curbing French expansion. The conference of 
Algeciras in 1906 recognised the sovereignty of the Sultan as well as stating shared 
French and Spanish responsibility to ensure stability in the region, which was becoming 
more and more difficult to uphold in the Spanish protectorate. Alfonso XIII saw Spain’s 
participation in the conference of Algeciras as a sign that the country still held some 
importance amongst the great powers. Equally he was aware of Spain’s limited scope to 
negotiate any territorial expansion in her North African colony and carefully expressed 
the hope to not leave the conference empty handed.111  
 Despite internal disagreements over what foreign alliance would be in Spain’s 
best interest, the Cartagena Pact of 1907, in which France, Britain and Spain pledged 
mutual guarantee against German ambitions, formally brought Spain into the Allied 
camp. The Entente proved effective during the Second Moroccan Crisis of 1911/1912 
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when German-French economic rivalry in Morocco flared up once again. Spain was 
seeing its influence threatened after France occupied Fez and responded by occupying 
Larache and Alcazarquivir. The arrival of a German gunboat at Agadir then prompted 
Britain to come to the aid of France and eventually Germany had to give in to French 
pressure. As a concession, Germany received a part of the French Congo in return for a 
smaller territory in Central Africa. In the Treaty of Fez of 1912 the Spanish protectorate 
in the north and far south-west of Morocco was agreed, while the French protectorate 
now stretched over most of the country.  
 In the intensifying rivalry amongst the Greater Powers at the eve of the First 
World War, Spain was already relegated to a second position. Economically and 
militarily too weak to negotiate better terms for herself or to pose a serious threat to 
Britain and France, she was still of strategic importance to the other European powers 
and therefore not completely side-lined. This position would not change with the 
outbreak of hostilities in 1914. 
 Spain’s territories in Morocco were to be a source of great trouble and unrest 
outside and inside the country. Inhabited by rebellious tribes who would not succumb to 
foreign rule easily, the Spanish government had to engage in a colonial war which was 
not met with popular support at home. After the Disaster the State was no longer able to 
re-establish its authority by appealing to the traditional national sentiment as it had done 
during the Spanish-American War, which meant popular support for any further 
imperial projects of expansion was difficult to find.112 
 When, in the summer of 1909, the government called-up reservists for a 
campaign in Morocco in order to defend Spanish mining concessions against guerrilla 
attacks, a general strike was called. During the summer Republicans and Socialists had 
voiced their opposition against the campaign in Morocco, which was seen as solely 
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protecting financial interests of Spanish investors.113 The general strike on 26 July 1909, 
called by the Anarchist organisation Solidaridad Obrera (Workers’ Solidarity), 
developed into an outbreak of violence in Barcelona and other Catalan towns during 
which churches and convents were burnt. Maura’s government suppressed the revolt 
violently: 175 people were killed and five more executed after the events, among them 
the well-known writer Francisco Ferrer.114 Ferrer, who propagated anti-clericalism in the 
Modern Schools he founded in Barcelona, was well known outside of Spain. His 
execution caused protest in Europe as well as in the United States. In London the Social 
Democratic Party organised a protest against Ferrer’s execution rallying 8,000 to 10,000 
people on Trafalgar Square.115 Demonstrations in Paris even led to violence and saw 
several policemen injured and one killed.116 In Italy a general strike was called in 
honour of Ferrer and the Rome Chamber of Labour went so far to suggest a renaming of 
the Piazza di Spagna to Piazza Ferrer. They also asked the Italian government to break 
off all diplomatic relations with Spain.117 In New York Socialists used the Ferrer 
execution as a way of showing their opposition to the Catholic Church.118  
 The events of what became known as the Tragic Week also caused the different 
oppositional movements to drift further apart. Catalan conservatives feared the 
proletarian mob would destroy Spanish society and argued that the violent protests were 
proof that the working classes were not ready yet for democracy and needed to be 
restrained with force if necessary.119 The army, which had welcomed the new colonial 
enterprise in Morocco, reacted with brutal repression to the public backlash which 
further alienated the military from civil society.120 Within the regime the protest against 
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Ferrer’s execution and the general unpopularity of the government were used by the 
Liberals, who were dissatisfied with Maura’s reforms, to oust the Prime Minister from 
office. The Conservatives’ request for a renewal of confidence was mistakenly treated 
by the King Alfonso XIII as Maura’s resignation.121 Alfonso appointed a new Prime 
Minister, Segismundo Moret, who was only to last four months in office.  
 Moret’s successor, the Liberal José Canalejas, who took over in March 1910, 
was equally unable to deal with growing labour protests since his reforms to improve 
the situation of the working classes did not go far enough. Like his predecessors, 
Canalejas reacted with repression to workers protests and strikes. In November 1912 he 
was assassinated in Madrid by an Anarchist.122 According to the rules of the turno 
pacífico it would have been the turn of the Conservative Party now to form a new 
government but the Liberal speaker of the lower chamber, Count Romanones, used the 
opportunity to declare his right to temporarily take charge of the premiership. Outraged 
by Romanones’ actions, Maura consequently refused to work within the system and 
rotate in government with the Liberals. When the Romanones government fell apart in 
October 1913, the Conservative party did not support their old leader Maura in his 
refusal to adhere to the rules of the turno and instead enabled Eduardo Dato to take over 
the premiership.123 
 By 1914 the Restoration system was still intact, even though it had been 
challenged and endured severe criticism. The political instability created in the 
aftermath of the Disaster was to increase during the First World War. At the outbreak of 
the Great War the Conservative Dato government declared Spain’s neutrality. This move 
was hardly surprising given the country’s military and economic weakness as well as its 
domestic troubles. Spain was also not tied to any of the warring parties. Even though 
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treaties with France and Britain regarding African colonies had been signed, they did 
not force Spain to join the fight of the Entente.124 While some, like Maura, hoped 
neutrality would enable Spain to lead peace negotiations at the end of the war,125 others, 
such as the leader of the Lliga Regionalista, Francesc Cambó, viewed the country’s 
neutrality negatively. Cambó declared that since Spain had no national ideal and was 
only able to maintain a civil war, there was no other possibility than opting for 
neutrality.126  
 However, the majority of Spaniards initially welcomed the decision of the Dato 
government to opt for neutrality.127 As the conservative newspaper ABC pointed out, 
Spain had been deserted by the Western European powers during the Spanish-American 
War; therefore, the country should not feel obliged now to enter into a conflict which 
pursued interests of no relevance to Spain. A minority of politicians and journalists 
though, disagreed with the government’s decision.128 Among them were the far-Right 
Carlists who supported Germany and the Central Powers. On the side of the Allies, the 
Republicans, in particular Alejandro Lerroux, advocated direct intervention in the 
conflict.129 Although Lerroux claimed to be a pacifist and declared to be an enemy of 
the wars of adventure and conquest which only aimed at territorial expansion,130 he 
thought that the conflict facing Europe in 1914 was too great in its scope and 
significance for any nation to remain neutral. Lerroux stated in this case neutrality was 
selfish and cowardly.131   
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 Opposition to neutrality from an unsuspected side came from the Liberal Party 
leader, Count Romanones. An article with the title Neutralidades que matan (Fatal 
neutralities) was published in the liberal newspaper El Diario Universal in the wake of 
the government’s declaration of neutrality. Although Romanones denied being the 
author of the article, his pro-Allied stance and favouring of intervention in the war 
would become clear during his administration from 1915 to 1917. In his autobiography 
the Count admitted to having written Neutralidades que matan but the political climate 
in Spain at the outbreak of the war did not permit him to put his name under it at the 
time. As Romanones saw it, the rapid German invasion convinced many Spaniards of an 
equally quick German victory while he always believed in a victory of the Allies.132 The 
article itself declared Spain should align herself with the Allies, but did not go as far as 
promoting entry into the war. Nevertheless, it argued that only by siding with the Allies 
would Spain be able to regain a position of significance in Europe. Romanones’ private 
economic interests as a shareholder of mining industries in Morocco and coal and pyrite 
mines in Asturias and southern Spain rendered him vulnerable to the accusation of 
seeking to align Spain’s foreign policy with his own financial needs. The king’s 
sentiments throughout the conflict were not entirely clear and he maintained the 
appearance of neutrality, hoping to take on a mediating role at the end of the war.133 As 
mentioned before, Alfonso took an active part in the country's foreign policy and while 
the defence of the Moroccan protectorate was of great importance to the king, a claim 
for Gibraltar was always under discussion134 and frequently used by the Spanish 
monarch in negotiations with both belligerents.135 
 Despite Spain’s neutrality, the war would soon deepen existing divisions within 
Spanish society and accelerate the process of reform started at the end of the nineteenth 
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century. The ideological gap between the ruling elite and its critics was now marked by 
their respective allegiances with one of the belligerents. In Spain, the European conflict 
played out as a confrontation of the Germanófilos, supporters of Germany and the 
Central Powers, and the Francófilos, supporters of the allies. These camps embodied a 
clash of ideals: the preservation of traditional values and a hierarchical society versus 
modernisation and a liberal government.  
 Controversies between Germanófilos and Francófilos offered the Central Powers 
and the Allies ammunition for propaganda and allowed both sides to maintain their 
interests in Spain. Although not a major player in the conflict, Spain’s geographical 
position was of great strategic importance for the greater European powers since it 
allowed control over the sea routes to the western Mediterranean as well as the eastern 
Atlantic. The Spanish coastline offered an ideal refuge for submarines. The country was 
also able to produce and provide a wide variety of foodstuffs and military supplies vital 
for the war effort of the Allies and the Central Powers.136 Britain in particular depended 
on Spanish supplies of iron ore and pyrites. In return, Spain urgently needed coal and 
cotton as well as other supplies which could only be obtained from the Allies. This co-
dependency was used by the British government to pressure Spain into cooperating with 
the demands of the Entente.137 Given Spain’s geographical proximity to Britain and 
France as well as its economic reliance on both countries, Germany never seriously 
considered for Spain to actively join the Central Powers in their war effort. Instead the 
German effort in Spain was focussed on enforcing strict neutrality and therefore 
ensuring the country would not join the Entente.  
 Despite their neutrality, European states such as Spain, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Switzerland were not left unaffected by the conflict and 
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although they did not make an active military contribution, they participated in the war 
in many other ways. As Jean-Jacques Becker pointed out, neutral states performed an 
essential task in keeping financial and diplomatic channels open between the warring 
parties.138 Therefore, it is vital to highlight the neutral’s role during the First World War 
and to investigate their relationship with each of the warring parties. The Allies as well 
as the Central Powers attempted to influence neutral European states through 
diplomacy, economy and propaganda.139 By trading with neutral countries, Europe’s 
war economy was kept alive and countries like Spain provided vital goods for the home 
and battle fronts of the belligerent nations. Furthermore, the neutral zones in Europe 
played an important part in keeping up communication by facilitating the exchange of 
information and propaganda material. This was of great significance in particular for the 
Central Powers, which had to overcome allied information blockades. The neutral 
territories also provided the Allies and Central Powers with suitable posts for setting up 
espionage networks that would enable both sides to closely observe enemy activity.  
 Although there cannot be a generalised explanation as to why some countries 
opted for official neutrality at the outbreak of the war, a closer look at them highlights 
some similarities. These include, for example, a lack of military resources enabling 
them to take part in a large-scale conflict. The European countries which at the outbreak 
of the war had not been directly attacked, or were not forced by treaty obligations to 
come to the aid of an ally, had the opportunity to assess their options and decide what 
was best in the national interest. As pointed out before, neutrality during war time did 
not mean passivity. It is evident by looking at the examples of Spain and the 
Netherlands that despite their official neutrality, those countries tried to make an impact 
on international politics in areas other than the battlefield. At the beginning of the 
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twentieth century, the two states which had held dominant positions in early modern 
Europe, had lost their significance on the European stage. The Netherlands used their 
neutrality as a reflection of their national history, emphasising a moral and cultural 
superiority by placing their interests above power politics and military ambitions.140 The 
concept of neutrality during wartime, however, was not clearly defined, allowing 
belligerents to infringe on the rights of neutral states which did not possess the 
commercial and financial resources to resist the pressures put on them.141  
 The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 forbade belligerents to move troops, 
ammunition or any other war supplies across neutral territory.142 Selling weapons and 
ammunition to a belligerent, however, was legal for private companies of neutral 
countries. Spanish munition factories did not want to miss out on a considerable profit 
and despite German protestations and boycott attempts, the arms trade between Spain 
and the Allies continued throughout the First World War.143 Issues also arose from the 
neutrals’ economic dependency on either one of the belligerents and their need to keep 
up trade, which eroded the concept of neutrality during the First World War. Spain’s 
dependency on British coal was often used to pressure the country into cooperating with 
the demands of the Entente.  
 The International Naval Conference of London in 1909 attempted to establish 
laws of naval warfare which would clarify and regulate diplomatic relations during 
wartime. Although it was intended to grant ‘[…] widest possible freedom for neutrals in 
the unhindered navigation of the seas […]’ 144, the legal framework set up by the Hague 
Conventions and the Declaration of London failed almost completely when put to test 
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during the Great War.145 Germany’s policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, which 
also targeted Spanish merchant vessels, put a great strain on Spanish-German relations 
during the war.146  
 Beside economic pressures some neutral states, such as the Netherlands and 
Denmark, also had to fear invasion from one of the warring parties due to their 
geographical location. Danish governments therefore, opted for a neutrality favourable 
to Germany and the Central Powers despite large pro-Allied sympathies prevalent 
amongst the Danish king, army, press and the Danish people.147 Conversely, Norway 
depended on Great Britain to maintain its economic welfare and therefore, opted for 
neutrality which favoured the Entente.148 Although Spain never seriously had to fear 
invasion by any of the belligerents, neutrality remained a contested issue throughout the 
war. Most neutrals were unable to maintain strict and impartial neutrality during the 
First World War due their weak political and economic standing amongst the greater 
powers.149  
 Indeed, those countries that abandoned neutrality, like Romania and Italy for 
example, hoped to improve their position in a post-war Europe in addition to gaining 
territory. In Spain any serious considerations of entering the war were always 
accompanied by demands for more territory, particularly in North Africa. The return of 
Gibraltar and a free hand in Portugal were also on top of the agenda when it came to 
negotiations with either of the belligerents. Neither the Entente nor the Central Powers 
could offer great enough territorial gains, though, for Spain to seriously consider joining 
their war effort. Ultimately a neutral Spain was of greater benefit for both 
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belligerents.150 Besides lacking the military power necessary to make a serious impact 
on the war, something that did not stop Portugal or Romania from joining the fighting, 
large sections of the governing elite feared an active participation in the European 
conflict would inevitably lead to an overthrow of the conservative monarchic regime in 
Spain.  
 Efraim Karsh notes that maintaining neutrality was far more complex for smaller 
states than for a great power. In a war between great powers a small neutral state is 
exposed to pressure from both belligerents and therefore needs to use all its resources in 
order to keep up a policy of neutrality that satisfies both belligerents.151 Spanish 
neutrality often vacillated between the belligerents. The position of King Alfonso XIII 
was especially difficult to ascertain during the war and despite his open, impulsive and 
emotional character, he was able to conceal his personal convictions in this matter.152 
From the early stages of the war Alfonso tried to position himself as a mediator between 
the warring parties. His attempts to form a neutral alliance with Romania and Italy, 
however, did not bear fruits.153 Similarly, the suggestion of a joint mediation with the 
United States, sent by the Spanish foreign minister to the American Department of State 
at the beginning of the war, fell on deaf ears since Woodrow Wilson thought the timing 
was not right to make a peace proposal.154 The Dutch also failed to obtain the support of 
the United States, a great-power neutral with the ability to make an impact on the 
belligerents. To protect the rights of neutrals, the Dutch, who also had aspirations to 
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hold a peace conference at The Hague, suggested a Dutch-American alliance. This was 
rejected by the Americans since they were unwilling to be tied down in any alliance.155  
 Other neutral countries tried to form alliances in order to defend their rights 
during wartime. The three Scandinavian countries came together and subsequently tried 
to attract other neutrals to join them. In October 1914 Norwegian, Swedish, Danish and 
Dutch representatives met in Stockholm to discuss neutral rights in wartime trade, in 
particular the effects war was having on maritime commerce. The United States 
declined to join the conference and the Netherlands eventually stopped participating in 
the joint neutral effort. However, the three Scandinavian countries drafted a declaration 
regarding neutral rights based on the idea of the freedom of the seas which was 
forwarded to the belligerent governments in November 1914.156 Without the support 
from the United States the effort of the Scandinavian countries made little impact on the 
warring parties.157  
To protest the British blockade and the restrictions on trade arising from it, 
several Latin American countries approached the American government but no 
concerted neutral effort resulted from this initiative.158 Germany was particularly 
interested in a neutral alliance and hoped that pressure exerted from the neutral 
countries would force Britain to loosen the blockade and also lead to peace terms more 
favourable to Germany. The Auswärtige Amt encouraged the Spanish and Dutch 
governments respectively to work closer together with the Scandinavian neutrals.159  
 Without support from the US, Spain saw no merit in joining the alliance of 
Northern European neutrals.160 It was believed the neutral alliance would have little 
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practical success and would not enable Spain to withstand Allied economic pressure. 
King Alfonso, who harboured ambitions to act as arbiter at peace negotiations, thought 
it best to wait for the end of the war when belligerents and non-belligerents would come 
together to make lasting agreements.161 It was Alfonso’s wish for Spain to regain a 
position of importance amongst the European powers. He thought by hosting a peace 
conference this could be achieved. Berlin encouraged the Spanish king in his hopes, 
since the conservative monarch was seen to be more favourable to the German cause.162  
 
Economic crisis and political instability 1915 – 1917 
 
 Beside an increased foreign interest, the Great War also provided Spain with an 
economic boom. The country’s neutrality allowed it to trade with both warring parties, 
while, conversely, its domestic market was benefiting from the sudden lack of foreign 
competition. By early 1915 imports were decreasing drastically while the volume and 
prices of exports were rising. Economic prosperity, however, was not evenly distributed 
across all regions and sections of society in Spain. The sudden influx of money sparked 
off inflation, which was reflected in a substantial increase in the prices of essential 
items. A reduction in imports meant that foodstuffs were becoming scarce, which 
particularly affected the rural and urban workers whose living conditions were 
worsening.163 The social and economic inequality, aggravated by the conditions of the 
war, caused civil unrest in Spain, leading to the outbreak of food riots, mutinies and 
popular protests. Failing to find a solution for the country’s economic problems as well 
as not being able to deal with mounting protest, Eduardo Dato resigned and the Liberals 
formed a new government in December 1915, led by the Count Romanones. Dato’s 
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administration had shown that there was still an unwillingness to break with the old 
regime. It was the local leaders, caciques and business elites who benefited from the 
war and the government was not prepared to take away their privileges.164  
 The government of Romanones, however, was equally unable to deal effectively 
with Spain’s economic situation. Electoral fraud still persisted and ensured the 
dominance of the dynastic parties. In the general elections of April 1916 the 
Republican-Socialist coalition was not only defeated, but the predominance of dynastic 
politicians, who were also linked by family ties, prompted the labour movement into 
action. The UGT congress in May 1916 demanded from government and parliament the 
introduction of immediate measures to improve the situation in Spain. If their demands 
were not met, the labour movement would resort to more aggressive measures against 
the regime.165 Despite their ideological differences, the UGT and the CNT formed a 
coalition in order to present a united front against the government.166  
 While the labour movement was proving increasingly challenging to the regime, 
Catalan regionalists also continued their offensive, demanding not just Catalan 
autonomy but actual participation in the political process and the destruction of the 
turno.167 As reaction to the growing popular protest and the deteriorating economic 
situation, the minister for finance, Santiago Alba, introduced the Plan of National 
Reconstruction in June 1916. This ten-year plan sought to reform the country and Alba 
hoped to finance it by taxing war profits of industry and trade which brought on 
resistance from the Lliga Regionalista, which tried to exert pressure on Madrid in order 
to obtain economic concessions for Catalonia.168 The Socialists also doubted whether 
the government would be able to introduce the suggested reforms. They therefore sided 
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with the Lliga.169 Facing strong opposition, Alba’s ambitious reform programme for 
Spain failed and the labour movement began to mobilise asking for solutions to food 
shortages, unemployment and inflation.  
 Due to their lack of action, the government allowed the economic crisis to 
worsen, which brought the country close to a revolutionary uprising. At the beginning of 
1917 the Socialists, increasingly exasperated with the government’s inefficiency, 
decided drastic measures were needed to bring about change.170 Strikes and food riots 
were a common feature of the rising social unrest Spain was experiencing in the first 
months of 1917. The overthrow of the Tsarist regime in Russia also gave Spanish 
Socialists hope that an offensive against the regime might be successful and a Republic 
could be established.171 UGT and CNT agreed to launch a general strike in the hope of 
overthrowing the regime and modernising the State. The economic crisis, however, did 
not only affect the working classes but also threatened the living standards and salaries 
of public sector workers, including the army. To protect their interests, mid-ranking 
army officers organised themselves into Juntas militares de defensa, modelled on trade 
unions. Officers stationed on mainland Spain had watched with mounting concern how 
their colleagues in the colonies received promotions based on their war achievements. A 
military reform programme introduced in 1914 which proposed the introduction of 
promotion by merit, and was financed by reducing the great officer surplus, further 
aggravated the military.172  
Amongst growing domestic tension, the government of Count Romanones was 
also faced with outside pressures which called the country’s policy of neutrality into 
question. Germany’s pursuit of unrestricted submarine warfare, which necessarily 
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resulted in the targeting of Spanish vessels, gave the pro-Allied Romanones an 
argument for abandoning neutrality and joining the Entente. Following the sinking of 
the Spanish steamer San Fulgencio in April 1917, the Count was prepared to deliver an 
ultimatum to Germany which could have resulted in a break of diplomatic ties and a 
closer cooperation with the Allies. However, it would not come to that. Shocked by 
events in Russia and concerned about the tense domestic situation, King Alfonso XIII, 
who had maintained a position of neutrality throughout the conflict, sided with the 
Germanófilos and ensured the fall of Romanones.173  
A campaign against the Prime Minister, largely supported by the German 
embassy, was orchestrated in the Spanish press accusing him of leading Spain into war 
out of personal financial interests. Romanones felt the crusade against him was 
becoming more and more violent, creating a suffocating atmosphere.174 With the Liberal 
leader, the Marquis of Alhucemas, and the speaker of the lower chamber of the Cortes, 
Miguel Villanueva, insisting on the continuation of neutrality,175 Romanones failed to 
obtain support from some of his own party colleagues and eventually had to resign.176 
The Count was replaced by Garcia Prieto, the Marquis of Alhucemas, who formed a 
new liberal cabinet on request of the king.177 The debate over neutrality revealed the 
reluctance of the Spanish ruling elite to pursue an active foreign policy, fearing that a 
closer alliance with the Entente would bring about drastic changes in Spain and infringe 
on their power and influence. Therefore Alfonso XIII’s actions have to be viewed as a 
defence of the monarchy rather than an agreement with the German cause. Worried 
about the army turning against him, he ordered the dissolution of the military juntas, to 
which the officers reacted with revolt.  
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 The liberal cabinet of Alhucemas only lasted two months and was replaced by 
the Conservative administration of Eduardo Dato in June 1917.178 Ignoring the 
revolutionary mood in the country, the king was adamant to enforce the turno, 
continuing to exclude Socialists, Republicans, army officers and the Catalan bourgeoisie 
from power. Their discontent, however, was growing and in the summer of 1917 the 
various groups opposing the regime came close to joining in their effort to stage a 
revolutionary uprising. A challenge to the oligarchy was mounted when the Lliga called 
for a Constituent Assembly seeking to alter political structures in Spain. On 19 July 
1917 Catalan regionalists organised an alternative parliament in Barcelona which hoped 
to implement change by peaceful means.179 The Assembly of Parliamentarians 
demanded truthful elections as well as a constitutional reform. Backed by the 
Republicans and Socialists, the assembly movement, as it became known as, sought the 
help of Antonio Maura, who had also been approached by the military juntas. Under 
Maura’s leadership the various movements could have combined their efforts, possibly 
leading to an overthrow of the regime. Despite Maura’s criticism of the turno system, he 
was not prepared to participate in an attack on Spain’s monarchy and refused any 
collaboration with the movement.180  
 The Dato administration desperately tried to control public unrest by promising 
to meet the demands of the military juntas and denouncing the Assembly movement as 
a Separatist and Communist threat.181 The workers’ movement, on the other hand, 
inspired by events of the summer, hoped to have the support of the bourgeoisie and the 
army and staged a general strike on 13 August 1917. Their attempt to overthrow the 
regime, however, went wrong, and instead of joining the revolutionary action, the 
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bourgeoisie remained passive while the army reacted with brutal oppression.182 Seventy 
people were killed during the unrest of August 1917, several hundred injured and 
approximately 2,000 arrests were made. The actions of the army resulted in a loss of 
popularity which the juntas had gained as an opposition movement against the 
government.183 In the aftermath of the events of the summer of 1917 the Socialists 
argued that the strike had been provoked by the government putting pressure on Dato to 
step down. In an attempt to restore their popularity, the military juntas now demanded 
the restoration of constitutional rights. The pressure on the Prime Minister was growing 
with Cambó and the Assembly movement actively trying to oust him and even Maura 
blaming him for the country’s instability. The state of war was finally lifted and 
constitutional rights restored on 7 October 1917.184  
Realising that it had been used by the government, the army delivered an 
ultimatum to Alfonso on 26 October 1917, demanding the formation of a new cabinet 
within seventy-two hours. If their demands were not met, the officers were prepared to 
take matters into their own hands. Under pressure from army and king the Dato cabinet 
collapsed on 27 October 1917 and despite the continued prominence of the dynastic 
parties, which were now divided into several competing factions, the turno pacifico was 
destroyed. After an eight-day-long crisis, a new government, led by Garcia Prieto, was 
finally formed from a coalition of Liberals, Conservatives, Independents as well as the 
Lliga Regionalista.185 The Catalan regionalists abandoned their alliance with the 
working class movement while the crown as well as the army were able to strengthen 
their authority in the aftermath of the crisis of 1917.186  
Political instability and civil unrest, however, continued and 1918 saw the crisis 
de subsistencias which was marked by the unavailability of affordable foodstuffs. 
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Demanding cheaper food, people took to the streets looting shops and bakeries. In 
January 1918 Malaga and Alicante experienced two general strikes at which several 
women were killed. While civil unrest initially took place in the cities, protest was 
spreading to the Andalusian countryside over the course of 1918.187 Workers living 
conditions worsened during the First World War and the centre and the south of Spain 
were particularly badly affected by unemployment and recession. In addition to Spanish 
workers forced to return home from abroad with the onset of war, internal migration to 
the cities caused further social tension. Living conditions for migrant workers in 
Barcelona, for example, were especially poor.188 At the same time divisions within the 
Spanish working class movement were further deepening. While the PSOE leadership 
opted for a cautious approach, viewing the Bolshevik revolution in Russia as 
detrimental to the Allied war effort, the more radical party members advocated strict 
neutrality and began to form a separate group. The CNT, on the other hand, emerged as 
the leading organisation representing Spanish workers who, faced with increasing costs 
of living, were becoming more militant.189 As previous governments, the coalition led 
by Garcia Prieto was equally unable to halt Spain’s socio-economic instability.  
In foreign politics, the government continued a policy of neutrality. A possible 
revolution in Spain would have been especially damaging to Allied trade, therefore 
France and Britain limited their support for Spanish Socialists and Republicans, 
allowing German agents to infiltrate Anarchist groups.190 Despite the German 
submarine campaign and Allied economic pressure, the Spanish government did not 
take decisive actions against Germany.  
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In domestic affairs, the elections of February 1918 did not produce any clear 
winner and no party held an overall majority.191 The coalition government was also 
faced with a serious threat from within their own cabinet. The minister for war, Juan de 
la Cierva, introduced a military reform bill which was passed by royal decree, thereby 
circumventing the parliament. Cierva, who argued the government should not be 
allowed to rule since it did not receive a majority, began to act like a dictator supported 
by the king and the army. When Garcia Prieto agreed to dissolve the cabinet at the 
beginning of 1918, Cierva refused to resign, leading to a continuation of the government 
with the concession that the military reform bill would not take effect until July 1918. 
Cierva was eventually forced to resign in March 1918 in the aftermath of the chaos he 
had created by transferring all postal services to the Ministry of War as a reaction to a 
strike of postal workers. Like the military reform bill, this transfer was passed by royal 
decree further highlighting the anti-constitutional behaviour of king and army. Cierva’s 
actions ensured the final collapse of the Prieto government in March 1918.192 The newly 
formed cabinet, led by Antonio Maura, only managed to last until the end of the First 
World War despite its high profile members, Eduardo Dato, Garcia Prieto, Francesc 
Cambó and Count Romanones.193  
 
Conclusion 
 
Following the events of 1917 several governments failed to halt the political 
instability and social conflict which Spain had been experiencing since the end of the 
nineteenth century. The opportunity to transform Spanish society and modernise the 
State was missed, largely due to the incompatibility of the different opposition 
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movements and the resilience of the ruling elite. At the end of the First World War Spain 
had not managed to gain a position of greater importance amongst the world powers, 
despite concessions to both belligerents. Throughout the war King Alfonso XIII had 
harboured ambitions for Spain to organise a peace conference after the conflict. He had 
hoped that a new role as arbiter of peace would allow the country to achieve some 
significance in a post war world order. His hopes, however, were dashed when the 
invitation to the Paris negotiations did not arrive. Continued efforts to expand the 
Spanish colonial empire during the war, also proved fruitless. Negotiations with Britain, 
France and Germany regarding Gibraltar and Tangier failed since Spain was unable to 
make an active military contribution to the war.  
The pressures Spain experienced during the First World War exacerbated the 
country’s internal conflicts, foreshadowing the civil war of the 1930s. While the Allies 
relied on their economic dominance to keep Spain on their side, Germany and the 
Central Powers pursued their interests on the Iberian Peninsula with a remarkable 
vigour. To ensure a Germanophile and neutral Spain, German diplomats and residents 
went after various sections of Spanish society, forging the most unlikely collaborations 
ranging from supporting the conservative monarchy and traditional values of the 
Catholic Church to working with Anarchist organisations.  
The debate over Spain's regeneration, which had its roots in the nineteenth 
century and became more urgent after the Spanish-American War in 1898, was further 
complicated with the outbreak of the First World War. Before 1914 a Europeanisation of 
Spain was seen as the best path for the country, but since the war also represented an 
ideological struggle amongst the European powers, Spanish reformers were divided 
over what European model to follow. Those that publicly expressed their admiration for 
German culture and philosophy came under attack from reformers who favoured French 
and British liberalism. As we will see in Chapter 3, some of the pro-German 
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intellectuals and writers extended their support for Germany by offering their services to 
the German administration. This was partly motivated by strong anti-clerical sentiments 
and a wish to diminish the influence of the Catholic Church in Spain. The Church, 
which had experienced an erosion of its power since the first half of the nineteenth 
century, paradoxically also favoured Germany in the war. Reasons for this can be found 
in the Church’s desire to maintain the status quo and a fear a closer alliance with the 
Entente might lead to further liberal reforms.194  
The army, which had become alienated from Spanish society in the aftermath of 
the Spanish-American War, was also a supporter of Germany during the First World 
War. Mainly preoccupied with its internal reforms, the Spanish military did not advocate 
joining either of the belligerents on the frontline. The colonial war in Morocco was of 
greater importance than the European conflict and at home the army was frequently 
called upon to deal with growing civil unrest. In its defence of the monarchy, the army 
sought to align itself with groups that could increase their power and ensure no 
restrictions were placed on the military budget. This was particularly important in light 
of anti-militarist feeling developing after the defeat in 1898.  
The Spanish king continued his role as his country’s ambassador throughout the 
First World War. His diplomatic efforts were carried out with the hope of res-
establishing Spain amongst the great powers which also meant extending her 
diminishing colonial empire. Though his true allegiances could not be pinned down, the 
king kept in close contact with the German administration during the war and often 
initiated diplomatic activity regarding colonial expansion, which could be viewed as 
pro-German, without the knowledge of his government.195 Alfonso kept his policies 
flexible in accordance with the course of the war and with an acute awareness of Spain’s 
economic dependence on the Allies. 
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As the war led to an economic boom in Spain, those industries that benefited 
from wartime expansion had no intention of abandoning the policy of neutrality. The 
Catalan textile industry, which had suffered after the loss of its Cuban market, was 
flourishing under the demand for uniforms and other war materiel. This industrial spurt 
strengthened the Catalan middle class and allowed the growing regionalist movement to 
become a serious political power. Wartime profits, however, did not benefit all and the 
economic boom came at the price of a subsistence crisis and inflation which mainly 
affected the working classes and rural workers. Republicanism, Socialism and 
Anarchism were on the rise, demanding better living conditions and political 
participation for all Spaniards. The working-class movement in Spain saw no merit in 
war to further their position and was therefore an ardent supporter of neutrality. This 
was exploited by Germany which began to present itself as a defender of Spanish 
neutrality and the Allies as interventionist powers who were trying to drag Spain into 
the war. The contested issue of neutrality became the focal point of the German 
propaganda campaign which tried to influence Spanish public opinion mainly through 
the press and ensure that Spain remained neutral throughout the war. How this 
campaign was organised and who was involved in staging it quite successfully will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
Mobilising the community –  
the German propaganda effort in Spain 
 
Often described as a total war, due to its all-encompassing nature, the First 
World War mobilised communities in their entirety, including the home fronts. Marked 
by conflicting ideologies, the Great War also developed into a war of words in which 
the struggle for the opinion of the belligerents as well as the neutrals became an 
important factor. According to Eric Hobsbawm, ‘[…] the war had to be fought on both 
sides by mobilising public opinion, i.e. by claiming some profound challenge to 
accepted national values, such as Russian barbarism against German culture, French and 
British democracy against German absolutism, or the like.’1 A hitherto unknown 
propaganda campaign, particularly employing press and print media,2 was carried out 
by the Allies and Central Powers, who not only attempted to sway neutrals but also 
sought to control opinion at home.  
Spain, as an important outsider in the conflict, quickly became a battleground for 
both warring sides. With little regard for the country’s neutrality, the Central Powers as 
well as the Entente bribed newspaper editors and journalists, bought control over entire 
publications, fed newspapers with their articles and distributed their own publications 
all over Spain. The division between Germanófilos and Francófilos enabled foreign 
propagandists to interfere in Spanish public opinion. As we have seen in Chapter 1, a 
debate regarding Spain’s regeneration had already been started after the Spanish-
American War in 1898 and was now intensifying during the First World War. The 
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ideological struggle between the Entente and the Central Powers was mirrored in Spain 
by the debate over neutrality. This debate not only highlighted the country’s struggle to 
position itself amongst the greater powers, but also showed how the gap between the 
reformers and the elite was becoming increasingly insurmountable. Germany seized 
upon those divisions in Spanish society and sought to influence public opinion in a large 
scale propaganda effort which was aimed at maintaining Spanish neutrality.  
How Germany and the Central Powers were able to set up a widespread 
propaganda network gaining control over large parts of the Spanish publishing world is 
worth further consideration, especially in view of the economic dominance of the 
Western Powers in Spain. The chapter will begin with an examination of German 
activity in Spain prior to 1914 which makes it clear that Germany’s impressive media 
campaign was largely facilitated by a small but very active German business community 
which was even further mobilised during the war. Highlighting some of those private as 
well as official propaganda activities brings to light an extensive German network in 
Spain which also relied on the collaboration of Spanish journalists, editors, politicians 
and diplomats. We will outline how the propaganda effort was organised in the initial 
phases of the war and what official and private institutions responsible for propaganda 
in Spain existed.  
Particular attention will be given to the work of August Hofer, a German 
businessman in Barcelona, who ran the German News Service for Spain, one of the 
most important propaganda offices during the war. Using some of Hofer’s and other 
propagandist’s publications we will look at the main themes employed by German 
propaganda in Spain. Conversely the chapter will also provide a brief overview of the 
various Allied propaganda initiatives which, although smaller in scale, gave German 
propagandists many headaches and much cause for concern. In order to influence 
Spanish public opinion, the German propaganda effort had to rely on collaborators in 
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the Spanish publishing world. The examination will introduce some of the journalists 
who were among the main conspirators of the German administration. This chapter will 
outline how their work was facilitated and supported by the German embassy and 
Berlin, which in turn will elucidate how Germany was able to maintain its propaganda 
campaign throughout the war.  
Although the German effort in Spain greatly benefited from the lack of press 
censorship laws for most of the war, an issue that will also be addressed in the chapter, 
German propagandists had to overcome many financial, logistical and communication 
difficulties. The chapter will explain how this was done, further outlining the extent of 
the German network in Spain. Our examination of the German propaganda campaign in 
Spain during the First World War will conclude with a look at how the German 
administration tried to consolidate its various private and official efforts towards the end 
of the war, when a German victory was becoming less and less likely. 
That the German network was maintained throughout the war despite various 
difficulties not only shows the perseverance of the propagandists, but also stresses the 
importance of Spanish neutrality for Germany and the Central Powers. An examination 
of the German effort in Spain also refutes the theory Germany’s unsuccessful 
propaganda campaign was to blame for the loss of the war3 – a popular argument most 
famously brought forward by General Ludendorff and Adolf Hitler. 
 
Organisation of the German propaganda network in Spain 
 
In Mein Kampf Hitler described Germany’s propaganda effort as worse than 
insignificant, insisting the German system of information completely failed and 
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claiming the country did not produce any propaganda at all. Hitler asserted that the 
propaganda effort carried out was useless and to some extent harmful to Germany’s 
cause.4 Ludendorff argued Germany was unable to respond to the overwhelming power 
of enemy propaganda which he saw as exceptionally clever and conceived on a large 
scale.5 German propaganda abroad, according to Ludendorff, was only implemented 
and carried out with great difficulty, achieving very few results.6 It was his estimation 
that, especially in neutral countries, German propaganda activity completely failed to 
make an impact. In his memoirs he wrote: ‘The way to the soul of the neutrals was 
barred to us. We did not know how to open it.’7 Ludendorff’s and Hitler’s assessment, 
however, can be refuted – at least in relation to German propaganda in Spain – by the 
following contemporary analysis of the Spanish novelist Eduardo Zamacois: ‘From the 
first day of the war the Germans have been campaigning in Spain. From the first they 
realised the tremendous value and power of publicity […] They went after public 
opinion and kept after it with the same precision and the same constancy with which 
they have pursued the rest of their war programme. They have spent millions of dollars, 
bought entire control of newspapers and magazines.’ He concluded ‘The Allies have not 
conducted a campaign in my country at any time.’8  
 Germany’s propaganda campaign in Spain was already initiated prior to 
the First World War, albeit on a very modest scale. At the beginning of the twentieth 
century the Spanish press was largely supplied with news reaching Spain via the French 
agency Havas and its Spanish subsidiary, Fabra. Havas was covering the news market 
for Southern Europe, the French colonial empire and was also influential in Latin 
America. The German news agency Wolffsche Telegraphenbureau, on the other hand, 
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was responsible for Central Europe, Russia and Scandinavia.9 Reports or news from 
Germany rarely made it into Spanish publications. As a correspondent of the German 
newspaper Kӧlnische Zeitung assessed in 1905, the strong French influence made it 
difficult to have an impact on the press in Spain.10 The dominance of Havas-Fabra was 
also a problem that had been identified by Alexander Bruns, director of the Berlitz 
language school in Madrid. His attempts in 1906 to establish an office of the German 
Wolffsche Telegraphenbureau in Madrid, however, failed. Wolff was contractually 
obliged to send its news via Paris to Spain, therefore, prohibiting a direct news 
exchange between Germany and Spanish readers.  
Bruns’ activity in Spain was welcomed by the Auswӓrtige Amt, which 
encouraged him to place German news in Spanish newspapers.11 Thanks to his contacts 
with the Madrid paper Epoca as well as other publications, Bruns succeeded in doing 
just that12 and by 1908 he had gained support from the Spanish government regarding 
an improved news exchange between both countries.13 It is important to note, however, 
that even before the outbreak of the war German propaganda had to be carried out 
carefully as not to provoke a reaction from France or Britain. Although the German 
embassy welcomed the publication of several pro-German articles in the 
Correspondencia during 1908, concerns about aggravating the French embassy were 
raised. Since the Correspondencia had hitherto been opposed to German ideas, German 
diplomats did not want to use the paper too frequently in order to avoid drawing 
attention to their propaganda attempts.14  
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 Besides Bruns, another active German propagandist was August Hofer, 
the manager of a printing business in Barcelona who had lived in Spain since 1906. 
Hofer also blamed the lack of a direct news exchange between both countries for the 
negative portrayal of Germany in the Spanish press and argued French ideas were being 
forced onto Spaniards.15 From 1910 onwards he supplied Spanish papers with German 
news, with little success, however.16 Although his idea of a German news agency 
received wide-spread interest amongst Spanish newspaper editors in 1912, the 
Auswӓrtige Amt would not support his plans and deemed news communication between 
both countries sufficient.17 Undeterred by Berlin’s rejection of his plans, Hofer vowed 
he would not rest until he had achieved his goal of reducing French and British 
influence in Spain.18 
 It can be said that beside official diplomatic efforts, the German 
community in Spain played an important role in fostering German-Spanish relations 
during the conflict. Thanks to the work of private propagandists such as Hofer and 
Bruns before 1914, Germany was able to quickly establish a network that would help to 
ensure Spanish neutrality remained benevolent to Germany and the Central Powers. In 
general, private individuals became greatly involved in propaganda during the First 
World War. As Niall Ferguson noted, the majority of propaganda activity during the war 
was initiated by independent organisations or private individuals while official 
institutions were often only responsible for their co-ordination.19 The ideological 
struggle between the warring nations mobilised all groups in society, therefore enabling 
wartime propaganda without the initiative of governments.20 German propaganda 
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activity in Spain during the First World War offers a prime example for this process of 
cultural mobilisation or rather self-mobilisation. In the initial phase of the war all major 
belligerents experienced this phenomenon of self-mobilisation bringing together various 
social groups and institutions which rallied behind their nation’s war effort.21 As 
Stéphane Audion-Rouzeau and Annette Becker have argued, propaganda was to some 
extent an upsurge from below which was sustained by a large number of individuals.22 
There was no need for private citizens to be given a mobilisation order. As the case of 
German private propagandists in Spain confirms, in the initial phases of the war a 
general consensus amongst the citizens of the belligerent nations existed which 
acknowledged the vital role non-combatants had to play in the war effort.23 Carl Coppel, 
owner of a watch factory in Madrid, who published regular information leaflets under 
the title Por la patria y por la verdad (For fatherland and truth) reporting on the course 
of the war,24 later explained his propaganda effort was motivated by a sense of duty 
towards his country.25  
 With the outbreak of the war the Auswӓrtige Amt made more concerted 
efforts to gain Spain’s favour and ensure the country’s neutrality. The need to establish a 
propaganda network in the Iberian Peninsula became suddenly very urgent. The 
embassy at Madrid, led by Ambassador Prince Maximilian von Ratibor und Corvey, 
became the headquarters for all German propaganda activity. Ratibor himself never tired 
in his pursuit of courting Spanish public opinion and defending the German cause. 
Within the first weeks of the war he arranged for pro-German articles to be placed in the 
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Spanish press since German news and publications only reached the country at the end 
of August 1914.26 While Alexander Bruns’ efforts were rewarded during the war, when 
he became press officer at the German embassy,27 August Hofer was less successful in 
joining forces with the diplomatic corps. Even though he seemed an ideal candidate as 
director of a German press bureau, Ratibor deemed him unsuitable for such a position 
due to his character and temper.28 This was not the only time the private propagandist 
would clash with the German diplomats in Spain.  
Although supported by the Auswӓrtige Amt and the embassy at Madrid, Hofer 
never received official diplomatic status but, undeterred by this, he carried on with his 
work. With the outbreak of the war he published a weekly pamphlet called La guerra 
mundial – The World War – which gave an overview of war events from a German 
perspective. Hofer distributed 10,000 copies of this publication and had plans to turn it 
into a regular newspaper. Those plans, however, were not realised.29 Despite 
differences, the embassy was grateful for the work done by privateers and was heavily 
reliant on their contacts in Spain. In November 1914 the ambassador was able to report 
to the Auswӓrtige Amt on the early successes of German propaganda which, as he 
pointed out, were only achieved with the help of the German communities in Barcelona 
and Madrid.30 The British Foreign Office also attributed the success of German 
propaganda to the ‘army of agents’ recruited from German residents in Spain.31 With the 
outbreak of the war members of the German colony initiated campaigns to spread pro-
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German news in Spain in an attempt to win over Spanish public opinion by influencing 
the press.32  
 German propagandists in Spain often operated with a certain degree of 
subtlety in order to get their articles printed in Spanish papers. A private news service in 
Madrid informed the Auswärtige Amt in November 1914 that news should be distributed 
to Spanish newspapers in typed form rather than printed. It was hoped that this would 
give the impression that the news was not generally distributed to all newspapers, 
therefore lending it a special status. Pro-Allied publications were also targeted with 
German propaganda in the hope that editors might prefer printing German news instead 
of writing their own articles.33  
In addition, German publications were sent to influential Spanish personalities in 
an effort to refute Allied atrocity claims during the German invasion of Belgium and in 
the hope to keep Spanish neutrality benevolent to Germany. For example, at the opening 
of the Cortes in November 1914, the German embassy sent out official documents 
relating to the outbreak of the war to all senators and deputies.34 Further incidents 
suggest that this was done on a regular basis. In August 1915 the Foreign Minister, 
Marques de Lema, confirmed to Ambassador Ratibor that he had received a copy of the 
German white book – Die völkerrechtswidrige Führung des belgischen Volkskrieges – 
(Violation of human rights during the Belgian people’s war).35 
 In the early stages of the war the German propaganda initiative was far 
from coherent and private initiatives worked alongside and often in competition to 
official German propaganda institutions. The central bureau for German propaganda 
abroad during the First World War was the – Zentralstelle für Auslandsdienst – (Central 
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administration for services abroad – Zfa), which operated under the supervision of the 
Auswärtige Amt, that in addition, maintained its own news department, also responsible 
for propaganda abroad. The Zfa was founded in October 1914 and led by Alfons 
Freiherr von Mumm, who in turn was assisted by a number of representatives from the 
Auswärtige Amt.36 It was responsible for producing and distributing propaganda 
material such as flyers, posters, newspapers, magazines and books. It also had a 
department for photographs, illustrations and films. The propaganda of the Zfa mainly 
targeted neutral countries like Switzerland, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries 
and the United States, but also included to some extent propaganda in Spain.37  
 A private organisation especially dedicated to Spanish and Portuguese-
speaking countries was the Nachrichtendienst für Länder spanischer und 
portugiesischer Zunge (News service for Spanish and Portuguese-speaking countries), 
based in Frankfurt am Main. Founded in August 1914, the news service was managed 
by personalities from industry, banking, press and the diplomatic world. The news 
service in Frankfurt hoped to curb the influence of Reuters and Havas and supplied 
material to private news services in Spain as well as the embassy and the consulates.38 
Other official German propaganda institutions were the German military, which was in 
charge of censorship. In Spain the main German propagandists were the embassy at 
Madrid as well as the various German consulates which collaborated with the 
Auswärtige Amt and other private propaganda operations such as August Hofer’s service 
and the Deutscher Nachrichtendienst (German news service) in Madrid. The service in 
Madrid, founded in 1914, was run by AEG vice director Wilhelm Rautzenberg. Other 
subsidiaries of AEG in Spain carried out similar propaganda work in collaboration with 
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the head office in Madrid.39 In contrast to Hofer’s service, which was specialised in the 
fast transmission of German news, Rautzenberg’s service translated longer articles from 
German publications and tried to place them in Spanish newspapers.40 AEG had been a 
well-established company in Spain prior to 1914 and therefore its propaganda service 
was able to build on existing business connection. It mainly focused on newspapers in 
which the company placed advertisements.41  
 As can be seen from these initial campaigns, no centralised propaganda 
effort in Spain existed at the beginning of the war despite attempts by the German 
embassy to coordinate, or at least keep track of, the various initiatives. Berlin was 
content to support the different private institutions in their efforts without taking direct 
control over their activities. No directive specifically outlining a propaganda policy for 
Spain was issued and the Auswärtige Amt mainly left matters in the hands of the 
diplomats and privateers on the ground. In the early stages of the war Spain did not have 
such great significance for Germany as other neutrals, such as the United States, which 
explains the freedom the German diplomats and privateers enjoyed in Spain. This, 
however, was to change as the war dragged on longer than initially anticipated. 
 As already outlined, the Auswärtige Amt was able to solicit the aid of 
several private propagandists who readily offered their services to the German cause. 
The activities of this community were also noted by outside observers. The Times 
reported in November 1915 of the existence of an ant-like industry organised with the 
involvement of all German residents.42 It is difficult to give a precise figure of how 
many Germans lived in Spain during the period of the First World War since residents 
were not obliged to register with the embassy or consulates. British estimates put the 
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German community at between 50,000 and 80,000 strong.43 According to German 
statistics these estimates seem to have been exaggerated. Before the war there were 
approximately 7–8,000 Germans residing in Spain. During the war those were joined by 
refugees from Cameroon and Portugal bringing the total number of German residents to 
somewhere between 10,000 and 30,000.44  
 Although the British and French communities in Spain were far larger 
than the German, the Allies failed to capitalise on this advantage and did not mobilise 
their expatriates from the start of the war, leaving the field to Germany and the Central 
Powers.45 Eager to make their contribution to the war effort, German residents 
organised themselves and became active propagandists for the German cause in Spain. 
Another article published in The Times, in February 1916, described them as ‘a veritable 
army in discipline and cohesion. There is not an idle man among them [...] Every 
German is a natural tout and canvasser for his country […].’46 
 August Hofer was arguably one of the most active private propagandists 
in Spain during the First World War. In the summer of 1914 Hofer was busy organising 
a trip for Spanish publishers to a book fair in Leipzig but with the outbreak of the war 
his plans changed dramatically. Since his wife and his sisters were in Italy, and unable 
to leave, Hofer agreed to meet them in Switzerland and then travel back to Spain 
together. He had to undertake an arduous journey via France to Geneva where he was 
reunited with his family. They then quickly made their way back to Spain. During their 
trip they avoided speaking German and instead conversed in Spanish in order to not 
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draw any attention to them while traveling through France.47 After two days of traveling 
they arrived in Barcelona, where Hofer almost immediately put his propaganda machine 
into operation. The Deutscher Nachrichtendienst für Spanien (German News Service 
for Spain) was to emerge as one of the most important German news services operating 
in the country.48  
 The lack of German news reaching the Iberian Peninsula, already a 
problem before the war, was an even greater problem and cause of concern for the 
German propagandists during the conflict. In his book – Deutschtum in Spanien – 
(German culture in Spain) – published in 1918, Hofer recalled the turbulent first few 
days of the war when excited crowds would gather on Barcelona’s main boulevard, Las 
Ramblas, queuing outside kiosks to read the latest news no matter how exaggerated and 
outrageous.49 The German community of Barcelona would meet in the rooms of the 
‘Germania club’. Unable to concentrate on anything else, discussions centred 
exclusively around the conflict in Europe and worry about the lack of news from home. 
Since Hofer believed Reuters and Havas, from which Spanish papers received the 
majority of their news, were pro-Allied, he decided to set up his own telegram service 
sending daily news from Berlin to Barcelona.50 Thanks to access to a radio transmitter, 
Hofer was able to receive telegrams from Germany which he would translate and then 
print and distribute to Spanish newspapers as well as sending them to South and Central 
America. Furthermore, he circulated his news to private individuals who requested 
them, mainly the German community in Spain and Latin America.51 Any information 
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provided by the German News Service for Spain carried the seal of the German 
consulate at Barcelona, which gave it an official status.52  
 Hofer’s enterprise was growing fast and in the first year of the war his 
news service already had thirty-five employees, amongst them Germans and 
Spaniards.53 Besides the distribution of German news, Hofer’s service also published a 
daily newspaper called Correspondencia Alemana. From 1917 onwards the newspaper’s 
main editor was a Spanish general who, while fulfilling his duty for the Spanish army, 
wrote articles for the German publication54. Other Hofer publications included the 
weekly illustrated paper La Neutralidad, published in Barcelona,55 and Germania, 
published on a fortnightly basis. Germania was aimed at Spanish intellectuals and its 
editorial team consisted entirely of Spaniards, amongst them publishers, writers, 
journalists, lawyers, members of the Cortes, professors, librarians, architects and 
doctors.56  
 In a country which, like Spain, was noted for its high illiteracy rate, 
visual propaganda employing posters, photographs and film was very important. 
Therefore, Hofer passed on photographs and illustrations he received from Germany to 
Spanish magazines and bookshops in Madrid and Barcelona for exhibition in their shop 
windows. He also distributed his publications and news telegrams to the German news 
service in Madrid, all German consulates and societies in Spain as well as to 115 
Spanish newspapers.57 The service also published numerous German propaganda works 
aimed at countering Allied publications and keeping Spanish public opinion benevolent 
to Germany. In his attempt to sway Spanish opinion, Hofer also sought out links with 
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publications naturally adverse to German ideas. Socialist and workers newspapers were 
fed pro-neutrality articles undermining the Allied position by claiming that France and 
Britain were trying to drag Spain into the war.58 The success of Hofer’s service was 
even noted in the English press, which, although it described the news service as 
slanderous and dishonest, also had to concede it was cleverly edited as well as full, clear 
and interesting.59 
 Beside his active role in press propaganda, Hofer was also involved in 
promoting German culture in Spain. In order to combat the negative, militaristic image 
employed time and again by the Allies, German propagandists were conscious of the 
need to highlight Germany’s cultural achievements. Peter Grupp has argued that 
German officials did not take cultural propaganda too seriously.60 Given Germany’s 
effort in Spain, however, it is clear that cultural propaganda was employed quite 
successfully. At the time though propagandists might not have made any distinctions 
between their various propaganda efforts and only after the First World War did the 
effort to influence public opinion become more sophisticated, using cultural propaganda 
on a larger scale.61 However, during World War I Germany already hoped to make a 
positive impression on neutrals by stressing the country’s success in the areas of culture 
and science. Themes of cultural propaganda ranged from town planning, industry, 
religion and philosophy, to literature and theatre.62 Hofer, for example, organised 
lectures on new technological developments, Germany’s social policies and German 
music, the latter being accompanied by piano recitals. Evidence from Spanish 
newspaper reviews suggests that concerts featuring music by German composers 
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frequently took place and were received with great enthusiasm by Spanish audiences.63 
The German embassy also promoted the staging of German plays in Spanish theatres.64  
Research on German cultural propaganda in other neutral countries such as 
Sweden and Switzerland shows that it was often taken less seriously than press 
propaganda and left to private individuals to organise.65 In Spain August Hofer 
requested German war films to be sent over from Berlin but German film propaganda 
was not able keep up with the effort by the Allies, who had a more developed film 
industry.66 A report from the German embassy from August 1916 described French film 
propaganda in particular as very strong and conceded that it was not possible to 
compete with the Allies in the area of visual propaganda such as illustrations, photos 
and films.67 Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1917 Berlin sent two propaganda films via 
submarine to Spain for the attention of naval attaché von Krohn. Krohn was ordered to 
have the films shown at the Spanish royal court and afterwards distribute them across 
the country with the help of private propagandists like Hofer in Barcelona and 
Rautzenberg in Madrid.68 
 Themes of German propaganda mainly focused on fostering the idea of a 
defensive war which Germany had been forced into, justifications for the violation of 
Belgian neutrality, and reasons for the continuation of unrestricted submarine warfare. 
Other popular topics frequently highlighted in pro-German articles were the export of 
contraband to the Allies and the use of Spanish ship space for England and France. The 
Roger Casement trial and execution was also highlighted by German propagandists, 
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especially in the Spanish republican press.69 Those themes were also reflected in 
Hofer’s publications, with titles such as ¿Crímenes alemanes? (German crimes?), El 
Origen de la Conflagración (Reasons for the outbreak)70, Calumnias inglesas (English 
slander)71, La agencia Reuter o la fábrica de embustes ingleses (Reuter – factory of 
English lies)72, Cómo Bélgica rompió su neutralidad (How Belgium broke its 
neutrality), ¿La guerra submarina, es legal? (Submarine warfare – is it legal?),73 and 
Asesinato de la tripulación de un submarine alemán por soldados inglesas 
(Assassination of a German submarine crew by English soldiers)74. Other publications 
of his service, for example La guerra alemana y el catolicismo por católicos alemanes 
(The German war and Catholicism for German Catholics)75, were aimed at Spain’s 
largely Catholic population.  
Among the main arguments brought forward against the Allies was the British 
blockade against Germany which, it was claimed, constituted a cruel transgression from 
international law and was seen as an attempt to starve the country.76 German 
propaganda in Spain also appealed to the country’s colonial and territorial ambitions in 
Morocco, Gibraltar and Portugal, which in the past had been subject to negotiations 
with the Allies and often led to Spain drawing the shorter straw.77  
Although the invasion and occupation of neutral Belgium presented a substantial 
obstacle to German propaganda, Spanish Germanófilos were less concerned with the 
matter. As outlined in Chapter 1, in Spain the European conflict was used to project the 
opposing viewpoints of traditional monarchists and liberal reformers by siding with one 
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belligerent who was thought best to represent Spain’s future. German propagandists 
often simply had to employ anti-British sentiments amongst Spaniards in order to 
explain the violation of Belgian neutrality. Since Spain was economically dependent on 
Britain and France, which frequently used this dependency to exert pressure on the 
Spanish government to show a pro-Allied neutrality, Germany’s explanation of a 
defensive war, forced upon it by the Allies out of fear for German economic dominance, 
seemed plausible to many Spaniards.  
An alleged letter from an English-man originally printed in the Gaceta Militar 
de Santiago de Chile in October 1914 and reproduced in the Correspondencia Alemana 
de la Guerra stated that Germany had become a venomous poison for English 
commerce. According to the letter, ‘made in Germany’ had turned into an unbearable 
nightmare for Britain and English businesses were suffering from being under-priced by 
German competitors. France, Belgium and Russia were also affected by this perceived 
German economic dominance and, as the writer argued, it was those countries, Belgium 
in particular, that first formed an alliance against Germany in order to curb its power.78 
To further emphasise the point of a defensive war, the Correspondencia Alemana de la 
Guerra argued that before the German occupation of Belgium Belgian soldiers with the 
help of the French were pillaging their own towns and it was therefore necessary to take 
measures against this behaviour.79  
Those arguments culminated in the aforementioned German white book, 
Violation of human rights during the Belgian people’s war, published by the Auswärtige 
Amt in May 1915. The book sought to justify the German occupation of Belgium and to 
refute accusations of atrocities committed by the German army. It was seen as 
                                                 
78Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Abteilung Historische Drucke, Signatur 4 Krieg 
1914/27614, Correspondencia alemana de la Guerra, no. 36 [1915?]. 
79Ibid., no. 1 [Aug?] 1914. 
87 
 
particularly vital to distribute the publication in neutral countries.80 Violence committed 
against civilians during the German invasion of Belgium had not only brought on 
outrage from the international community but also turned important neutrals such as 
Italy and the USA against Germany.81 In Spain, however, the violation of the rights of a 
fellow neutral, Catholic country did not cause widespread consternation or diminish 
support for Germany and the Central Powers.  
The German media campaign successfully presented the Central Powers as 
defenders of traditional, Catholic values and supporters of the Spanish monarchy and 
ruling order82. Equally Germany secretly supported the pro-neutrality sentiment of the 
Spanish working class movement while the Allies were portrayed as a pro-
interventionist force only using Spain to further their war effort. German propagandists 
ensured Spain would enforce its policy of strict neutrality and not join the war on the 
side of the Entente. As propagandist Carl Coppel wrote in 1920, ‘What was Germany 
asking from Spain? Nothing. The abstention from a war in which the Spaniards had 
nothing to avenge nor claim from the Germans. What were England and France, the 
authors of Spanish decadence, asking from Spain? A break from neutrality, intervention, 
ruin. In return for what? What was the compensation? Nothing more than the honour to 
be enlisted amongst the whites, blacks and yellows of the great guard.’83 
Since joining Germany in the war was not a possibility, the Germanófilos 
showed their support for the Central Power’s by defending strict neutrality. Their 
support was hidden behind declarations of patriotism and rejection of any outside 
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interference in Spanish affairs.84 Left-wing publications, on the other hand, argued that a 
departure from neutrality would negatively impact on the working classes.85  
 The success of German propaganda campaigns, such as Hofer’s, was 
further facilitated by the lack of any major opposition from the Allies. Indeed, France 
and Britain were slow to initiate a cohesive propaganda operation combating German 
activity.86 The Allies initial inactivity was openly criticised by some Spaniards and 
visitors to Spain87 and it was concluded that the passive position taken by Britain and 
France could only be viewed as indifference.88 Although the Foreign Office was well 
aware of German intrigues in Spain and also realised the ineffectiveness of its own 
propaganda, British diplomats were confident that Spain would not join Germany in the 
war.89 An intervention was seen as unnecessary, at least in the initial stages of the war, 
since it was felt that Spaniards would be able to judge the shortcomings and advantages 
of each warring party for themselves.90 The illusion of a short war probably also played 
a part in the Allies’ decision not to stage a large propaganda campaign in a neutral 
country immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, as did Spain's economic reliance 
on France and Britain, which allowed the Entente to assert sufficient pressure on the 
country.  
 Soon, however, the Allies realised the need to counter German propaganda. As 
the war continued activities of the German embassy were increasingly carried out in the 
open and German influence on the Spanish press as well as the political world was 
becoming more widespread.91 Amongst the Entente powers, it was France that most 
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actively tried to counter pro-German news in Spain. Similar to the German propaganda 
effort, the French relied on private initiatives and organisations such as the Institut 
Français in Madrid, which formed a propaganda committee. They published their own 
newspapers and also distributed propaganda material sent from France. Attempts were 
also made to influence the Spanish press through Havas and its Spanish subsidiary, 
Fabra.92  
The British pursued their propaganda in Spain very cautiously. Official British 
documents relating to the outbreak of the war were circulated amongst newspaper 
editors and private individuals. Also, the British embassy financially supported the 
various French propaganda activities. Allied propaganda during the first year of the war, 
however, was still not matching heightened German activity in Spain. Only from the 
second half of 191593 onwards did the Allies follow a more aggressive strategy in the 
struggle for Spanish opinion. Following Italy’s entry into the war in May 1915, German 
diplomats in Spain expressed their concern over increased Allied propaganda activity 
aimed at shifting Spanish sympathies towards the Entente. Ambassador Ratibor was not 
very concerned about that development though, since he was convinced the majority of 
Spaniards were in favour of strict neutrality. He suggested, however, an immediate 
increase in propaganda activity, in particular by winning over important Spanish 
newspaper and possibly influencing politicians.94 The Auswärtige Amt, alarmed by 
Italy’s entry into the war, agreed with Ratibor and insisted on boosting the German 
campaign in Spain stating ‘A few million more or less should not matter.’95 Ratibor was 
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ordered to take all necessary measures immediately and unlimited financial support for 
propaganda purposes was assured to him.96 
 The British increased their propaganda effort by giving financial support 
to several Spanish newspapers and also supplying them with propaganda material.97 In 
February 1916 a British propaganda office was established in Madrid. A month later the 
French started a telephone news service sending news from the French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to Spain. 
 French propagandists in particular were very active in the area of cultural 
propaganda. They organised talks and lectures of French intellectuals and artists who 
would travel through Spain and conversely invited Spanish intellectuals to France. Joint 
exhibitions of Spanish and French artists took place on initiative of French 
propagandists.98 With the entry of the United States into the conflict in 1917, the Allied 
propaganda campaign in Spain received additional support with the establishment of an 
American press bureau in Madrid. American news items from the Committee on Public 
Information were translated and forwarded to the Spanish news agency Fabra. The 
Americans also employed film propaganda but instead of war films they used films on 
the advantages of US agriculture and industry. Also, American companies and 
businesses exhibited propaganda photos in their shop windows.99  
Until the end of the war, however, Allied expenditure for propaganda in Spain 
never surpassed that of the Germans.100 At the beginning of 1917 the British overall 
investment in propaganda in Spain was approximately 24,000 pesetas. In 1916 the 
German embassy had paid 35,000 pesetas per month to El Dia alone.101 This did not 
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prevent the German propagandists from frequently complaining about the Allied 
propaganda effort which they felt was far greater than their own.102 Official and private 
propagandists argued the Allies had a greater advantage in Spain since the beginning of 
the war thanks to larger financial investments.103 Although their perception of the allied 
propaganda effort in Spain did not reflect reality, it could be explained by the need to 
pressure the Auswärtige Amt into spending more money and also stressing the 
importance of their own work. Both sides employed similar propaganda techniques 
during the Great War but each warring party was convinced of each other’s 
superiority.104 
 
Collaboration between Spanish newspapers and journalists and the 
German embassy 
 
The propaganda network the Germans had built up in Spain depended on the 
collaboration of Spanish journalists and newspaper editors as well as businessmen, 
politicians and diplomats. Some of those collaborations were achieved with bribery. 
Since many Spanish newspapers were struggling financially due to rising prices in 
paper, financial contributions by German diplomats and private propagandists offered a 
welcome relief during times of economic hardship. Further pressure was put on 
newspaper editors when German businesses stopped buying advertisement space in pro-
Allied newspapers, ensuring a loss of circulation amongst these publications.105 Many 
Spanish editors and journalists however, were more than willing to make a contribution 
to the German war effort in the hope this would be to the advantage of Spain.  
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 While the German embassy, with the help of private news services, 
established contacts with Spanish journalists who would write pro-German articles, 
Spanish newspapers favourable to German opinion were targeted and subsequently 
published articles praising the German war effort. In October 1914 Ambassador Ratibor 
was able to report back to the Auswärtige Amt that La Tribuna and El Pais were willing 
to print pro-German propaganda under the guise of Spanish nationalism.106 However, it 
is unlikely that the liberal and pro-Allied publication El Pais107 formed a lasting 
relationship with the German embassy and evidence suggests that the contact was an 
isolated incident.  
The collaboration with La Tribuna, an illustrated evening paper with a 
circulation of approximately 20,000 copies,108 was seen as particularly useful since the 
paper did not have a particular political stance and was therefore read by a wide 
audience. Contact between the paper and the German embassy had been initiated by 
AEG director Armbruster, who, as mentioned before, had founded a propaganda service 
in Madrid. He had known La Tribuna’s owner, Canovas Cervantes, for several years. 
Canovas was willing to hand over his paper to the Germans in return for financial 
contributions.109 In July 1915 the German embassy was able to buy over two thirds of 
the shares for a newspaper trust which included La Tribuna as well as Día Grafico,110 an 
illustrated morning paper with a circulation of 30,000 copies.111 The Foreign Office 
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called La Tribuna ‘Spanish only in name’ due to the direct influence of the German 
embassy.112 
 Alexander Bruns was able to make use of the various contacts he had 
established before the war and continued to successfully provide Spanish newspapers 
with pro-German articles and news. Publications favourable to German ideas such as 
the Carlist papers Correo Español and El Universo were at the disposal of the embassy 
right from the outset of the war. The German propagandists however, realised the need 
to win over newspapers which did not have any strong political tendencies in either 
direction.113 August Hofer ensured German propaganda in Spanish newspapers focused 
on the issue of strict neutrality by paying Spanish journalists to write pro-neutrality 
articles.114  
 German propagandists were also able to rely on news correspondents of 
German publications who had been reporting from Spain prior to the war. The 
Kölnische Volkszeitung, for example, enjoyed good relations with the Madrid paper El 
Debate and assured the Auswärtige Amt in the pro-German leanings of the 
publication.115 German propagandists cleverly manipulated Spanish public opinion to 
their advantage and sought collaboration with publications from across the political 
spectrum. German propaganda activity in Spain reached such heights that by the end of 
1917 the Foreign Office declared half the Spanish press was bought by Germany.116 
Approximately 500 Spanish newspapers were in the hands of the Central Powers by the 
end of the First World War.117 The main Madrid papers controlled by the German 
embassy were La Tribuna, Correo Español, ABC and several smaller publications. Pro-
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Allied newspapers such as El Imparcial, El Heraldo, Vanguardia, the Republican papers 
Diluvio and España Nueva were also to some extent influenced by German 
diplomats.118 Although the collaboration with Diluvio was not seen as very successful, 
the embassy maintained its financial support in order to avoid the paper being taken 
over by the Allies.119 
 Hofer’s German News Service for Spain was able to call on the help of 
the journalist Fabré y Oliver and also attracted the interest of the head of Agencia 
Central de la Prensa, Jose de Guiller-Garcia. Fabré y Oliver, who had worked for 
Vanguardia,120 would write articles for different publications based on German material 
and Guiller-Garcia, also supplied with material from the German propaganda service, 
would give presentations in Spanish workers’ clubs. By praising German social 
institutions, Hofer was hoping to achieve a positive influence on Spanish workers.121 To 
guarantee a successful collaboration with journalists, German propagandists not only 
had to offer financial rewards but also facilitate trips to Germany or the Western front. 
Writer and journalist Ricardo Leon was lavished with attention by German officials 
during his stay in Germany. He was able to visit different social and industrial facilities 
and was also introduced to German politicians. In return, it was hoped that the positive 
reception he received would lead to a favourable portrayal of Germany in the Spanish 
press.122 
To avoid any suggestions of bribery, which could have impacted negatively on 
the propaganda effort, Berlin preferred foreign journalists to approach the German 
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government rather than the other way around.123 Ambassador Ratibor was eager though 
to find more Spanish literary personalities willing to travel to Germany and took matters 
into his own hands.124 However, he was not successful in attracting great attention. 
Fernando Weyler, son of General Valeriano Weyler – former governor general of Cuba, 
signalled his interest in such an undertaking to the German embassy.125 At the beginning 
of the twentieth century Weyler senior had served as minister for war and had also been 
in close contact with German diplomats in Spain. In February 1914 for example, he 
attended a banquet of the German colony in Barcelona in honour of the birthday of 
Kaiser Wilhelm II.126  
 The Vanguardia correspondent Enrique Dominguez Rodiño, reporting 
from Bremen, was a frequent collaborator of the German administration and received 
financial support from the Auswärtige Amt.127 Curiously, he had first come to the 
attention of German diplomats for articles which painted Germany in a less than 
favourable light. In February 1914 the German consulate at Barcelona informed the 
chancellor of an article by Rodiño which, as the German diplomats saw it, demeaned 
German institutions and painted the German military as war mongers.128 In his article he 
claimed the German people did not want war and it was only the military, convinced of 
a victory, that was advocating, what he called a ‘suicidal struggle’. He went on to 
describe the German soldier as self-deluded, believing he was god-like and invincible 
while German officers were painted as rich and pleasure loving.129  
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Rodiño, however, quickly changed his tune and the consulate was already able to 
report in March 1914 that he had written a more complimentary article after an 
encounter with the Kaiser himself.130 In it the Kaiser was described as a friendly, caring 
and hardworking ruler rather than a war monger. Rodiño stated his admiration for the 
German emperor had grown after seeing him up close and he even went so far as to 
describe him as the ideal citizen.131 After the outbreak of the war his support was sought 
by the consulate at Barcelona and Rodiño was even facilitated in his wish for interviews 
with German politicians. In his account of the war years Rodiño detailed interviews he 
conducted in Belgium with Cardinal Mercier and the German governor general of 
Belgium, von Bissing. Though he mentioned that these interviews were organised with 
the help of the Spanish representative at Brussels,132 the Marquis de Villalobar, a 
frequent collaborator of the German administration,133 he did not mention his close 
collaboration with the German diplomats and propagandists. Rodiño did not see himself 
as an unconditional Germanófilo but instead as an impartial foreigner who had lived and 
reported from Germany for many years. He saw Germany as a cultured country and 
rejected any notion of German barbarism.134  
 Using the occasion of the 300th anniversary of Cervantes’ death, an 
interview between Rodiño and the German state secretary von Jagow was arranged in 
April 1916 and it appeared in the German sponsored publication La Correspondencia de 
España. Only shortly afterwards though, the German embassy had to give up its 
financial support for the paper as it appeared the Correspondencia was receiving larger 
funds from the Allies. The paper’s editors were therefore not interested in a 
collaboration with the German administration anymore, highlighting that collaboration 
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with the belligerents was also opportunistic and motivated by financial needs rather than 
political convictions.135 The occasion of the interview between Rodiño and von Jagow, 
however, was seen as a good opportunity to show appreciation for Spanish culture 
without being overtly political.  
In the interview von Jagow praised Cervantes’ work, comparing him to Homer 
and Shakespeare, whom he called eternal figures of the world of literature with which 
German people were as familiar with as with Goethe. He went on to state that Don 
Quijote as well as Cervantes’ works La gitanilla and Novelas ejemplares were known to 
Germans and that ‘Germany would willingly give testament to admire, honour and 
venerate Cervantes work, his noble language and the genius of Spain.’136 The lavish 
praise was quickly followed by an attempt at damage limitation regarding the sinking of 
the passenger ship Sussex, which had claimed the life of Spanish composer Granados. 
The state secretary confirmed that Germany would respect the rights of neutral countries 
and promised that an investigation into the incident would be carried out.137 The 
interview between Rodiño and von Jagow serves as an excellent example to illustrate 
how cultural propaganda was instrumentalised to distract from the negative impact the 
war was having on neutral countries. Spain, which was often side-lined by the greater 
powers in international matters,138 also felt her culture was not appreciated enough by 
the Entente, something German propaganda used to its advantage.139 
 The interview between Rodiño and von Jagow also served to voice 
sympathy for the 16,000 Spaniards that had signed a pro-German manifesto.140 Ongoing 
arguments between Francófilos and Germanófilos had produced several manifestos 
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published by Spanish intellectuals who wished to express their solidarity with one of the 
warring parties.141 The first of those publications was a pro-Allied manifesto which 
appeared in Iberia on 10 July 1915.142 As a response a pro-German manifesto followed, 
written by Literature Nobel prize laureate and well known Spanish playwright Jacinto 
Benavente. It was published in La Tribuna on 18 December 1915 under the title 
‘German–Spanish friendship’. Besides expressing admiration for the German state and 
German culture, it also claimed that German and Spanish interests were harmonious 
while at the same time affirming Spanish neutrality.143 Amongst the signatories were 
intellectuals, scholars and religious figures. It was also claimed that many army officers 
and businessmen agreed with the ideas expressed in the manifesto but were reluctant to 
sign it out of fear of being blacklisted.144 The manifesto was reproduced by Hofer’s 
news service which distributed 30,000 copies of it in 1916.145 The text was also 
reprinted in the German press, as ABC was able to report.146 
 Journalists working with the embassy or other German propaganda 
institutions were carefully investigated by the Auswärtige Amt to ensure their pro-
German leanings. It was often difficult to establish the true motives of collaborators as 
can be seen in the example of Javier Bueno, who was reporting from Germany. Bueno 
was often difficult to control147 and frequently complained about the measures of the 
German censors which he thought were hindering his work supporting Germany in the 
Spanish press148. Despite those difficulties, the Auswärtige Amt was keen to keep Bueno 
on their books and tolerated his behaviour. Bueno, who also wrote under the pseudonym 
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Antonio de Azpeitua,149 was a controversial and paradoxical character who prior to the 
war had been the long-time editor of the anarchist paper El Radical and a confidante of 
Alejandro Lerroux.150  
During the First World War, however, he changed his political direction and 
started writing pro-German propaganda for La Tribuna and other Spanish 
publications.151 Before the outbreak of the war Bueno had caused a controversy while 
working as a correspondent in France. In an article published in La Tribuna he had 
described Raymond Poincaré as a statesman with little representative force and a 
wardrobe with not much left to desire. This resulted in a hostile campaign against 
Bueno in the French press with journalists asking for his expulsion from France.152 
During the war he was frequently criticised by fellow journalists for his pro-German 
propaganda and also accused of making up his articles.153 Bueno’s character and 
political background remained ambivalent. La Correspondencia de España in 1915 
described him as a Republican journalist working for España Nueva under the 
pseudonym Carlos Roig.154 Given this ambiguity as well as his personal difficulties – he 
was shot at as a result of an argument with the director of the newspaper El 
Parlamentario155 – it is surprising that the German administration sought to collaborate 
with him.  
 Another prominent Spanish journalist at the service of the German 
administration was Juan Pujol. He had worked as a war correspondent for ABC in 
various European capitals from 1914 onwards but left the paper at the end of 1916 due 
to disagreements. Subsequently he became co-director of the pro-German paper La 
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Nación156 and was also part of the editorial team of the Hofer publication Germania.157 
In his articles from the front line Pujol gave the impression of being courted by German 
generals who were trying to gain ABC’s favour.158 Similar to Bueno’s publications, 
doubts were raised over the authenticity of Pujol’s work and whether he had actually 
visited the places at the front which he was describing in his articles.159 While some 
liberal publications, such as Los Aliados, welcomed Pujol as their adversary,160 others 
like España criticised him for accusing their writer Luis Araquistáin of being paid by 
the British government while Pujol himself was supported by the German. The 
accusations against Araquistáin were denied by the British embassy, which claimed not 
to exert any pressure on the Spanish press, unlike other countries.161  
Araquistáin, however, did negotiate with the Foreign Office over subsidising a 
pro-Allied publication which could have served as an instrument to spread Allied 
propaganda in Spain. Though his suggestion of founding a paper possibly called Union 
Latina, Alianza Latina or Politica Latina was not picked up by the British, he 
approached British diplomats again by the end of 1915 with another idea. This time he 
offered to sell 10,000 mules to the British army in order to create a pro-Allied paper 
with the profit which, however, did not come about. Araquistáin pressed on though, and 
eventually informed the British about España’s financial difficulties. They agreed to 
finance the publication by contributing 1,000 pesetas per edition. The use of España as 
a pro-Allied propaganda tool did not sit well with its director and founder, philosopher 
José Ortega y Gasset, who feared this would lead to relinquishing intellectual control 
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over the publication.162 The publication, founded in 1915 as a weekly journal of culture 
and politics, provided a platform for many of the writers and thinkers of the Generation 
of 98 who voiced their political ideas in its pages as well as discussing culture and 
arts.163 During the First World War the newspaper frequently criticised activity by pro-
German journalists and condemned actions initiated by German propaganda.  
 Despite his own collaboration with one of the belligerents, Araquistáin 
was quick to criticise other Spanish journalists for working with the German 
administration. In an article published in the Daily News, Araquistáin accused some 
Madrid newspapers of having sold themselves to Germany. As a response to his article 
several newspaper directors came together demanding reparations from Araquistáin, 
staging a tribunal de caballeros (a gentlemen’s tribunal) against the writer and 
protesting against his accusations.164 This tribunal, also involving General Primo de 
Rivera, was mainly of symbolic character rather than entailing any legal implications 
for the España writer. It did not seem to have amounted to anything other than 
protesting against the accusations. Among the papers that protested were El Correo 
Español, El Universo, El Debate, La Tribuna and ABC,165 all papers which received 
financial support from Germany for printing pro-German propaganda. 
 Since no censorship laws existed, journalists and editors could not be 
prosecuted for collaborating with one of the belligerents. The Spanish constitution of 
1876 guaranteed freedom of the press. This right was only revoked in times of civil 
unrest such as the summer of 1917, when España was temporarily suspended for 
supporting the parliamentary assembly and Araquistáin and some of his colleagues were 
arrested.166 Similarly in August 1918 freedom of the press was revoked until October of 
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that year as a response to violent revolutionary strikes.167 It was only in July 1918 that a 
law to ensure neutrality was introduced, which also enabled the government to censor 
articles and images relating to the war.168 The bill of neutrality gave the government the 
right to prohibit publication, issue, transmission or circulation of any news it considered 
contrary to the respect due to neutrality or the security of Spain. Any breach of the law 
was subject to penalties of imprisonment or fines ranging from 500 to 100,000 pesetas. 
Equally, spreading news of events abroad which caused unrest amongst Spaniards or 
defaming the head of a foreign state verbally or in writing led to punishment. The 
Spanish government also reserved the right to enforce the new law by censorship.169  
In the same month another law was passed that would create a support system 
for publishers granting advance payments to make up for the difference in the price of 
paper.170 According to reports from the Foreign Office the neutrality bill led to strong 
protests from the Liberal Party as well as the Republicans and Socialists, all of whom 
viewed it as an attack on the freedom of the press and saw it as a way for the 
government to mute any criticism levelled against it. British diplomats were also 
concerned that the bill would not only hinder their own propaganda but also interfere 
with British intelligence in Spain and prevent any criticism of the war, however 
reasonable or moderate.171  
Enforcing strict neutrality in the press, however, played into the hands of 
German diplomats who throughout the war had attempted to portray the Allied 
campaign in Spain as an interventionist one. By extending the commitment to neutrality 
to the print media as well, it was now very unlikely Spain would openly join the Entente 
in the war – the goal the German propagandists had pursued all along. Prior to the 
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enactment of censorship laws the only other means of suppressing inflammatory articles 
was by enforcing a press law which forbade attacks and abuses of a friendly foreign 
sovereign.172 When the Carlist publication Correo Español printed an attack on the 
French ambassador to Spain, it was subsequently prosecuted for it.173 Equally the editor 
of La Tribuna was charged for allowing the publication of an offensive caricature of the 
King of Italy. The paper also received a warning that it might be suspended if there were 
any repeated incidents.174  
Anti-German propaganda, to some extent, was also curbed by the Spanish press 
law. The Voz de Guipuzcoa, for example, was temporarily suppressed after printing 
articles condemning German cruelties in Belgium which also contained attacks on the 
Kaiser.175 The Foreign Office tried to restrict anti-British propaganda by complaining to 
the Spanish government, though not always with success. Arguing that Spain was not in 
a state of siege and officially neutral, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs could not always 
prevent defamatory articles from being printed.176 The lack of wide-ranging censorship 
laws for most of the war also allowed German propagandists to carry out their work. 
However, they had to face numerous other obstacles in their campaign for Spanish 
public opinion. 
 
Difficulties of German propaganda in Spain 
 
 News embargos, disruption of telegraphic communication and the 
logistics of sending material made the work of propagandists very difficult. Sending 
material from Germany to Spain was a constant problem and alternative routes had to be 
found in order to keep up the supply of propaganda material. In the first months of the 
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war distribution took place via Genoa. Increased news blockades meant propaganda 
publications could only be smuggled.177 In April 1915, in a letter to the German 
chancellor, the German consulate at Genoa confirmed that large quantities of German 
propaganda material had been received in the Genoese port since the outbreak of the 
war. The received material was then sent on to Spain, Portugal and America either via 
post marked with Italian stamps to classify them as Italian dispatches or shipped as 
freight.  
 The shipping of material on neutral vessels was already creating 
difficulties for the German diplomats in Genoa. After the British government decided on 
15 March 1915 to clamp down on German goods and material being smuggled on 
neutral ships, Italian shipping companies demanded certificates of origin authenticated 
by British consulates for all goods carried on board in order to avoid searches by the 
French or British authorities. Therefore, any German deliveries arriving in Genoa 
subsequently had to be sent to Spain by land route. To avoid any suspicions, the 
Genoese consulate also suggested posting propaganda material separately in small 
parcels or letters. Alternatively, propaganda material could be printed in Holland and 
then distributed to its required destination.178 Only shortly after the consulate’s report to 
Bethmann Hollweg, Italy entered the war on the side of the Allies, forcing German 
officials to find alternative routes via Switzerland and in some cases Holland, Sweden 
and Denmark.179 Switzerland, with a German propaganda office established in Bern, 
was seen as a relatively safe route for sending propaganda material to Spain.180 
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However, posting material via Bern was not always reliable and often German 
propagandists in Spain had to be supplied through deliveries from Holland.181  
It was not only delivery routes that posed a problem; how material was 
dispatched also became an issue. Large parcels and packets often aroused the suspicion 
of the French authorities. Therefore, propaganda material had to be sent in letters, 
making the whole procedure much more costly.182 The postal route from Spain to 
Germany was equally difficult. In order to keep the Auswärtige Amt informed of their 
activities, German propagandists had to resort to sending their reports via Sweden and 
Holland.183 This obviously led to long delays in sending propaganda material to Spain 
and the German embassy and private propagandists were often hindered in their work. 
In August 1916 embassy secretary von Stohrer reported that they were happy to have 
received new material from Germany after being without propaganda supplies for 
several months.184 The extent and effort German propagandists went through in order to 
get propaganda material into Spain also shows the importance of Spanish neutrality for 
the German war effort. 
 Telegraphic communication between Spain and Germany was another 
obstacle the German propagandists had to overcome. Due to allied blockades, news 
from home was reaching the German diplomatic corps and residents with long delays, 
causing a great deal of anxiety and uncertainty amongst them.185 In addition to the 
Emden-Vigo cable, another cable existed at Tenerife connecting German cables with 
Monrovia (Liberia), Pernambuco (Brazil) and via Lome (Togo) to Douala (Cameroon). 
While the Emden-Tenerife cable was cut by the Allies at the outbreak of the war, the 
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Tenerife-Monrovia connection was used to send news items from Germany to the 
German community in Tenerife who then positioned those news in publications on the 
island until this connection was also eventually cut off in November 1914.186  
 With the cutting of the German Emden-Vigo cable in August 1914, the 
German community in Spain had to obtain current news from radio transmissions from 
Norddeich, received by German ships interned in Spanish ports.187 In the first weeks of 
the war August Hofer was able to obtain news from a radio transmitter on the German 
steamer Düsseldorf. He would copy the news and then distribute them on a daily basis 
to the most important Spanish and Portuguese newspapers. Soon, though, the Allies put 
an end to the radio communication and the Spanish government decreed in August 1914 
that all radio transmitters on foreign ships lying in Spanish ports had to be 
dismantled.188 Hofer was not deterred by this and was able to install a radio transmitter 
in his own house in a suburb of Barcelona.  
A second radio station working for Hofer was run by Spaniards who, when 
threatened with closure, appealed to the local governor and were granted permission to 
continue their work. Naturally, they did not disclose that they were in the service of 
German propaganda.189 Although he was under constant surveillance by the Spanish 
police and Allied agents, Hofer managed to maintain his radio communication with 
Germany, forming the basis for his German News Service for Spain.190 He was also able 
to undermine Allied propaganda efforts by ensuring the shutting down of two French 
radio transmitter stations.191 Beside Hofer’s illegal transmitter, communication between 
Germany and Spain was facilitated through the Spanish military wireless station at 
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Carabanchel, which had been installed by AEG, and connections via Austria-Hungary 
(Pola) as well as the stations at Norddeich, Königswusterhausen and Eilvese. The offer 
by the Spanish Compania nacional de telegrafia sin hilos (National wireless telegraphy 
company) at the end of 1914 to establish a German-Spanish wireless service was turned 
down by the German administration. It was feared that the service was too closely 
connected to Britain.192   
 The importance of maintaining radio transmission for the transfer of 
news and for propaganda purposes was seen as vital by the Germany military, which 
also stressed the importance of continuing these networks after the war. In the case of 
another European wide conflict communication systems needed to be in place and not 
be, like in the First World War, set up from scratch.193 It is interesting to note that by the 
beginning of 1917 German military planners had not only learned their lessons 
regarding the importance of communication networks but also did not rule out another 
large conflict between the greater powers.  
 Private initiatives such as Hofer’s were often financed by the individuals 
themselves and relied on contributions from the German community in Spain. Officials 
in Berlin did not view Spain as the most important neutral country to be targeted with 
propaganda. Italy and the United States, while they were still neutral, were seen as the 
main targets of German propaganda. Indeed, both those countries, as well as 
Switzerland, experienced major propaganda campaigns from both warring sides.194 
Although the Auswärtige Amt wanted to ensure good relations with Spain, especially in 
view of establishing trade links after the war, it expected that a large part of the 
propaganda effort was financed from within the German business and diplomatic 
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community in Spain.195 Therefore, official and private propaganda efforts were hindered 
by limited finances and despite contributions from Berlin, propagandists had to 
constantly ask for more money in order to keep up their work in Spain.196 
 The various activities by different private and official organisations 
hindered a coherent effort in the pursuit of Spanish public opinion and often led to 
confusion. The lack of cohesion became apparent in the correspondence between the 
Saxony Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Auswärtige Amt from May 1915. The 
ministry in Saxony had received a request for the publication of articles from the 
Oficina de información Alemana (Office for German news) and now asked for 
confirmation from Berlin whether this bureau was an official German institution and if 
their articles had been subject to censorship. An investigation by the Auswärtige Amt 
amounted to nothing and it could not be established whether the service was the same as 
Rautzenberg’s service in Madrid.197  
The multitude of participants also created great competition between the various 
propaganda institutions, a fact that was recognised by the diplomats themselves. 
German naval attaché von Krohn described German propaganda efforts in Barcelona as 
incoherent, due to the lack of leadership by the German consul there who, according to 
von Krohn, was not very popular amongst Spanish and German circles and also lacked 
an understanding of Spanish culture and institutions. He assessed that this situation 
resulted in a race amongst propagandists who, rather than working together, ensured 
their competitors would not overtake them. Krohn wrote, ‘The head which guides the 
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movements of the individual parts is missing.’198 Equally ambassador Ratibor was not 
pleased with Consul Ostmann’s propaganda efforts in Catalonia and complained to the 
Auswärtige Amt about the consul’s lack of initiative.199  
 The hierarchy amongst German private and official propaganda efforts in 
Spain was often unclear. Private propagandists were expected to follow the lead of the 
embassy and the Auswärtige Amt, yet a high degree of initiative in their work was also 
expected from them. Due to the lack of any official guidelines outlining the 
collaboration between state and private propaganda institutions, the Auswärtige Amt 
was not always able to control all activity carried out by private propagandists who 
fought hard for the attention of Berlin with the hope of receiving financial support. 
Although the work of services such as Hofer’s was highly valued and supported by the 
German embassy and the Auswärtige Amt, he largely had to finance the service with his 
own money and contributions from the German and Austro-Hungarian community in 
Spain. The ambitious Hofer frequently clashed with German officials who were 
concerned with his indiscretion regarding propaganda activities and also wanted him to 
curb his expenses. 200 Undeterred by this, Hofer continued to request financial support 
as well as some official recognition which would grant him diplomatic immunity. In his 
requests he naturally praised his own work while criticising the official propaganda 
efforts of his main competitor, the German vice consul at Barcelona, Alfred von 
Carlowitz-Hartitzsch.  
 Whether out of financial need or motivated by a lack of recognition, 
Hofer not only resorted to discrediting the vice consul’s work but also cast doubts over 
whether Carlowitz’s character was suitable for representing the German cause in 
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Spain.201 According to Hofer, a German vice consul should not have been seen 
frequenting bars and attending a costume ball during the battle of Verdun as Carlowitz 
had. The private propagandist felt that the vice consul’s two year stint in Paris and Nice 
had left a deep impression on Carlowitz which, as Hofer argued, led to the diplomats 
less than gallantly behaviour in his affair with Baroness Ostmann.202 It is unclear 
whether the affair between the vice consul and the consul’s wife was a rumour made up 
by Hofer but his accusations certainly did not help to consolidate the German 
propaganda effort in Barcelona.  
Petty quarrels between Hofer and the German diplomatic corps in Spain brought 
his career as a propagandist to an abrupt end. In December 1917 he was faced with 
allegations of having written an anonymous letter to Ambassador Ratibor in which he 
discredited Vice Consul Carlowitz, referring to an incident in which the consular official 
had brought about the dismissal of Vanguardia journalist Rubio. The letter, signed by 
‘An editor of the Vanguardia’, urged Ratibor to reinstate the journalist, otherwise the 
paper would publish a sensationalist article damaging the reputation of the German 
embassy and the consul.203 Although Hofer denied having written the letter, he admitted 
to having provided a manuscript on the incident with the Vanguardia which was then 
used for the letter. In the wake of a growing scandal, Hofer agreed to hand over his 
news service to the German embassy in December 1917.204  
 Negotiations over the management of Hofer’s news service after its 
founder’s fall from grace also highlight the more interventionist approach the German 
authorities were taking towards the end of the war. While a high degree of self-
mobilisation was noted in all belligerent countries at the beginning of the war, the 
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longer duration of the conflict, high number of casualties and waning prospects of 
victory, forced governments to take more control over private activities such as 
propaganda.205 The end of Hofer’s career as a propagandist for the German cause can 
therefore be seen as part of an attempt to streamline the German propaganda effort. 
Despite the fact that his enterprise was a private one, the embassy at Madrid and the 
consulate at Barcelona determined who would be Hofer’s successor. The businessman 
Eduard Kröger was chosen to continue Hofer’s work strictly collaborating with the 
German administration while still largely financing the service out of his own pocket.206  
Just before the end of the war an additional German propaganda office in Madrid 
was created to relieve the embassy of some of its press propaganda activities and to 
concentrate all propaganda efforts in one agency. The Sociedad de Estudios Economicos 
(Society for economic studies), ambiguously named in order to avoid any connections 
with the embassy,207 also continued its work after the war collaborating with Spanish 
partner publications.208 At the beginning of 1919 August Hofer’s creation, the German 
news service for Spain, was dissolved but its founder was keen to pick up his 
propaganda work again by trying to revive the Correspondencia Alemana.209  
 
Conclusion 
 
German influence on Spanish public opinion ensured a heated debate over 
neutrality which further widened the gap between Germanófilos and Francófilos. 
Contemporaries even described the conflict as a civil war of minds which did great 
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harm to Spain.210 Widespread German propaganda activity in the face of great allied 
economic advantage as well as much larger British and French communities in Spain, is 
further proof for the effectiveness of German propaganda during the First World War. 
The effort organised by German private propagandists and diplomats refutes the claim 
of Allied superiority in the struggle for neutral opinion.211 In Spain the German 
administration with the help of private residents staged an efficient and determined 
assault on public opinion.  
Undoubtedly the Allies had hoped their advantageous position in Spain would 
render an intensive campaign unnecessary. The country’s dependence on British coal212 
was frequently used as a bargaining tool not only to receive vital goods and resources in 
return but also to put pressure on Spain to align herself with the Allies and curb German 
influence. Various Spanish governments during the war, however, did not diverge from 
a policy of strict neutrality and avoided an open declaration of sympathy for one of the 
warring parties. This can also be attributed to the efforts of portraying Germany and the 
Central Powers as champions of Spanish neutrality and to a clever manipulation of the 
ideological differences within Spanish society. Although Allied economic supremacy 
ensured Spain would not join the Central Powers either, the lack of effective Allied 
propaganda countering German efforts meant that insufficient measures were taken to 
convince the conservative Germanophile elements of Spanish society of the merits of 
democracy and liberal ideas. As Spain’s civil war of words continued, Spanish 
intellectuals and writers, spurred on by the cultural mobilisation created by the 
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European war, continued their search for a regeneration of Spain which had begun at the 
end of the nineteenth century. 
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Chapter 3 
Pro-German Spaniards and the search for a new Spain 
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the war in Spain was mirrored in a confrontation 
between supporters of Germany and the Central Powers (Germanófilos) and those of the 
Entente (Francófilos). This chapter will closely analyse this debate, paying particular 
attention to the ideas of pro-German Spaniards which emerged during the First World 
War. The examination will be put into context with the process of cultural mobilisation 
during the war, a phenomenon which is often exclusively applied to the belligerent 
countries but has rarely been used to discuss the wartime experience of a neutral state.1 
However, as the example of Spain demonstrates, despite the country’s official neutrality 
a process of self-mobilisation amongst Spanish intellectuals and writers did occur. 
While this was an extension of the discussion on Spain’s regeneration, ongoing since 
the end of the nineteenth century, it was also partly exacerbated by the belligerents’ 
propaganda campaigns and the tangible prospect of political and social change 
emerging in Spain between 1914 and 1918. 
We have already seen in Chapter 1 that the end of the nineteenth and beginning 
of the twentieth century marked a period of great change for Spain with various groups 
in society attempting to reform the country. The First World War made this desire for 
change even more imment. Relatively little research has been done investigating the 
impact of World War I on Spanish intellectuals by trying to place them within the wider 
context of cultural mobilisation during the war.2 However, the works produced by pro-
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German Spaniards during the First World War contain the central ideas from which later 
emerged Spanish nationalist thought and therefore call for a closer examination. The 
themes championed by the Germanófilos, such as the negative impact of democracy, 
parliamentarism, English imperialism on the one hand and the transformative potential 
of science, order and German state socialism on the other, influenced Spanish 
nationalism, which began a transformative process in the inter-war period.3 The First 
World War therefore, can be seen as a facilitator of intellectual self-mobilisation in 
Spain, which turned writers, intellecutals, journalists and philosophers into what 
Maximiliano Fuentes Codera has called catalysts of national opinion. In their writings 
during the war Germanófilos and Francófilos sought to propose models of reform for 
Spain influenced by other European writers and spurred on by the intellectual 
mobilisation created by the war.4  
While the national question had already preoccupied the Generation of 98, they 
fell short of developing a coherent ideology and failed to formulate a programme of 
national reform. Stanley Payne has attributed this shortcoming to the subordinated role 
writers and intellectuals had played in Spanish public life until the end of the nineteenth 
century.5 Traditionally it had been the institution of the Catholic Church that was meant 
to provide national unity for all Spaniards. However, at the beginning of the twentieth 
century the Church’s power had been significantly eroded and intellectuals were gaining 
greater influence in the shaping of public opinion. Spain’s experience of the First World 
War not only highlights the emergence of writers and intellectuals in forming a national 
ideology, but it also underlines the struggle of the Spanish Catholic Church to find its 
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position in an increasingly secularised society in which alternative voices sought to 
redefine Spanishness. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, German propagandists successfully 
managed to maintain a hold on Spanish public opinion by highlighting Germany’s 
defence of Spanish neutrality and stressing the interventionist intentions of the Allies. 
To counter Allied accusations of barbarism, the German propaganda campaign 
emphasised the country’s cultural achievements. In that effort German propagandists in 
Spain were aided by the works produced by pro-German Spanish writers. In this chapter 
we will turn our examination to the arguments brought forward by Spain’s 
Germanófilos to justify their support for the Kaiserreich. Close attention is paid to 
views and opinions of intellectuals, as represented by writers, journalists, and artists, as 
well as leading religious figures in Spain. It soon will become apparent that this support 
was born out of various, often contradictory, reasons. The motivation of the Spanish 
Catholic Church to support tacitly the German war effort was entirely different, in fact 
opposed to, those of intellectuals and artists – further deepening the schism within 
Spanish society. Nevertheless, the fact that this support emerged from the ranks of 
Spaniards of all classes and outlooks made it especially valuable to the German cause. 
Spain’s Germanófilos were not a homogenous group of conservative nationalists 
but also included artists such as playwright Jacinto Benavente and writer Pío Baroja, 
whose ideas of liberalism and spiritual regeneration did not always fit in with orthodox 
Germanophile thinking. The investigation will focus on some of the literary works 
produced by Benavente and Baroja during the First World War in order to gain a better 
understanding of their pro-German arguments. Many Germanófilos, influenced by 
German wartime mobilisation in their search for Spain’s regeneration, used their 
writings to criticise the existing regime and what they perceived as the ills of the 
country. The Spanish Catholic Church, on the other hand, was concerned by the spread 
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of liberal ideas, which the clergy mainly associated with France, and therefore 
supported Germany. How the Catholic hierarchy in Spain justified its support of a 
predominanently Protestant power will also be discussed in the chapter.  
The majority of Spanish intellectuals favoured the side of the Entente during the 
war and heavily criticised their pro-German colleagues in various manifestos and other 
publications. The arguments brought forward against Germanophile thinking will be 
outlined in the discussion by looking at the different manifestos produced in Spain 
during the First World War. Finally the chapter will detail how the work of 
Germanófilos was used by the German administration for propaganda purposes which 
mainly focused on highlighting the positive achievements of German culture. Many 
Germanófilos happily collaborated with the German diplomatic corps in Spain, and by 
writing articles, editing German sponsored publications and holding lectures, they 
contributed to galvanise Spanish public opinion. 
Wartime mobilisation during the Great War also extended into the field of 
culture where intellectuals, writers and artists began to defend their respective warring 
side. The German ‘Manifesto of the 93’ or An die Kulturwelt (Appeal to the Civilised 
Nations) published at the beginning of October 1914 propagated the idea of a defensive 
war forced onto Germany, and sought to defend German culture. A month earlier a 
British manifesto published in the New York Times, and signed by prominent British 
writers such as H. G. Wells, Rudyard Kipling, Arthur Conan Doyle and others, had 
appealed to readers to come to the defense of civilisation. Manifestos produced by 
Russian intellectuals and scientists in 1914 also appealed to the civilised world, 
denouncing the actions of the Central Powers. German academics and intellectuals 
responded to Allied manifestos by denying accusations of war crimes and pledging their 
full support to the German military. Each side sought to defend their idea of civilisation 
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and by producing manifestos, articles, books and pamphlets, intellectuals and writers 
made their contribution to the war effort by trying to rouse public opinion.6  
That this form of cultural mobilisation could be observed in the belligerent 
countries is not so suprising, given the immediate impact of the war on every-day life 
and the fact that writers and intellectuals also actively fought at the front. At first glance 
the situation in a neutral country should have been quite different, since there was no 
need to rouse public opinion, and strengthen the nation’s resolve, in order to boost the 
war effort. This was not, however, necessarily the case in Spain.  
Philosopher Ortega y Gasset described Spain’s situation at the beginning of the 
First World War in the following terms: ‘Two Spains, gentlemen, are locked in an 
incessant battle: one Spain is dead, barren and desolate and the other is a new Spain, 
prosperous, and competitive, promoting life. Everything is in place so that this new 
Spain can triumph.’7 Ortega y Gasset’s hope for the emergence of a new Spain had also 
not diminished by the end of the war when he wrote, ‘There is a fabulous immanence in 
the air: the minutes are shuddering by. The time has come for the grand modernisation 
of Spain.’8 It was this hope for change, as described by Ortega y Gasset, as well as the 
European conflict, that mobilised Spanish writers and intellectuals. 
 
Spain’s Germanófilos – Motivation, arguments and works by pro-German 
Spaniards 
 
An article which appeared in the German newspaper Kölnische Volkszeitung in 
June 1916 outlined the contradictory behaviour of Spanish public opinion. It explained 
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that Spain’s anti-clericalists valued German culture and education and hoped a German 
victory would establish a freedom of conscience in Spain, the only country in Europe, 
as claimed in the article, which had not yet introduced religious freedom. The majority 
of Spaniards, however, were pro-German for entirely opposite reasons the author 
argued.9 Gerald Meaker assessed the phenomenon of Germanophilism as a form of 
Spanish nationalism which mainly championed Spanish themes, interests and traditions. 
He identified three groups of Germanófilos: ultra-Catholic traditionalists, moderate 
Catholic nationalists and national regenerationists.10 Maximiliano Fuentes Codera, on 
the other hand, divides the Germanófilos into two large categories: those who wanted to 
see England and France humiliated and those who wished for Spain to follow the 
German model for social, cultural and economic development in order to enable a 
national rebirth.11  
In the first category identified by Fuentes Codera fall those like Carlist leader 
Vazquez de Mella, who rejected the international politics of England and the Republican 
ideals of France.12 Meaker assigns the Carlists to his first group of Germanófilos – ultra-
Catholic traditionalists – who he viewed as more staunchly anti-French, more so than 
anti-British.13 Fuentes Codera, however, argues that while the Carlists viewed Britain as 
the main enemy of Spain, and saw France as less dangerous, they nevertheless regarded 
French aspirations as completely incompatible with those of Spain. According to 
Fuentes Codera, the Carlists thought of the First World War mainly as a conflict 
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between Germany and England; therefore, supporting Britain would have been against 
the interest of Spain, as Vazquez de Mella argued.14  
As a second group of Germanófilos, Meaker recognised the more moderate 
Catholic nationalists who opposed British imperialism and military power. They were 
represented by writers such as Edmundo González-Blanco, whose work Alemania y la 
Guerra Europea y la culpa de los Aliados (Germany and the European war and the fault 
of the Allies) was published in 1915. Fuentes Codera puts González-Blanco in his first 
category of those who wished to see England and France humiliated.15 In his writings a 
clear antipathy for Britain and France is evident, although his hatred for the former 
seems to have been stronger. This became clear in an article he wrote for La Nación, in 
which he outlined his reasons for opposing the Entente:  
The geographical and historical interests of England are conflicting with those of 
our homeland. From there arise ideal motifes of support and sympathy for 
Germany. Contrary to England, Germany does not have geographical or 
historical interests opposed to ours. Germany needs a strong partner in the 
Mediterranean and it is obvious that it cannot be France or Italy. Germany’s 
interests are in agreement with our interests and that is why a large part of the 
Spanish nation has more sympathies for Germany.16 
González-Blanco also blamed the Allies for the outbreak of the First World War and, 
similar to Carlist leader Vazquez de Mella, believed that the war mainly represented the 
outburst of the commercial rivalry between Britain and Germany initiated and spurred 
on by the British policy of encirclement.17 His hatred for Britain became particularly 
evident when he wrote: 
The cheek of England is repugnant. [...] Under the most flimsy pretexts they try 
to reduce Germany to a position of immorality and illegality, saying to neutral 
countries: Here is the criminal against whom all attacks are legitimate. [...] Very 
clear are the schemes of England which has been pursuing militarist policies in 
the last twenty years, as demonstrated in the Bosnian crisis and events at 
Agadir.18  
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When it came to attributing blame for the outbreak of the war, the Germanófilos 
were quick to point the finger at Britain or indeed Russia. González-Blanco argued in El 
Origen de la Guerra Europea (The origin of the European war) that the war was 
unavoidable and that while Britain was responsible for it as much as Russia, he saw 
Russia as the main culprit. Referencing the German white book, González-Blanco 
concluded Russia had wanted the war. As proof he cited a telegram sent by the Tsar to 
Wilhelm II on 31 July 1914 expressing his wish for a successful outcome of 
negotiations in Vienna despite the fact that Russia had begun to mobilise the day 
before.19 The book was published in 1916, while the above-cited article from 
Renovación Española was written in July 1918. It is possible that after the Russian 
Revolution González-Blanco began to view the war as a conflict between Germany, 
France and Britain exclusively, explaining the shift in his later writings to attributing the 
sole responsibility for the outbreak of the war to Britain.  
The invasion of Belgium, in González-Blanco’s assessment, was a tactical error 
on Germany’s behalf because it immobilised half of its military power. He also saw the 
violation of Belgian neutrality as a political mistake because it led to alienating 
Germany from the sympathies of the entire civilised world. However, he also stated that 
the war was unavoidable since Britain wanted it at any cost.20 Belgium, he argued, was 
only a pretext for Britain in line with ‘its hypocrisy’21 which attempted to disguise its 
aggressive imperial ambitions. Germany, on the other hand, was merely defending its 
borders against attacks from the ‘arrogant and proud Albion enraged to see its empire 
under threat.’22  
Other Germanófilos such as playwright Jacinto Benavente also defended 
Germany against accusations of aggressive militarism. He argued that there was no 
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other nation more militant than France and that the Napoleonic wars made two or three 
German wars in the nineteenth century look insignificant in comparison.23 While 
Germany’s critics decried its empire, Benavente sarcastically wrote Britain and Russia 
could hardly be called Republics. To him, the empire of Napoleon I was the most 
despotic and militarist that had ever existed in the modern world.24 In his defence for 
Germany he went so far as to describe German colonial activity as a merely peaceful 
extension of trade, quite unlike the unrest and oppression caused by French activities in 
Morocco.25 As outlined above, many Germanófilos like Benavente resented France’s 
and Britain’s influence on Spain, which was perceived as a subjugation and dependence, 
hindering the country’s development as a strong nation. Contrary to his critics, 
Benavente saw Germany as a well organised and strong country with a democratically 
functioning parliament and a free press. Moreover, he believed the country to be a 
model for socialism, which he saw as the future form of governance in the world.26 The 
wish for Spain to be a strong nation again was also expressed by González-Blanco who 
hoped the country would be ‘free to choose its own friendships and arrange its 
alliances’. He added, 
we wish to be independent to live our own life, without having our 
politics dictated and our destiny marked by the cabinets in Paris and London. We 
demand, in summary, the right to continue our national existence not in the 
shadow of the supremacy of France and that of the hegemony of England but in 
the light of international autonomy or of a more serious alliance more in 
accordance with our future.27 
British and French dominance, and economic dominance in particular, was also 
cause of resentment for the third group of Germanófilos as identified by Meaker. They 
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were the national regenerationists who wished for Spain to reform along the lines of 
Germany, following its lead on matters such as science, education and efficiency.28 For 
Fuentes Codera they fall into the second category of pro-German Spaniards. Many 
economists could be found among this group of Germanófilos who voiced their ideas in 
the Revista Nacional de Economía (which was founded in 1916) and in the weekly 
publication Renovación Española, which existed between January and November 1918 
only. The leading advocates of this group of pro-German Spaniards were Emilio Ríu, 
Eloy Luis André and Vicente Gay. The latter published a work called El pensamiento y 
la actividad alemana en la guerra europea (German thought and activity during the 
European war).  
Wartime economic mobilisation had left a great impression on these 
regenerationists, described by Meaker as national socialists, and the economic centralist 
policies employed by the belligerents were seen as a model of reform for Spain. 
Admiration for German social discipline as well as a relatively low level of German 
economic investment in Spain re-enforced their pro-German attitudes. They hoped a 
German victory would break Spain’s economic dependence on France and Britain and 
bring an end to the imperialist policies which, as they saw it, had turned Spain into a 
semi-colonial country. Eloy Luis André advocated an almost total nationalisation of 
Spanish society in order to reform the country’s underdeveloped economy.29 Edmundo 
González-Blanco saw some important lessons to be learned from Germany’s wartime 
mobilisation. In an article entitled ‘Lessons of the war’, published in Renovación 
Española in June 1918, he wrote:  
The triumphs of Germany are owed to patriotic discipline, to a complete 
subordination of particular interests of the state to the militarisation of the entire 
nation, represented in a notable result to which we should all pay attention. [...] 
In wars those who triumph are those who obey not with a sense of servility but 
with a consciousness for the necessity of discipline. When the moment arrives 
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they, like Nietzsches’ ideal soldier, are able with the awareness of their great and 
proud obedience to leave their rank and take command.30 
González-Blanco’s admiration for the German military leadership and the 
importance he placed on discipline and the necessity of sacrifice for a greater cause 
could also be interpreted as a criticism of Spain’s ruling elite. As outlined above, ideas 
such as expressed by Eloy Luis André and Edmundo González-Blanco show the 
emergence of nationalist thought.  
All groups of Germanófilos were staunch advocates of absolute neutrality.31 
Amongst them were also a number of scholars. Many of the university professors in the 
central region of Spain were pro-German. Vincente Gay, for example, was a professor 
of economy at the University of Valladolid. Cervantes scholar and director of the 
National Libray, F. Rodríguez Marín, as well as the director of the Cisneros Institute in 
Madrid, Francisco de Carracido, secretary of the Royal Academy, Emilio Cotarelo y 
Morí and Professor Adolfo Bonilla y San Martín, a philosopher and legal scholar, could 
also be found amongst the supporters of Germany.32  
In addition to Revista Nacional de Economía and Renovación Española, another 
important outlet for Germanophile ideas was the Hofer publication Germania – Revista 
de confraternidad hispano-alemana.33 In Germania a position of strict neutrality was 
advocated. Moreover, neutrality was portrayed as being hispanophile and therefore 
synonymous with Spanish patriotism.34  
A strict categorisation of Spain’s Germanófilos is difficult to achieve since, as 
the example of Edmundo González-Blanco demonstrates, most of their ideas could be 
assigned to either of the categories proposed by Gerald Meaker and Maximiliano 
Fuentes Codera. Two supporters of Germany that stood apart from Spain’s 
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Germanófilos were the aforementioned Jacinto Benavente and writer Pío Baroja. Their 
Germanophilism took on a more apolitical, cultural and even spiritual or philosophical 
dimension in contrast to the political and economic reforms proposed by other 
Germanófilos. As discussed in Chapter 2, playwright and Nobel Prize laureate Jacinto 
Benavente, who had penned the pro-German manifesto published in December 1915, 
was one of the most prominent Germanophiles. Although he had criticised German 
imperialism and the Kaiser in his works prior to the war and harboured a liberal attitude 
towards social questions, he was also strongly motivated by a belief in Spanish national 
traditions and a severe dislike for France and Britain.35  
Robert Louis Sheehan assessed that Benavente believed in the inevitability of 
socialist reforms which would have a positive effect on mankind. This social revolution, 
however, was based on love and individual regeneration and not force.36 In his eyes war 
was evil, causing needless slaughter for which both sides were responsible. He could 
not understand why fellow socialists would advocate a war which defended the interests 
of kings and emperors such as the English king and the Russian tsar. Due to heavy 
criticism of his pro-German writings he was forced to stop writing newspaper articles 
and became isolated from the intellectual community in Spain.37 Luis Anton de Olmet 
thought Benavente’s literary importance diminished considerably after he publicly sided 
with Germany.38 In an interview with La Nación, Azorín said of Benavente’s work that 
he used to like it but not anymore. Works such as Campo de armiño, La propia 
estimación and El collar de estrellas were described by Azorín as ‘as bad as they make 
them.’39  
In the works he produced during the war Benavente championed the themes of 
neutrality, patriotism and a concern for the poverty of the Spanish people. For example, 
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in La ciudad alegre y confiada (first staged in Madrid in May 1916), the rulers of the 
city have to decide whether to make a pact with the Republic of Venice or declare war. 
The following excerpt from the play can be interpreted as a criticism on Spain’s wartime 
economic situation: ‘There’s a lot of hunger in the city. You know when everything is 
getting more expensive, men are getting cheaper.’40 In another passage from the same 
play Benavente seems to comment on neutrality as well as on those profiting from the 
war when he wrote, ‘Nobody wants the war. […] And is it enough not to want it? We 
live in peace with the whole world. [...] we are trading with everyone and providing 
what is needed. And many are enriching themselves. Profiting today, empoverished 
tomorrow. Today they are selling at a good price what they need tomorrow but cannot 
find at any price.’41 By declaring ‘War is inhumane,’42 Benavente made his anti-war 
stance particularly evident. 
As will be outlined in Chapter 5, the economic boom Spain experienced during 
the First World War only benefited a few while the working classes and rural population 
in particular had to suffer food shortages and declining living conditions. This 
subsistence crisis is also commented on in Benavente’s comedic operetta Mefistofela, 
whose storyline revolves around the concern over a lack of women in hell, referred to as 
a ‘crisis de las subsistencias’ (subsistence crisis). The idea to solve the problem is to 
marry women off to the demons. In the songs of the operetta Benavente criticized 
Spain’s political situation, writing, for example, ‘Renovation, Renovation, there is no 
other solution, in this difficult situation, we have to accept evolution in order to avoid a 
revolution.’43  
In another song Benavente referred to Spain’s dependency on British coal which 
the country received in return for iron ore and pyrites supplies, vital for the British war 
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effort.44 This co-dependency, often used by the British government to pressure Spain 
into cooperating with the demands of the Entente, was a thorn in the eye of 
Germanófilos like Benavente who resented Allied influence in Spain. The playwright 
commented on this situation in a sarcastic manner in his operetta Mefistofela: ‘And what 
about the coal? No need to worry, that’s the easiest problem. If the husband is a demon 
and this demon is a friend of ours, we will have coal in abundance with the coal of her 
husband.’45 
In La ciudad alegre y confiada Benavente not only voiced his views on war in 
general but also on Spain’s specific situation as caused by the country’s neutrality. The 
Germanophile’s playwright defence of neutrality becomes very apparent in the 
following passage from the play: 
Rivalry between sovereigns, insult of an ambassador, territorial disputes are just 
laughable pretexts for a war. Underneath these superficial causes are more 
profound reasons of interest, competition, commercial rivalry. And these are still 
not the real reasons. Because above all this there is in every war the wish of one 
nation to dominate another nation, one race above another race, new ideas over 
outdated ideas. This, however, can only become evident with time, with 
adequate distance. That is why, when you look at this war today, you get excited 
and passionate because it tells you: hate, blood, violence. You are inclined to one 
or the other side, spreading hate and violence yourself without knowing on 
which side is reason and justice. But if you read about past wars in history with a 
serenity that only time allows, you will see that in all wars, even those that 
brought humiliation and destruction to your motherland, triumphed what should 
always triumph, the idea of God. [...] True strength is the spiritual strength 
because it is only the spirit which puts the light of intelligence into the swords.46  
Like most Germanófilos, Benavente was also a defender of the Spanish patria 
and advocator of Spanish independence. Again, in La ciudad alegre y confiada this 
theme of patriotism was picked up when he stated, ‘Look at my face reddened with 
shame from listening to you speaking ill of this noble city which is our motherland, it 
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sounds like it would not be important to you to see her dominated by outsiders, that 
would come as you say and impose their culture on us.’47  
As stated above, another champion of Germany was the writer Pío Baroja, who 
could be found amongst the editorial team of the Hofer publication Germania. Baroja’s 
ideas of Germanophilism, however, did not sit well with the majority of pro-German 
Spaniards, which made him into an outsider not just among the Germanófilos but also 
amongst Spanish intellectuals in general.48 Political opponents of Baroja seemed to have 
admired in Germany what he detested and vice versa.49 Similar to Benavente, his 
Germanophilism appeared to have stemmed from a strong resentment against Britain 
and France and, as he saw it, their role in Spain’s decline. Like many other Spanish 
intellectuals and writers of the Generación del 98 Baroja was influenced by the German 
philosophers Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche.50 The latter could be 
described as the spiritual leader of the regenerationist movement of intellectuals that 
formed in the wake of the Spanish-American War.51  
Nietzsche, along with historian Heinrich von Treitschke and General Friedrich 
von Bernhardi, became a key figure of Allied propaganda which utilised the German 
philosopher in order to demonise the enemy. This effort was done in order to prove 
German aggression and drive for expansion were to blame for the outbreak of the war.52 
Aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy, such as his opposition to Christianity, his rejection 
of conventional moral codes and his glorification of strength, were misinterpreted for 
this propaganda effort in order to show the inherently war-like nature of the German 
                                                 
47Ibid., p. 1142. 
48Meaker, ‘A civil war of words’ in Neutral Europe between war and revolution, pp 1-56. 
49Santos Juliá, ‘La nueva generación: de neutrals a antigermanófilos pasando por aliadófilos’ in Ayer. 
Revista de Historia Contemporánea, Dosier: La Gran Guerra de los intelectuales: España en Europa, xci, 
no. 3 (2013), pp 121-44. 
50Álvaro Alcalá Galiano, España ante el conflicto europeo 1914–1915 (Madrid, 1916), p. 201, p. 203. 
Alfredo J. Sosa-Velasco, Médicos escritores en España, 1885–1955. Santiago Ramón y Cajal, Pío Baroja, 
Gregorio Marañón y Antonio Vallejo Nágera (Woodbridge, 2010), p. 63. 
51Paul Ilie, ‘Nietzsche in Spain: 1890–1910’ in PMLA, Vol. 79, No. 1 (Mar., 1964), pp. 80–96. 
52Nicholas Martin, “Fighting a Philosophy”: The figure of Nietzsche in British propaganda of the First 
World War’ in The Modern Language Review, xcviii, no. 2 (Apr., 2003), pp 367-80. 
129 
 
enemy. Allied atrocity propaganda attributed the crimes commited by the German army 
during the invasion of Belgium to the influence of Nietzsche’s philosophy.53 
However, it was the anti-clerical stance of the German philosopher that 
particularly appealed to Pío Baroja. Besides German philosophy Baroja admired the 
country’s science, order and technology, which he hoped would have a positive 
influence on Spain and sweep away the ‘myths of religion or democracy, and ... the 
force of Christian charity.’54 He believed Germany was the only country that could 
crush the influence of the Catholic Church in Spain.55 A self-confessed agnostic and 
hater of religious dogma, he saw the effect of Christianity on society as harmful and 
stifling the progress in culture, science, politics, social justice and personal 
relationships.56 The Spanish writer had little interest in political systems and viewed 
parlamentarianism as a ‘joke which could only be discredited by a country like 
Germany.’57 Unsurprisingly Baroja was often described as a nihilist and an anarchist 
due to his dislike of any political system. Instead he favoured an individualism based on 
Nietzschean philosophy. 
Baroja’s anti-clerical position was completely opposed to that of the Spanish 
Catholic hierarchy, a tacit supporter of Germany, which tried to minimise the influence 
of liberal philosophy which undermined its power and influence. Therefore it is not 
surprising that Baroja’s Germanophilia was described as being contrary to that of other 
Germanófilos.58 Baroja personified the contradictions of cultural mobilisation 
encouraged by the war. He rejected the notion that liberalism was only reserved for 
those supporting the Allies and supporters of Germany were seen as conservative and 
militarist. As a liberal, in a largely apolitical sense mainly opposing all forms of 
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restriction and absolutism,59 and a Germanófilo, Baroja certainly stood apart from other 
pro-German, conservative intellectuals during the war. In the Catholic newspaper La 
Lectura dominical the writer was described as a ‘Germanófilo without germanophilism 
[...] a plate of meat […] without meat so to speak.’60  
As was shown in Chapter 1, with the advance of liberal ideas the Spanish 
Catholic Church had been experiencing a gradual erosion of its powers since the 
nineteenth century. The State’s increased effort in gaining greater control over Church 
affairs saw the the closure of religious houses and the sale of Church property. In an 
attempt to deal with growing social unrest and anti-clerical tendencies from the middle 
of the nineteenth century onwards, the Catholic Church tried to win back working class 
Spaniards from socialist and anarchist organisations. Catholic social action, however, 
did not address the underlying problems of poverty and class conflict but instead was 
limited to gestures and appeals to the faithful rather than decisive actions.61 Although 
the Spanish constitution of 1876 guaranteed religious freedom, Catholicism was the 
confirmed religion of the State. The Spanish Catholic Church was in charge of many 
charities, orphanages, hospitals and asylums and, most importantly, held almost 
complete control over primary and secondary education. With growing social unrest and 
the rise of liberal ideas advocating the separation of Church and State, the Church had to 
face the challenges posed by industrialisation in order to maintain its influence.62  
By 1913 the Church’s dominant role in education came under attack when the 
Ministry of Public Instruction attempted to make religion voluntary in secondary 
schools as well as demanding academic titles from professors of religious colleges and 
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introducing state run inspections in private educational institutions.63 This policy of 
secularisation, which undermined the Church’s power, was vehemently opposed by the 
Catholic hierarchy. The reforms were seen as an offence to Catholic beliefs in Spain and 
as an attempt to dechristianise Spanish society. Public opinion was rallied in order for 
the educational reforms to be halted and subsequently the Royal decree of 26 December 
1913 maintained the compulsory teaching of the catechism for Catholic children in all 
public schools.64 Alarmed by the states’ encroachment on what the Church viewed as its 
own domain, urgent action was advocated by the clergy. A focus on ‘producing teachers 
and good Catholics that would fight off the sectarian forces threatening to dechristianise 
schools’65 was suggested as well as an attempt to form political alliances with the ‘true 
Catholics’ in the Cortes in addition to galvanising social action from the parents of 
families concerned by the educational reforms.66  
Attempts by the Church to engage with the working classes met with little 
success, since no substantial solutions to alleviating poverty or preventing exploitation 
could be offered. Church-sponsored trade unions mainly played into the hands of 
employers by breaking strikes and generally represented the wealthy, land owning 
elite.67  
With the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 the Spanish Catholic Church 
followed the official line of the State, which was that of strict neutrality, condemning 
any attempts to drag Spain into the war. Those who advocated intervention the Church 
deemed ‘internal enemies of Spain – bad Spaniards.’68 The Allies, however, saw the 
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Spanish Catholic hierarchy as a bulwark of the Germanófilos.69 English residents 
reported anti-English campaigns being carried out by Spanish clergy and priests 
denouncing France and Britain from the pulpit.70 A priest in the province of Toledo was 
heard asking for an offertory after mass proclaiming, ‘Germany needs guns, we good 
Catholics are bound to help her get them.’71 In an attempt to sway Spanish clerical and 
religious circles and combat prejudices against France and Britain, Allied propaganda 
particularly highlighted atrocities committed by Germans in Catholic Belgium.72  
Propaganda works like the French publication La Guerra alemana y los 
catolicos (The German war and the Catholics), written by the rector of the Catholic 
university in Paris, were aimed at neutral countries like Spain. The publication stressed 
France’s service to the ‘true religion’ despite successive French governments’ 
persecution of the Church and sectarian politics. At the same time Germany was 
portrayed as the Protestant, rationalist nation that Catholics should not trust.73 In 
contrast, German Catholic propaganda blamed France for the moral corruption in the 
world while arguing that the propaganda war by the Allies was just as cruel and lasting 
as the war in the trenches. The Spanish Catholic publication La lectura dominical 
assessed that the war would lead to the discrediting and destruction of what they termed 
social and philosophical utopias such as internationalism, pacifism, cosmopolitanism 
and French Jacobinism.74  
Some, like the Archbishop of Tarragona, argued that claims of rampant 
Germanophilism amongst the Spanish clergy were exaggerated and that the Spanish 
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Catholic hierarchy, whose highest dignitaries, according to him, were not pro-German, 
was merely concerned with the anti-clerical policies of the French government. The 
archbishop believed that there was a confusion between French politics and the national 
sentiment of the French which he saw as being Catholic. He thought it absurd that 
Spanish Catholics should aid the cause of Lutheran Germany and forget that France and 
Italy were the two great Catholic nations despite the separation of Church and State in 
both countries. In his diocese he forbade his clergy any forms of protest against 
France.75 A report of the Auswärtige Amt put the attitude of the Spanish Catholic Church 
more into perspective and supported the archbishop’s assessement by stressing that the 
Spanish clergy was merely reticent to support the pro-Allied movement in Spain since it 
was mainly represented by anti-clerical groups such as the Radicals, Republicans and 
Socialists. The Archbishop of Toledo stated that the clergy was purely pro-Spanish and 
saw no reason to support the Entente.76 
In an attempt to pursuade the Spanish clergy to assume a more pro-Allied 
position, the Bishop of Southwark visited Spain in October 1915. The bishop, who was 
from Gibraltar and had a Spanish background, expressed his regret over the fact that the 
Spanish supporters of Britain could be mainly found amongst the followers of 
anarchists and revolutionaries like Radical Republican Alejandro Lerroux. He urged 
Spanish journalists not to engage in anti-English propaganda as that would also damage 
the Church in general since the Roman Catholic Church was not an opponent of 
Protestantism and British rationalism.77  
The Germanophilism of the Spanish clergy was based in a fear of French 
sectarianism, whose increase was also thought of being the reason for the success of 
Spanish politicians like Lerroux. A French victory, Spain’s Catholic Church worried, 
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would lead to a further rise of sectarianism.78 While supporting Catholic France, the 
Spanish Catholic Church opposed the ‘official, sectarian France’.79 On the other hand, 
the invasion of Belgium was condemned by some Spanish clergy, such as P. Marcelino 
Arnaiz, professor at the Novitiate of the Augustinians at El Escorial, who also praised 
the efforts of Cardinal Mercier and the Belgian episcopate.80 Arnaiz, however, saw 
himself as a Germanófilo due to his fear of the spread of French liberal ideas.81  
In the context of the two opposing sides in the world war Germany, although not 
a Catholic country, could be seen as a bulwark of conservatism against an emerging new 
order. The Germanophilism of the Spanish Catholic Church was mainly aimed against 
France which it deemed ungodly and French persecution of Catholics was seen as the 
main reason for Catholic support for Germany in neutral countries.82 Support of the 
Spanish Catholic Church for Germany should be viewed as part of an attempt to 
maintain the status quo and to ensure that conservative elements of Spanish society 
stayed in power. Therefore the Church served as another important weight putting 
pressure on public opinion to not deviate from the course of neutrality, making an 
alliance with the Entente almost impossible. 
 
‘War of the manifestos’ – Criticism of pro-German ideas 
 
As mentioned above, Germanophile intellectuals hoped following the German 
model would usher in an era of progressive, anti-clerical thinking. In their beliefs they 
were confronted by the majority of Spanish intellectuals and artists who supported the 
Allies. The conflict between Germanófilos and Francófilos during the First World War 
led to a series of manifestos which showed support for either of the belligerents and also 
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often attacked the opposing Spanish camp. The frenzied discussions carried on in these 
publications were aptly described by Alzamora Menéndez as the war of the 
manifestos.83 As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, this public debate amongst 
scholars, intellectuals and writers formed part of the process of wartime cultural 
mobilisation that could be observed in the belligerent countries but was also present in 
neutral Spain.  
Even prior to the First World War Spanish intellectuals used the form of the 
manifesto in order to address fellow intellectuals or the government in an appeal for the 
regeneration of the country after the failed war of 1898. An example of this was the 
Manifesto of National Union written in 1900 and signed by, amongst others, Ramon y 
Cajal and Miguel de Unamuno. Similar appeals followed that sought to influence civil 
society by applying social science to the ills of everyday life, advocating the 
introduction of compulsory education for example. Further manifestos were prompted 
by events of the Tragic Week and the Ferrer execution in 1909.84 Paul Aubert has 
suggested that the First World War produced a different type of manifesto in Spain, a 
manifesto which began not only to criticise the existing order but also proposed 
programmes of reform essentially criticising the functioning and foundations of the 
constitutional monarchy. The appeals of Spanish intellectuals in favour of the Allies 
therefore symbolically represented a break with the dynastic Spain.85 
After the outbreak of the war, the first manifestos in Spain began to appear at the 
end of 1914. The Germanófilos used their appeals to defend Germany’s conduct of the 
war. In the pro-German manifesto published in La Tribuna on 18 December 191586 
Benavente pointed out that French militarism was far worse than German while 
stressing that France and Britain had never been friends of Spain, citing their failure to 
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come to Spain’s aid in the Spanish-American War. Therefore, so the playwright urged, 
Spanish neutrality should not be viewed as betrayal or disloyalty to anybody. Benavente 
expressed the wish for peace and for Spain to be independent from any outside 
influence.87 As already discussed above, the strong economic dependence on Britain and 
France was a cause of resentment for many Germanophiles. The active private German 
propagandist August Hofer claimed he won over Benavente and Rodriguez Marín for 
the manifesto and also gathered 1,500 signatures for it.88 It appears though, that many 
manifestos came about independently and were only subsequently used for propaganda 
purposes by the belligerents. Hofer’s claim might have been an exaggeration designed 
to elevate his achievements in the eyes of the Auswärtige Amt. In the pro-German 
manifesto Benavente reiterated many points he had made in his previous articles on the 
war.  
1915 was also the year which saw the publication of other, mainly pro-Allied, 
manifestos. The most important one was the Manifiesto de los intelectuales españoles 
(Manifesto of Spanish intellectuals) published in Iberia on 10 July.89 This manifesto 
was attributed to writer Ramón Pérez de Ayala and expressed solidarity with the Allied 
cause, described as the only cause that also represented the interests and ambitions of 
the Spanish nation. The manifesto stated, ‘We give our support to the cause of the Allies 
and that which they represent, their ideals of justice – the only thing that can coincide 
with the deepest and most urgent political interests of the nation.’90 Earlier in the year 
Eugenio d’Ors in the Manifiesto de los amigos de la unidad moral de Europa 
(Manifesto of the friends of moral unity of Europe) had advocated European unity 
writing that, ‘The principle that divides us is that the terrible war which is today 
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shattering the body of our Europe, constitutes by definition a civil war.’91 In April 1915 
Catalan artists, writers, intellectuals, politicians and industrialists published a manifesto 
in España declaring their solidarity with their neighbour France.92 To highlight the 
anniversary of the destruction of the University of Louvain a number of Spanish 
lawyers, law professors and journalists produced a Catholic manifesto, also published in 
España on 23.9.1915.93 
At a later stage of the war, on 18 January 1917, the manifesto of the Liga Anti-
Germanofila appeared in España.94 The Liga Anti-Germanofila, which was founded 
with the help of the British embassy,95 especially attacked those who claimed to defend 
neutrality. Signed by leading intellectuals such as Miguel de Unamuno, Manuel Azaña, 
Luis Araquistáin and Melquíades Álvarez, the manifesto accused the Germanófilos of 
hiding behind the concept of neutrality which simply served to mask their devotion to 
Germany and their hate for the Allied countries.96 The Liga was founded in the hope of 
clearing up persisting opinions that Germanophilism meant neutrality while being pro-
Allied stood for interventionism. Germanophilism was viewed by the Liga as false, as 
anti-neutrality.  
Concerned with the movement gathering a greater momentum during a time 
when Spain was warned by the Allies to comply with its obligation as a neutral in the 
matter of supplying belligerent submarines, the Liga Anti-Germanofila refuted the claim 
that this posed a threat to Spanish neutrality as argued by pro-German Spaniards. The 
neutrality defended by the Germanófilos, according to the manifesto of the liga, would 
have enabled Germany to continue taking advantage of Spain by violating international 
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law.97 Stating that they were not anti-German but in opposition to the German state, 
which to them represented the negation of small nations in its foreign policies as well as 
the negation of democracy and the civic spirit in general, the Liga Anti-Germanofila 
vowed to fight Spain’s internal enemies. Those enemies, they argued, diverted Spain 
from its course of liberty, of its interests and its international security. 98 
Other critics of Spanish Germanophilism argued while Germany was seen as a 
model of progress and ‘the guiding light of civilization’,99 its supporters conveniently 
overlooked the archaic and oppressive nature of German politics and the country’s 
responsibility in the war. While many Spaniards harboured admiration for German 
culture and art, recognizing the achievements of Goethe, Schiller, Wagner and others, 
they were unable to show sympathy for a country which in their eyes had resurrected 
barbarity with the military despotism displayed in the outbreak of the war. Germanófilos 
were therefore often viewed as representing the most antiquated elements of Spanish 
society who in their support for Germany sought to defend tradition and feudalism.100 
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The front cover of España on 8 February 1917 illustrated this view quite well with its 
customary sarcastic cartoon by Luis Bagaria: ‘The good Germanófilo. Germanófilo: 
‘Germany, the cultured land, the land of great men!’ Listener: ‘Oh, you’re an admirer of 
Kant, Goethe, Nietzsche, Hegel, Schopenhauer...’ Germanófilo: ‘No, lies!’101 
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Some were accused of opting for Germanophilism simply because it was 
fashionable at the time. Commenting on the large number of Spaniards, according to 
British ambassador Hardinge thousands, visiting the German embassy at Madrid in 
February 1916 to sign a list to congratulate the Kaiser to his birthday, Hardinge 
concluded that in certain sections of Madrid society it was considered ‘de bon ton’ to be 
pro-German.102 At the beginning of 1918 German ambassador Ratibor confirmed to the 
Auswärtige Amt that approximately 8,000 congratulatory notes had been received on 
the Kaiser’s birthday.103 While prior to the war the Spanish upper classes would have 
flocked to Paris or London, practising Anglo-Saxon sports and regularly speaking 
English, with the war they suddenly turned into Anglophobes.104 A contemporary 
commentator pointed out the contradictions of the Germanófilos who, on the one hand 
claimed to defend national independence and renounced any foreign influences, and on 
the other hand published a publication called Germania.105  
Luis Araquistáin, a writer for the liberal publication España who, as seen in the 
previous chapter, was very vocal in criticising the Germanófilos and their ideas, pointed 
out that the debate between supporters of the Allies and supporters of the Central 
Powers was futile since it did not produce any original contribution to explain the 
origins of the war.106 According to Araquistáin the motivation of some to support either 
one of the belligerents lay in their personal affiliation to a particular country and its 
culture. Being a Germanófilo because Gibraltar belonged to Britain, or because of 
Napoleon’s attacks on Spanish independence, or because of a fondness for Viennese 
operettas or beer from Munich or Wagner’s music, was simply no valid reason for him 
to take sides in a war in which the basis of international law and the achievements of 
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ethics were under threat. Equally Araquistáin believed it was foolish to be a Francófilo 
merely because Paris was the best city in the world for pleasure, being pro-British 
because of the great English tailoring, pro-Russian because Tolstoi was a great writer, or 
a supporter of the Japanese because of their genius at painting. Araquistáin described the 
controversy between Franco- and Germanófilos in Spain as a ‘debate in a madhouse not 
fit for making a decision about the war.’107  
Araquistáin put the responsibility for the outbreak of the war firmly at the feet of 
Germany. Not at the feet of the German people however, who he saw as ignorant to the 
true causes, but at those of the German military that, according to Araquistáin, had 
planned the war for years and finally provoked it.108 Citing Bernhardi’s Deutschland 
und der nächste Krieg (Germany and the next war) he outlined the ideology proclaimed 
by this, as he called it, criminal caste who saw war as a biological necessity, a law of 
human evolution before which all other legal agreements become irrelevant.109 This 
mentality which proclaimed the benefits of a war for the sake of war and elevated the 
violation of international law to the status of a philosophical principle was seen by 
Araquistáin as a great threat to the world.110  
 
Spain’s Germanófilos in the service of Germany – German cultural propaganda in 
Spain 
 
Beside an immense output of Germanophile literature in Spain during the war, 
pro-German Spanish intellectuals, as well as members of the Spanish Catholic Church, 
could also be found actively assisting the German administration in Spain. Only a few 
months into the war, the British Foreign Office already reported the discovery and 
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subsequent dismantling of a wireless apparatus in a convent in Bilbao. Consul Madden 
commented on the incident by stating ‘these priests are so terribly pro-German and very 
anti-English.’111 The convent in question was a Carmelite convent at Portugalete near 
Bilbao.112 Though it remained unclear whether the priests in said convent were working 
with the German administration or acting on their own initiative, German military 
documents reveal that collaboration with Spanish clergy took place in other instances. 
Writing to the head of the German admiralty in December 1914, naval attaché Krohn 
informed his superiors that through Carlist leader Vasquez de Mella contact could be 
made to the local priest in Algeciras who was also working in Gibraltar. De Mella, a 
frequent collaborator of Germany,113 assured the German naval attaché that the priest 
was pro-German and willing to pass on information to the German embassy at 
Madrid.114 From the documents it remains inconclusive whether the priest was used as 
an agent by Krohn. However, an outpost of the German intelligence network in 
Algeciras did exist until 1918.115  
Evidence suggests that members of the Spanish clergy acted as informants for 
German military personnel in Spain. In one of his telegrams to the admiralty Krohn 
mentioned a Jesuit priest who he described as a well-informed and trustworthy agent.116 
The president of the Juventud Catolica (Catholic Youth), Ferrol, also offered his support 
to the German consulate at Vivero by agreeing to distribute German propaganda flyers 
at a Republican meeting taking place in the summer of 1915.117 Amongst the well 
wishers on the occasion of the Kaiser’s birthday at the beginning of 1918 a priest from 
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Segovia could be found as well. To his congratulatory note he attached 25 pesetas to be 
given to the German seaman who would be the first to sink an American ship. 
Apparently similar donations had been received throughout the war.118 The Catholic 
newspaper La lectura dominical commented favourably on the captain of the German 
cruiser Emden who according to the paper ‘had brilliantly fought English ships in the 
Indian Ocean and surrendered gloriously in the north of the Keeling Islands to the 
English fleet.’119 In February 1915 the union of Jaimistas organised a concert in aid of 
the German and Austro-Hungarian Red Cross which was attended by approximately 
8,000 spectators in the Ateneo Tradicionalista in Barcelona.120 As British residents had 
already reported to the Foreign Office,121 Ratibor too informed the Auswärtige Amt 
about newspaper reports of Spanish clergy including the Kaiser in their sermon 
prayers.122  
Although these examples of collaborations between Spanish clergy and the 
German diplomatic corps give an indication of attitudes prevalent amongst the religious 
elite in Spain, conclusions cannot be drawn whether the Catholic hierarchy condoned 
such activity or even actively encouraged it. As already discussed, Spain’s Catholic 
Church maintained a position of neutrality, supporting neither side, but found it difficult 
to extend its sympathies to the Francófilos due to their anti-clerical views. Allied 
attempts to moderate pro-German attitudes of the Spanish clergy, such as the visit of the 
Bishop of Southwark to Spain in 1915, were met by efforts of the Germany embassy to 
assert influence on Spanish clergy through the Vatican. Ratibor voiced concern over a 
trip to the French-English frontline undertaken by the archbishops of Tarragona and 
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Granada in October 1917. 123 As discussed above the Archbishop of Tarragona was quite 
vocal about his pro-French leanings. Fearing the trip would result in negative 
propaganda which could have been detrimental to the German war effort, the nuncio in 
Germany was contacted who promised to send a telegram to Rome immediately. The 
nuncio also described the archbishop of Tarragona as difficult to influence and not quite 
sane.124 Ratibor had heard similar complaints about the archbishop, whose behaviour 
had already led to suggestions for him to resign. The nuncio in Spain told Ratibor he 
strongly disapproved of his colleagues’ views and had reported about him to Rome.125  
Many pro-German writers and intellectuals collaborated with the German 
administration in their propaganda effort in Spain. In Chapter 2 we could already 
observe how German propagandists attempted to highlight German cultural 
achievements in order to combat the negative, militarist image employed in Allied 
propaganda. The aformentioned Vincente Gay not only wrote pro-German articles for 
La Tribuna and Día Grafico126 but also gave public lectures organised by August 
Hofer.127 In May 1915 Eloy Luis André held a conference in the Ateneo on the topic of 
German ethics and the moral education of the German people.128 Efforts by the German 
embassy to invite leading Spanish pro-German intellectuals to Germany were not met 
with much enthusiasm. Although Jacinto Benavente assured the embassy secretary von 
Stohrer personally of just how proud he was being able to support the German cause,129 
it was doubtful he would consent to travelling to Germany on the embassy’s behest. 
Stohrer described the playwright as an oddball who was shy and reserved, although he 
would accept invitations, he often would not show up if it did not suit him. Equally, Pío 
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Baroja was reluctant to undertake any propaganda trips to Germany on behalf of the 
German embassy. Other Spanish intellectuals, such as Ramon y Cajal, who were 
approached by the embassy, were also evasive.130  
In Barcelona a series of academic lectures was organised by the embassy in 
which members of the University of Barcelona as well as members of the Institute for 
Catalan Studies took part, amongst other academics. The banquet held at the end of the 
series in June 1917 was also attended by Prof. Fabregas, Father Clascar, Prof. Bosch-
Gimpera, Dr. Dal-Guardiola, Dr. Ballvé, Prof. Westermann, Dr. Jokers and Dr. Simon.131 
Pro-German Catalan intellectuals had also formed a union of friends of Germany, the 
Comite de'amichs de Germania. Many of its members had studied in Germany and also 
worked for Hofer’s news service and its publication Germania. Amongst them were Dr. 
Ballvé, Dr. Manuel de Montliu, Prof. Pedro Bosch, Dr. Barnils and Luis Almerich 
(director of Germania). Hofer also intended to approach influential Catalans such as 
Francesc Cambó and Prat de la Riva.132 A memorandum of the Comite de'amichs de 
Germania (Committee of friends of Germany) sent to the German embassy at the 
beginning of 1916 stated a commitment to defend German culture and finished with the 
promise that those who wished to see German culture flourish in Spain had to count 
with Catalonia.133 While in other countries German culture, for example music by 
German composers, was banned during the war, in Spain it was celebrated as could be 
seen in numerous concerts.134  
As part of the German propaganda effort in Spain attempts were made to 
promote Spanish culture and art in Germany. Translation of Benavente plays, for 
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example, were offered to the Deutsches Theater.135 Since 1914 works by Spanish 
playwrights such as Pedro Calderon de la Barca, Tirso de Molina and Jacinto Benavente 
had been staged in Germany.136 Various German-Spanish associations were founded 
throughout Germany.137 Indeed, the positive reception of Spanish culture was welcomed 
by Spanish artists who felt it had hitherto not received the recognition it deserved. 
Germanophiles, such as Rodriguez Marín, the head of the National Library, expressed 
his gratitude to German scholarship for acknowledging Spain’s literary achievements by 
carrying out detailed studies which helped to highlight the wealth of Spanish literature 
in the world.138 This interest in Spanish culture Marín contrasted with what he perceived 
as ignorant and prejudicial stereotyping by other nations, which ridiculed Spain by 
portraying it as the country of the tambourine, its women with a dagger in their 
suspender. He criticised Alexander Dumas for stating Africa began at the Pyrenees.139 
Germany to him also exemplified the ‘brave and strong hero patriotically fending off 
threats by several attackers without the need to bolster their army with foreign soldiers – 
in contrast to those who even considered bringing the Japanese to Europe to fight for 
them.’ Anybody with manly blood running through their veins and possessing a manly 
heart, argued Marin, had to admire such display of masculinity.140  
 
Conclusion 
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The positive image of Germany defended by Spain’s Germanófilos was largely a 
reflection of their own hopes for Spain to transform itself and become a strong nation 
again. It therefore represented a form of Spanish nationalism which was galvanised 
during the First World War. This indirectly benefited Germany in its pursuit of Spanish 
neutrality since the defense of the German conduct of war and the highlighting of the 
perceived short-comings of the Allies ensured a lively debate putting further pressure on 
Spanish wartime governments not to join the Entente. This debate, however, did not 
need to be encouraged by German agitators but was a product of the cultural 
mobilisation which Spain experienced during the First World War despite its neutrality. 
This process could be seen as an extension of the reformation movement that had begun 
in the nineteenth century and received further strength in the wake of the Spanish-
American War.  
World War I and its subsequent uneven economic development in Spain made 
the discussion over regeneration even more urgent and also more heated. As the war 
was presented as a battle between ideologies so was the conflict in Spain marked by 
opposing ideas how to modernise the country and halt its decline. The search for the 
reasons for Spain’s decline as well as ways of reforming the country now found its 
expression in the negative portrayal of France and Britain in pro-German writings. 
Resentment against the Allies by the Germanófilos stemmed from Spain’s historic ties 
with France and Britain, as well as the resentment against Allied economic dominance 
in Spain. By decrying British imperialsm, Germanófilos indirectly voiced their 
bitterness over Spain’s declining empire and its dependence on France and Britain. 
Germany as a model for social, cultural and economic reform was seen as a way out of 
Spain’s crisis by pro-German Spaniards. Inspired by Germany’s wartime mobilisation 
and its strong military leadership, Germanófilos developed ideas which contributed to 
new nationalist thought. It is therefore not surprising that some Spaniards who were 
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pro-German during the First World War assumed important positions in the Franco 
regime. Writer and journalist Vincente Gay, for example, was appointed head of the 
Press and Propaganda Ministry in 1937.141 
While liberal intellectuals such as writer Pío Baroja supported Germany in the 
hope of diminishing the influence of the Catholic Church in Spain, the Spanish clergy 
supported Germany, fearing the spread of French secularism and liberal ideas which 
would further undermine the power of the Church. That liberal and conservative 
Spaniards alike supported Germany for completely opposing reasons represents another 
perplexing facet of Spanish neutrality during the First World War contributing to the 
country’s instability. The German diplomatic corps at Madrid took advantage of the 
divisions within Spanish society and agitated public opinion even further by actively 
meddling in the country’s domestic affairs. 
                                                 
141P.A., R123008, Die Presse in Spanien (auβer in Madrid) 1918-39, Faupel Embassy Salamanca to 
Auswärtige Amt, 22.1.1937. 
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Chapter 4 
Wartime diplomacy:  
Germany's attempts to maintain Spanish neutrality 
 
With the introduction of the neutrality law in July 19181 the Spanish government 
not only attempted to curb widespread German and Allied propaganda, it also sought to 
control outside interference in domestic politics and to counter covert operations carried 
out by both belligerents in the peninsula. Just like the private propagandists and 
businessmen vying for Spanish public opinion, who were discussed in Chapter 2, the 
German diplomatic corps in Spain was active in pursuing influential Spaniards and 
trying to ensure Spanish neutrality. Ironically, Germany’s efforts to keep Spain neutral 
meant a complete violation of all laws guarding the rights of a neutral state during 
wartime. German diplomacy in Spain during the First World War was marked by 
bribery, coercion, covert activity and did not even stop at plotting assassinations.  
Spain’s dependence on trade with Britain and France made it difficult for the 
German diplomats on the ground to push for a break with the Entente. Therefore, this 
chapter will firstly examine Spain's close economic ties with the Allies in order to gain a 
better understanding of the heightened German activity on the Iberian Peninsula. 
Although the German diplomatic corps in Spain acted with a certain amount of 
independence, its members ultimately had to follow instructions from Berlin and fall in 
line with governmental foreign policies. The power struggle between the German 
civilian government and the military leadership which emerged during the First World 
War also had an effect on diplomatic relations between Spain and Germany. What has 
                                                 
1See chapter two. 
150 
 
been termed a ‘Silent Dictatorship’2 of the Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL – German High 
Command) will be briefly discussed to illustrate the deteriorating effects of submarine 
warfare on Spanish-German relations during the war. Introducing the main protagonists 
of the German diplomatic corps in Spain and their Spanish collaborators, the chapter 
gives a detailed analysis of the activities of the German embassy and its diplomatic 
outposts. The role of the Spanish king, vital in the German diplomatic effort, is also 
outlined, while his relief work and that of other Spanish diplomats is briefly highlighted. 
Despite the damaging effect of the German U-boat campaign on Spain's economy as 
well as the scandals caused by German interference in Spanish domestic politics, Spain 
never broke off relations with the Kaiser Reich. This was largely owed to the work of 
the German diplomatic corps which restlessly mobilised pro-German and pro-neutrality 
elements of Spanish society. 
As was seen in Chapter 1, Spain’s rich mineral reserves made her an attractive 
trading partner. Due to the blockade enforced by the Allies almost immediately after the 
commencement of hostilities, it was mainly Great Britain and France which benefited 
from those resources. Since the middle of the nineteenth century Spain, in return for 
coal, had been supplying Britain with iron ore, copper, lead and other minerals.3 During 
the war Spanish imports of iron ore became particularly vital for the British arms 
industry. About 70% of Britain’s overall iron ore supplies came from Spain.4 A 
disruption of deliveries, the British munitions office feared, would have brought the 
manufacture of explosives to a complete halt within three months.5 Therefore, it was not 
only in Britain’s utmost interest to preserve good diplomatic relations with Spain and 
nurture a position of neutrality benevolent to the Entente, it was also in her interest to 
                                                 
1Martin Kitchen, The silent dictatorship: the politics of the German High Command under Hindenburg 
and Ludendorff, 1916–1918 (London, 1976). 
3Zeiseler, Spanien im Kalkül der britischen Kriegspolitik, pp 247, 252. 
4Ibid., p. 274. 
5Ibid., p. 167. 
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ensure stability in Spanish domestic politics by avoiding any upheaval which could 
have hampered trade.  
The Foreign Office observed German activity on the Iberian Peninsula with 
concern, often attributing workers’ strikes to agitation incited by the German embassy.6 
In November 1917 the Foreign Office assessed that while German diplomats had lost 
influence in other neutral countries, Spain was the exception. Due to the heightened 
activity of the German diplomatic corps a large part of the Spanish aristocratic, official 
and clerical world favoured Germany and the Central Powers during the war. As British 
diplomats saw it, German propaganda in Spain cleverly employed the aristocracy's 
dislike for democratic notions struck by the Entente, the military's admiration for the 
German army, the Church’s hatred of French anti-clericalism and the general resentment 
of French colonial policy towards Spain in Morocco. The Foreign Office had to concede 
that German diplomacy and propaganda in Spain during the First World War achieved 
its goal to a large extent.7  
The work of German diplomats in Spain had to be carried out amidst the conflict 
between political and military needs which arose throughout the war. The Auswärtige 
Amt was caught in a constant struggle with the military demands of the OHL to defend 
the need to keep up good diplomatic relations with neutral countries. This in turn also 
affected diplomatic relations between Spain and Germany during the First World War 
and would become particularly evident in the U-boat campaign.  
In Martin Kitchen’s assessment, the OHL managed to gain a dominant position 
in German politics during the First World War due to the Kaiser’s failure to fully assume 
                                                 
6N.A., CAB/24/31, Image ref. 0040, Cabinet Papers, Intelligence Bureau, Department of Information 
1917, Weekly report on Spain XIII 7.11.1917. Also see A.M.A.E., H1346, Correspondencia embajadas y 
legaciónes Alemania, Notas verbales 1911–16. Ratibor to ministry of state 18.08.1916. Ratibor 
complained that the Spanish press was printing ‘French lies’ about Germans being involved in stirring up 
strikes in Spain. 
7N.A., CAB/24/31, Image ref. 0040, Cabinet Papers, Intelligence Bureau, Department of Information 
1917, Weekly report on Spain XIII, 7.11.1917. 
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his constitutional role.8 The wide-ranging, almost dictatorial rights, of the generals were 
backed up legally by the law on the state of siege. This imperial law had been used by 
Bismarck during the Franco-Prussian War but only to a limited extent. During the First 
World War, however, it was applied all over the German Reich. The Prussian law on the 
state of siege from 1851 gave the military executive power in curbing revolutionary 
unrest or fending off any threats from foreign aggressors. This elevated its leaders into a 
position of independence from civil government and parliamentary bodies.9  
The law of state of siege allowed the suspension of several civil liberties such as 
freedom of speech and assembly and freedom from unlawful search and seizure. 
Usually it was only the Kaiser who was able to suspend any of these rights but with the 
declaration of 31 July 1914 the right was granted to the German military command.10 As 
the war went on the OHL maintained its supreme authority, not allowing any criticism. 
Censorship was justified by the overriding need to keep up morale and support for the 
war effort.11 The issue of unrestricted submarine warfare illustrates perfectly how 
military matters were prioritised over civilian rights and how political consequences 
were ignored. With the appointment of Hindenburg and Ludendorff in August 1916 it 
became evident that all resources had to be mobilised in order to win the war.12 This 
also meant extending German activity into neutral countries and not only mobilising the 
diplomatic corps but also the German communities living in those countries.  
 
The work of the German diplomatic corps in Spain during World War I 
 
                                                 
8Kitchen, The silent dictatorship, p. 272. 
9Ibid., p. 50.  
10Ibid., p. 51.  
11Ibid., p. 274.  
12Wilhelm Deist, ‘Strategy and unlimited warfare in Germany: Moltke, Falkenhayn and Ludendorff’ in R. 
Chickering, S. Förster (eds), Great War, Total War. Combat and mobilization on the Western Front, 1914–
1918 (Cambridge, 2000), pp 265-80. 
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The man at the head of the German diplomatic community in Spain during the 
war was Prince Maximilian von Ratibor und Corvey, member of the Hohenlohe family. 
He was appointed ambassador at Madrid on 27 February 1910,13 a month after the 
passing of his predecessor Count Tattenbach. Ratibor, who had previously served at 
Vienna, Athens, Budapest, Belgrade and Lisbon, was described by his British 
counterpart, Sir Arthur Hardinge, as ‘a pleasant colleague, frank and good-natured of 
jovial appearance, a keen sportsman’.14 Hardinge also noted in his assessment, 
expressed in a report from 1913, that Ratibor had not engaged in any particular political 
activity or intrigues aimed at arousing Spanish feeling against France.15 Of course this 
was to change dramatically with the outbreak of the war. The European crisis was to 
transform Ratibor into Germany’s leading agent in Spain, relentless in his attempt to 
conquer Spanish public opinion. In his work the ambassador was assisted by embassy 
secretaries Eberhard von Stohrer and Franz Grimm. Von Stohrer, who had served as 
embassy secretary in Madrid since 1913, would return to Spain after the First World 
War when Adolf Hitler appointed him as ambassador on 25 July 1936, the same day the 
Führer decided to come to the aid of the nationalist coup that would eventually propel 
General Franco to power.16 
Prior to 1914 the German embassy, with its central location on the Paseo de la 
Castellana, was the place to be for Madrid’s upper class society, in particular for the 
city’s affluent youth.17 Well known for their parties and dances, the Ratibors kept an 
open and welcoming house, lavishing considerable hospitality on Madrid society.18 In 
his social functions ambassador Ratibor was greatly helped by his wife, the Princess of 
                                                 
13P.A., Botschaft Madrid, Karton 362, Äuswärtige Amt to Legationskasse 14.3.1910. 
14N.A., FO371/2103, Foreign Office, Spain & Portugal (War) 1914, Report on Heads of Missions for 
1913, Hardinge to Grey, received 31.1.1914. 
15Ibid. 
16P.A., Botschaft Madrid Karton 23 Ausschnitt Artikel Stuttgarter Neuen Tagesblatt 31.8. [no year given] 
17La Esfera, 6.5.1916. 
18N.A., FO371/2103, Foreign Office, Spain & Portugal (War) 1914, Report on Heads of Missions for 
1913, Hardinge to Grey, received 31.1.1914. 
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Ratibor (nee Countess d’Orsay), and their six daughters. The wife of the German 
ambassador was referred to as the Doyenne of the diplomatic corps in Madrid.19 
Princess Ratibor also founded a hospital in Madrid for her German, Austrian and Swiss 
compatriots. It was located at Paseo de Ronda and was led by a Dr. Wendel.20 Ratibor's 
daughters seamlessly integrated into Spanish society, speaking perfect Castilian and 
identifying with Spanish customs and culture.21 The British ambassador noted the 
regard given to Ratibor and his family by the Spanish king.22 One of Ratibor's 
daughters, for example, attended hunts organised by the Spanish royal family.23  
Although Madrid was the centre of German activity, Barcelona was of no lesser 
importance to the diplomats. Baron Ostmann von der Leye, the German consul at 
Barcelona, and vice consul Alfred von Carlowitz-Hartizsch were equally active in the 
pursuit for Spanish public opinion as their superior at Madrid. Pro-German sentiment 
amongst Spanish officials in Barcelona was already evident before the war when the 
German community of the Catalan capital celebrated the birthday of Kaiser Wilhelm II 
with a banquet that was also attended by the mayor of the city, former governor general 
of Cuba, Valeriano Weyler,24 and other leading Spanish authorities.25 The German 
diplomats did not shy away from joining in with Spanish customs such as carnival, 
frequently attended by vice consul Carlowitz who in 1916 dressed up as a Parisian 
Apache celebrating at the Circulo Artistico.26 In February 1917, a disgruntled August 
Hofer noted, Carlowitz even held a party in his apartment at which he was dressed as a 
woman and his wife was dressed as a man.27 Despite the seriousness of their mission, 
                                                 
19La Esfera, 6 May 1916. 
20Ibid. 
21Ibid. 
22N.A., FO371/2103, Foreign Office, Spain & Portugal (War) 1914, Report on Heads of Missions for 
1913, Hardinge to Grey, received 31.1.1914. 
23La Esfera, 16 Feb. 1918.  
24 See chapter two. 
25La Ilustración Artística, 2 Feb. 1914. 
26B.A., R901/71832, Politische, wirtschaftliche und militärische Lage in Spanien 1917, Hofer to Zfa, 
28.06.1917. 
27Ibid. See chapter 2 for the confrontation between August Hofer and Vice Consul Carlowitz. 
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German diplomats did not lose sight of the more enjoyable advantages of serving in a 
neutral country. A lengthy exchange of letters stretching over the course of five years 
shows ambassador Ratibor’s pursuit to recover several bottles of wine and champagne 
which had gone missing at the beginning of the war.28 The partying lifestyle of the 
German diplomats did not indicate a lack of interest in their diplomatic work, nor was it 
detrimental to the German cause; on the contrary, it allowed them to mingle with the 
Spanish upper class, winning the trust of some while simultaneously being able to 
observe shifts in public opinion and subtly assert their influence.  
As outlined in Chapter 1, Spanish society was divided over the issue of the 
country’s neutrality and in its sympathies towards the belligerents. Attempting to 
manipulate Spanish public opinion to their advantage, Germany and the Central Powers, 
as well as the Allies, dedicated considerable amount of time to analysing Spain’s 
fractious domestic situation and trying to identify political groups favourable to their 
respective cause. Ambassador Ratibor’s assessment of Spanish attitudes prior to the war 
bluntly stated Spaniards could generally be regarded as xenophobes but if they had any 
sympathies for another nation it would be for Germany.29 In February of 1913 he wrote 
to chancellor Bethmann Hollweg confirming pro-German tendencies amongst the 
Carlists, who fully supported Germany, the majority of the Conservative party and even 
amongst some members of the Liberal and Republican parties. Although Ratibor could 
confirm clear pro-German tendencies at the Spanish royal court, he also concluded that 
there was a reluctance to firmly support one side.30 The British Foreign Office attributed 
Spanish sympathies for Germany to the lack of conflict between both countries, a far 
                                                 
28A.G.A., 54/1510, Comercio Alemania, Ministry of State to German Embassy, 3.1.1919. 
29P.A., R11950, Spanische Staatsmänner 1913–17, Ratibor to Äuswärtige Amt 6.11.1913. 
30P.A., R11998, Spanien 61 – Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen Spanien und Deutschland 1911–16, 
Ratibor to Bethmann Hollweg 23.2.1913. 
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cry from the situation that applied to both France and England, which had clashed with 
Spain on numerous occasions in history.31 
Amongst Germany’s most important collaborators was the Marquis de 
Villalobar, Spanish ambassador in Belgium, who kept in close contact with Baron Oscar 
von der Lancken, chief political advisor to the German governor general in Belgium. 
Lancken had been embassy secretary at Madrid from 1906 to 1907.32 Though not 
resident in Spain, Villalobar proved to be a useful ally, particularly when it came to 
influencing King Alfonso XIII. His frequent visits to the royal court allowed for 
German ideas to be transmitted through him.33 Regular meetings between Villalobar and 
von der Lancken also enabled a better insight into Spanish domestic affairs and opinions 
which were reported back to the Äuswärtige Amt and the embassy at Madrid. 
Villalobar’s hope was that a German victory would also elevate Spain into a position of 
power and allow her to fulfil territorial ambitions by reclaiming Gibraltar and annexing 
Portugal.34 According to von der Lancken’s memoirs, Villalobar was first and foremost 
a Spaniard and an ardent monarchist who believed that the future of the Spanish throne 
would be much more secure with the German Kaiser Reich by its side. This was so 
despite having been embassy secretary in London for several years and having many 
friends amongst the British aristocracy, even being part of the inner circle of King 
Edward VII. In Brussels he was a popular guest at the royal court owing to the great 
admiration he held for the king of Belgium. Villalobar’s wide-ranging connections and 
his great diplomatic skills made him a very valuable collaborator for Germany.35  
Not only conservative Spanish politicians supported Germany during the war but 
also liberals who wished to defend Spanish neutrality against the interventionist 
                                                 
31N.A., FO371/2470, Foreign Office, Spain & Portugal (War) 1915, Hardinge to Grey 3.1.1915. 
32Oscar Freiherr von der Lancken Wakenitz, Meine dreissig Dienstjahre, 1888-1918. Potsdam – Paris – 
Brüssel (Berlin, 1931), pp 43-7. 
33P.A., R11950, Spanische Staatsmänner 1913–17, Lancken to Auswärtige Amt, 9.10.1916. Villalobar sent 
telegram to King to inform him about activities of Count Romanones.  
34P.A., R123013, Beeinflussung der spanischen Presse 1915–17, Lancken to Auswärtige Amt, 11.7.1915. 
35Lancken Wakenitz, Meine dreissig Dienstjahre, pp 164-5. 
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tendencies within their own party. As outlined in Chapter 1, it can be argued that 
caciquismo allowed for the development of a political culture based on personal interest 
which could explain the support for Germany and the Central Powers from various 
political groupings within Spain. Miguel Villanueva, a leading Liberal, was minister for 
foreign affairs in 1915 and minister for finance and speaker of the lower house of the 
Cortes in 1916. He was another collaborator who held good relations with Ratibor. He 
belonged to the faction of the Liberal party which rivalled that of Count Romanones. 
When the latter was appointed prime minister in December 1915 he chose Villanueva, a 
supporter of strict neutrality, as his foreign minister in order to appease his opponents 
who accused him of having interventionist ambitions.36 Alfonso XIII also assured 
German diplomats the appointment of Villanueva was proof that Romanones would be 
kept under control in his pro-Allied tendencies.37  
Villanueva openly declared to the ambassador that he was a friend of Germany 
and worked on an approximation between Spain and Germany.38 He had been actively 
involved in the Morocco Crisis with von der Lancken39 and was known to the Foreign 
Office as a pro-German.40 Though he supported the German administration, Villanueva 
insisted that the German diplomats accept the liberal tendencies within his party and 
that the embassy would not seek a collaboration with reactionary elements in Spanish 
politics, such as the Carlists.41 When Villanueva became speaker of the lower house of 
the Cortes in April 1916 and Romanones gave Amalio Gimeno, a confidant of the 
Count, the foreign affairs portfolio, the Germans feared a departure from strict neutrality 
                                                 
36Romero Salvadó, Spain 1914 – 1918, p. 62. 
37Carden, German policy toward neutral Spain, pp 104–5. 
38P.A., R11998, Spanien 61 – Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen Spanien und Deutschland 1911–16, 
Ratibor to Äuswärtige Amt 6.12.1915. 
39P.A., R11950, Spanische Staatsmänner 1913–17, Ratibor to Äuswärtige Amt, 6.12.1915. Ratibor 
describes Villanueva as not completely reliable but pro-German nevertheless. P.A., R11950, Spanische 
Staatsmänner 1913–17, Lancken to Äuswärtige Amt, 11.12.1915. Lancken reports he has been friends 
with Villanueva for several years and worked with him in Cauterets during the Morocco Crisis.  
40N.A., FO371/2469, Foreign Office, Spain & Portugal (War) 1915, Telegram Hardinge 9.12.1915. 
41P.A., R11998, Spanien 61 – Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen Spanien und Deutschland 1911–16, 
Ratibor to Äuswärtige Amt 6.12.1915. 
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and remained sceptical about the move despite assurances by the Prime Minister that 
Spain would stay out of the conflict.42  
The Carlists and their leader, Vazquez de Mella, were the principal champions of 
the German cause in Spain.43 German diplomats and Carlist leaders maintained close if 
unofficial relations throughout the war, in order not to antagonise Berlin’s other Spanish 
collaborators.44 De Mella not only openly propagated the German cause in public 
speeches45, he also collaborated with German military intelligence recommending 
suitable agents for covert activities.46 His public speeches were seen as useful 
propaganda for the German cause and attempts were made to publish them in German 
newspapers.47  
Niceto Alcalá-Zamora and Juan de la Cierva were two high-ranking and 
influential politicians who could also be found amongst Germany’s supporters in Spain. 
Alcalá-Zamora, a Liberal deputy, and later a president of the Second Spanish Republic, 
had been minister for public works in 1917 and had held other ministerial posts prior to 
that. He was also editor of the German sponsored newspaper El Día. Cierva was a 
Conservative politician and a former minister of the interior. Commenting on the 
cabinet formation under Prime Minister Garcia Prieto in November 1917, Ratibor 
described both men as Germany’s friends.48 Alcalá-Zamora in particular held close 
relations with the German embassy.49  
                                                 
42Carden, German policy toward neutral Spain, p. 113. Also see Romero Salvadó, Spain 1914 – 1918, p. 
62. 
43N.A., FO371/2759, Foreign Office, Spain & Portugal (War) 1916, Vaughan to Grey 28.04.1916. 
44P.A., R11915, Die Karlisten 1912-20, Unsigned report dated 20.8.1916. 
45P.A., R21240, Weltkrieg Nr. 11q Geheim Bd. 2 – Unternehmungen und Aufwiegelungen gegen unsere 
Feinde in Spanien, Ratibor to Äuswärtige Amt 16.9.1915. 
46B.A.M., RM5/2408 Admiralstab der Marine, Schrift–pp. Verkehr mit Vertretern der Marine, ab Sept. 
1916 dem Marineattaché, und anderen Personen in Madrid Bd. 1 1914–15, Krohn to Admiralstab der 
Marine 8.12.1914. Also see chapter five. 
47P.A., R123013, Beeinflussung der spanischen Presse 1915–17, Rautzenberg to news service Frankfurt, 
23.6.1915. 
48P.A., R11951, Spanische Staatsmänner 1917–19, Ratibor to Äuswärtige Amt 3.11.1917.  
49P.A., R12003, Spanien 61 – Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen Spanien und Deutschland September 
– November 1917, Report Welzceck Berlin 5.11.1917. 
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Alcalá-Zamora’s support of the German administration could be explained with 
reference to his devotion to absolute neutrality. In his autobiography Memorias, Alcalá-
Zamora claimed to have been a defender of Spain’s neutrality during the First World 
War since he believed it was what the majority of Spaniards wanted and in the country’s 
best interest. He saw no advantages in entering the conflict.50 He further claimed that 
while the Spanish people and most of the military were for neutrality, most of the major 
parties, with the exception of the Carlists, and the majority of leading newspapers had 
an interventionist agenda and were not very enthusiastic about neutrality.51  
According to Alcalá-Zamora, Conservative politicians González Besada, 
Antonio Maura, the journalist and politician Julio Burell as well as Liberal Miguel de 
Villanueva and Alcalá-Zamora himself formed the exception amongst Spanish 
politicians in regards to the issue of Spanish neutrality. Alcalá-Zamora stated it was his 
obsession which he pursued with tireless tenacity, similar to another German 
collaborator, Villanueva. Alcalá-Zamora argued his efforts for Spanish neutrality formed 
an exceptional case.52 His memoirs, however, do not mention any collaboration with the 
German administration during the war. The willingness of liberal Spanish politicians to 
engage with the German administration demonstrates how lines were blurred during the 
war allowing for collaborations which would have been otherwise unthinkable. In their 
pursuit to maintain Spain's neutrality and despite conflicting ideologies, conservative 
and liberal Spanish politicians alike sought the help of the German government, to the 
detriment of Spain's political stability.  
Also of great help to the German diplomatic effort in Spain were the Spanish 
representatives at Berlin. Ambassador Polo de Bernabé was a conservative Germanófilo 
                                                 
50Niceto Alcalá-Zamora, Memorias (Barcelona, 1998), p. 66. 
51Ibid., p. 64. 
52Ibid., pp 64-5. 
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who was in favour of strict neutrality.53 Major Valdivia, the Spanish military attaché at 
Berlin, was equally pro-German. Like other collaborators, the Spanish diplomats in 
Berlin mainly facilitated a more direct news exchange between both countries which 
allowed the Auswärtige Amt to gain an insight into Spain’s domestic politics, observe 
shifts in opinion of influential power players and plan a strategy accordingly.  
German diplomats made good use of their political contacts and asserted their 
influence on Spanish politics in various ways. They resorted to election bribery, a 
common feature of Spanish politics at the time, in order to ensure a balance between 
Francófilos and Germanófilos in the Spanish government. Similarly to the German 
propaganda effort, no costs were spared to influence neutral Spain. In June 1915 state 
secretary von Jagow confirmed to ambassador Ratibor that any amount of money would 
be at his disposal to win over leading Spanish politicians.54  
As was already seen in Chapter 2, rather than forcing Spain to side with the 
Central Powers, Germany was cleverly portrayed as a champion of Spanish neutrality, 
fostering an anti-interventionist mood in Spain and therefore avoiding the country 
defecting to the side of the Allies. While trying to advance neutrality amongst the 
working class movement in particular, the German diplomats also exacerbated divisions 
within Republicans and Socialists. Rumours of a possible revolutionary uprising in 
Spain financed by Britain and France prompted German diplomats to support anti-
interventionist elements amongst the Spanish left, leading to further infighting.55 In June 
1915 Ratibor reported to the Äuswärtige Amt that he had successfully recruited a 
Republican leader in Barcelona who propagated neutrality and worked towards causing 
a split amongst supporters of Lerroux’s Radical Republicans.56 The embassy hoped to 
achieve this with the help of a lawyer, Llado, who planned to publish a socialist pro-
                                                 
53Romero Salvadó, Spain 1914 – 1918, pp 62–3. 
54P.A., R123013, Beeinflussung der spanischen Presse 1915–17, v. Jagow to Ratibor 2.6.1915. 
55P.A., R21239, Weltkrieg Nr. 11q Geheim Bd. 1 – Unternehmungen und Aufwiegelungen gegen unsere 
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neutrality newspaper which would also be used to encourage sympathy for the socialist 
and republican parties in Germany. Although Ratibor did not deem this type of 
propaganda as strictly necessary, since he assessed the mood for Germany as steadily 
improving, he nevertheless thought it useful to curb French influence.57  
To limit British influence in Spain political propaganda using events such as the 
1916 Easter Rising in Ireland was employed by German diplomats. The Imparcial 
printed an article entitled ‘A tribute to green Erin’, pointing out the close ties between 
Ireland and Spain and calling for sympathy for the defeated Irish.58 Concerned by the 
negative press against Britain, the Foreign Office tried to stop proposed services in 
Barcelona which were to take place in honour of the Irish revolutionaries killed in the 
rebellion.59 Anti-British activity initiated by the German embassy, however, did not stop 
at propaganda but also targeted British diplomats deployed to Spain. When news of a 
possible recall of British ambassador Sir Arthur Hardinge reached Ratibor, the German 
ambassador tried to keep his British colleague in office since he deemed him harmless. 
According to Ratibor, Hardinge had failed to gain sympathies in political and society 
circles and even managed to look ridiculous at times. His rumoured replacement, the 
former British ambassador to Spain – Maurice de Bunsen – enjoyed a better reputation 
and would have been a more dangerous adversary for Ratibor. Therefore, the German 
ambassador spread rumours about Hardinge’s recall in the Spanish press stating that 
pro-German circles were pleased about the development. Ratibor hoped his tactics of 
reverse psychology would prompt the British to keep Hardinge in Spain.60 Hardinge 
indeed remained in the country until the end of the First World War and was only 
replaced in 1919. 
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The ‘highlight’ of German meddling in Spanish domestic affairs, however, could 
well be the events that led to the resignation of Count Romanones’ in April 1917.61 
While the German contribution to the prime minister’s fall should not be overstated, it is 
necessary to point out how a feverishly organised campaign by ambassador Ratibor 
helped to turn public opinion against Romanones and increase his isolation even within 
his own party.62 The Count, who had made his pro-allied stance clear from the outset of 
the war, favouring intervention, though unable to break off relations with Germany and 
the Central Powers, tried to curb German activities in Spain, angering ambassador 
Ratibor. Romanones also faced an increasingly pro-German public opinion and felt that 
towards the middle of the war support for the Allies in Spain was waning.63  
German diplomatic correspondence gives the impression of a personal vendetta 
carried out by the ambassador, who abandoned all rules of diplomacy in his pursuit of 
Romanones’ downfall. In his memoirs Count Romanones remarked that Germany 
showed a tenacity unlike any other country in its attempts to drag Spain into the war. 
Romanones described Ratibor as an adversary who carried out the instructions of his 
government with more zeal than discretion.64 The Spanish prime minister was wrong, 
though, in his assumption Germany wanted Spain to join the war. Berlin tried to ensure 
Spain would not join the Allies. Even the Äuswärtige Amt was of the opinion Ratibor’s 
methods to remove Romanones were too dangerous and could have compromised the 
position of their diplomats on the Iberian Peninsula.65  
At the beginning of September 1916 Ratibor requested permission to do 
everything necessary to dispose of the pro-allied prime minister,66 causing a discussion 
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amongst diplomats in Berlin and the OHL about how to proceed in the matter. State 
secretary von Jagow suggested involving the Marquis de Villalobar and using the king 
in order to get rid of Romanones.67 However, Villalobar deemed Ratibor too indiscrete 
to instigate swaying the king by using persons close to him and instead thought it more 
useful to let Alfonso know Germany was fully committed to entrusting him with peace 
negotiations.68 The king had expressed his wish to take a role in peace negotiations 
throughout the war and hoped Spain’s role as a neutral would be recognised 
favourably.69  
Ignoring Villalobar’s advice, General Ludendorff demanded that Ratibor be 
authorised to find a way of removing Romanones without putting pressure on the 
Spanish king.70 Finally the Auswärtige Amt had to give way to requests from the OHL 
and prompted Ratibor into action. As outlined at the beginning of the chapter the 
German military leadership gained substantial power during the war which allowed it to 
have a decisive say in political matters. The military’s interference in diplomatic 
relations with Spain highlights how political considerations were subjugated to military 
demands despite the risk of turning a hitherto friendly, neutral state against Germany. 
Portugal’s entry into the war on the side of the Entente in March 1916 must have 
certainly played an important part in the decision to pursue a more aggressive campaign 
in Spain. Germany could not risk losing another neutral state to the Allies. In November 
1916 the ambassador was able to confirm his plan to remove Romanones, consisting of 
supporting the neutrality campaign, instituting press propaganda and influencing 
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Alfonso XIII, was in place.71 From Belgium Villalobar had begun to discredit 
Romanones in front of the king.72  
The press campaign launched against the prime minister used his success as a 
businessman to portray him as a greedy war profiteer, claiming he was involved in 
contraband trade. According to Romanones’ critics, the interest he held in the Spanish 
mining industry was not compatible with his duties as prime minister and represented a 
threat to the country’s neutrality.73 In an interview with La Nación, an unnamed 
diplomat of the Central Powers also claimed Romanones was involved in contraband 
trade.74 The diplomat, as it transpired, was not the German ambassador but the Austrian 
ambassador at Madrid, Prince Fürstenberg.75 La Nación also printed further articles 
defaming the prime minister. In a particularly strongly worded article from May 1917 
titled ‘The true enemy’, the publication called for a destruction of ‘all the germs of 
influence of the Count Romanones in Spanish politics’ and stated, ‘The whole nation 
knows this man [Romanones] is her enemy therefore they keep attacking his intrigues, 
his declarations and his obvious intentions.’76 Romanones later described the right-wing 
press campaign directed against him as something no other politician had suffered 
before: ‘Germany not only torpedoed our merchant navy but also torpedoed me with 
great eagerness’, the Count recounted.77  
Further attempts were made to prove Spanish steamers carried deliveries for the 
Allies from mines of which Romanones was a shareholder.78 Romanones tried to curb 
the campaign by enforcing censorship and prohibiting the publication of some 
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newspaper editions.79 Though effective, the Auswärtige Amt expressed concern over 
Ratibor’s methods and urged him to keep up the appearance of a civil relationship with 
the prime minister, who had complained about his constant interference in Spanish 
politics.80 Count Romanones’ position was becoming increasingly precarious and 
eventually he was forced to resign in April 1917. The controversy over the handling of 
the sinking of the San Fulgencio revealed the reluctance amongst Spanish politicians, 
Conservatives and Liberals alike, to abandon the idea of neutrality.81  
German involvement in the downfall of Count Romanones was not the only 
interference in Spanish politics the German diplomats engaged in. The British Foreign 
Office suspected German participation in the dismissal of Eduardo Dato, who served as 
prime minister between June and October 1917, and also conceded that possibly one or 
two members of the subsequent cabinet, assembled in November 1917 and led by 
Garcia Prieto, had been bought over by Germany. The British expected large-scale 
election bribery on Germany’s part to guarantee the presence of Germanófilos in the 
Cortes.82 In a letter to the Auswärtige Amt Ratibor confirmed British suspicions, stating 
it would be difficult to estimate the amount necessary before candidates had been 
nominated and asking for permission to spend up to 5 million pesetas.83 The pro-allied 
Spanish press also reported about how German money was used to influence election 
results in Spain, much to the dismay of ambassador Ratibor.84  
In their effort to influence the general elections at the beginning of 1918, 
German diplomats also received help from unsuspected collaborators. Just like Liberal 
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and Conservative Spanish politicians worked with the German administration, 
Alejandro Lerroux, leader of the Radical Republicans, also offered his services to the 
German embassy in January 1918. His intention was to carry out an election campaign 
based on championing the idea of neutrality and the need for peace in the world.85 At 
the beginning of the First World War Lerroux had been one of the most ardent 
supporters of intervention but had changed his attitude throughout the conflict 
presumably to gain wider support amongst the Spanish working class movement which 
was largely in favour of neutrality.86 A self-proclaimed advanced Republican and 
Socialist as well as a revolutionary and reformist, Lerroux’s objectives remained vague, 
therefore enabling him to avoid any real political commitments.87 As prime minister 
during the Second Republic his politics were decidedly more moderate than his radical 
political beginnings.  
Fitting in with the popular theme of Germany as a defender of Spanish 
neutrality, often employed in German propaganda, the Auswärtige Amt agreed to work 
with Lerroux.88 German diplomatic documents from July 1918 confirm payments were 
made to the leader of the Radical Republicans.89 While in the summer of 1915 the 
embassy was plotting against Lerroux and trying to cause a rift in his party, as was seen 
above, they now readily accepted his help. This constitutes yet another example of 
German opportunism, using opposing political forces to their advantage regardless of 
the consequences for the stability of Spanish domestic affairs. 
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The incident surrounding the removal of the Ferrer statue in Brussels, 
documented by some historians90, showed how German diplomats tried their utmost to 
keep Spain’s Germanófilos in their favour. Erected in the wake of the Tragic Week in 
1909 to remember Francisco Ferrer, the statue had always been a source of controversy 
in Spain.91 In 1914 the German embassy at Madrid was approached by different 
political groups and individuals suggesting the removal or destruction of the statue. One 
of them were the Carlists92 who, according to German military attaché Kalle, were an 
important power player in Spanish politics due to their influence on Church and army. 
He therefore recommended complying with their wishes.93 The suggestion to dispose of 
the monument also came from a leading political figure with far greater influence than 
the Carlists, Alfonso XIII himself. In a meeting with Kalle Alfonso mentioned the great 
impact it would make in Spain if the statue was to be removed or damaged.94 In addition 
the Auswärtige Amt received a letter from a Spanish priest asking for the Ferrer statue to 
be destroyed and confirming that the true Catholics of Spain were pro-German.95 After 
deliberating how best to dispose of the monument, von der Lancken suggested 
damaging it with a chemical solution, forcing its subsequent complete removal in order 
to preserve public order. His plan was put into action in the night from 22 to 23 January 
1915 and the Ferrer statue disappeared from Brussels cityscape.96  
Another breach of Spanish neutrality, also instigated by the Spanish king, was 
the landing of a German U-boat at the Spanish port of Cartagena in June 1916. In 
February 1916 Alfonso had expressed to Kalle the idea of sending a German delegation 
to Spain by submarine. This plan, the Spanish monarch hoped, would deliver a powerful 
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blow to interventionists in general and Romanones in particular.97 When the U-35 
reached Cartagena on 21 June 1916, it carried a letter from Wilhelm II to Alfonso 
reiterating vague promises that the Spanish king would play an important role in peace 
negotiations and offering to settle the transfer of ten German ships interned in Spanish 
ports, an offer that had been made in acknowledgement of the economic hardship 
endured by Spain as a result of the war.98 Wilhelm also asked the Spanish sovereign to 
mediate between the belligerents and to encourage the Entente to accept the German 
conditions of peace. Alfonso in turn wrote to US ambassador Willard suggesting that he 
could represent the Central Powers in peace negotiations while the US could represent 
the Allies.99  
The official reason stated for the visit of the submarine was to show appreciation 
for the generous welcome that had been extended by Spain to German refugees from 
Cameroon.100 The incident, however, led to loud protests from the Allies. For Prime 
Minister Romanones it only meant a further increase in tension between Spain and the 
Allies. He later claimed to have ignored the contents of the Kaiser’s letter delivered by 
the U-boat to the Spanish king.101 After the landing at Cartagena, Alfonso asked the 
German government to refrain from sending further submarines to Spain.102  
The U-35 affair, as was hoped by the Spanish monarch, put an end to Count 
Romanone’s plans of moving closer into the Allied camp. With Portugal joining the 
Entente’s war effort only a few months prior to the incident, in March 1916, the friendly 
dealings between Alfonso and the Kaiser could have been interpreted as a sign that 
Spain had no intention of following Portugal’s path into the war. Even more worringly 
for the Allies, Spain’s behaviour might have been viewed as an aggressive move 
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towards its Iberian neighbour. As mentioned above, Germany frequently offered Spain a 
free hand in Portugal in return for a pro-German neutrality. If Spain would have acted 
on that offer, Portugal’s contribution to the Allied war effort would have been seriously 
undermined. By sending a U-boat to Spain only shortly after declaring war on Portugal 
over the seizure of German ships in Portuguese ports,103 Germany was following an 
aggressive strategy possibly aimed at trying to assert her power in the battle of the 
Atlantic by demonstrating to the Allies that Spain was benevolent to Germany. Even a 
strictly neutral Spain benefited the German war effort since it provided a buffer zone in 
a territory otherwise dominated by the Allies. The U-35 incident, like the campaign 
against Count Romanones outlined earlier in the chapter, marked a more aggressive 
behaviour of German activity in Spain from 1916 onwards.  
 
The role of the Spanish king during the war 
 
Both Alfonso’s eagerness to have the Ferrer statue removed and the U-35 
incident encouraged the German diplomats in their belief the King was a Germanófilo. 
Ratibor confirmed to the Auswärtige Amt in October 1914 that the Spanish royal family 
was siding with Germany and trying their utmost to increase sympathy for the Central 
Powers amongst the Spanish people. The royal court was also aware that an alliance 
with France would aggravate the army and the Carlists, possibly leading to 
revolutionary uprisings threatening the stability of Spain’s monarchy.104 Before the 
outbreak of the war Alfonso spoke freely about his antipathy for France in an audience 
with his military attaché at Berlin, Major Valdivia. Valdivia was able to report to Kalle 
that the king had no intention of supporting France in the case of a European war. In 
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matters of foreign affairs, however, he was forced to bow to the demands of Spain’s 
neighbour. The German military attaché already detected the difficulties that might arise 
from this dependency on France and questioned whether Spain would be able to resist 
being drawn into binding military pacts allowing transport of divisions and supporting 
the Entente in the Mediterranean.105  
Shortly after the outbreak of the war in a meeting with Kalle, Alfonso expressed 
his admiration for German mobilisation and left no doubt, according to the German 
military attaché, that he was a supporter of the German cause. In his audience Kalle was 
also given the impression that the king was not opposed to the idea of serious damage 
being inflicted on Britain and strongly believed in a German victory.106 German 
diplomats first began to exert pressure on the Spanish monarch in October 1914 after a 
swift victory had escaped the German army and Portugal was turning against Germany. 
State secretary von Jagow instructed ambassador Ratibor to try and sway Alfonso and 
the Spanish government to side against Portugal. In turn the Auswärtige Amt offered 
Spain a free hand in Portugal and the return of Gibraltar. This offer was rejected out of 
fear of an occupation of the Baleares and the Canary Islands as well as Spain’s mainland 
ports if Spain should act against Portugal.107 Whatever Alfonso's personal convictions 
were, he was not willing to risk Spain being dragged into the war, however tempting the 
territorial offers were.  
Throughout the war Alfonso maintained a close friendship with the German 
military attaché and it was mostly Kalle that represented the German diplomatic corps at 
court. While it would have been common for the two to discuss military matters, the 
king also consulted Kalle on diplomatic issues, preferring his council to that of 
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Ratibor.108 Alfonso’s education, which closely resembled that of an infantry cadet, had 
been mainly conducted by military men. It was therefore hardly surprising that the man 
who viewed himself as first soldier of the nation with a keen interest in military 
affairs109 cultivated close friendships with military personnel such as Kalle. Even after 
the end of the war the Spanish monarch showed an interest in the former German 
military attaché. During a dinner at the royal court in 1920 Alfonso was having a 
conversation in German with the acting German ambassador Bassewitz. Amongst 
discussing the political situation in Germany, the King also asked about the current 
position of Major Kalle.110  
During the war Alfonso frequently confided in the German military attaché. The 
King confessed his admiration for Germany and the Kaiser but also admitted, contrary 
to earlier declarations, to having a lot of sympathy for France and the French people. 
England, on the other hand, he hated whole heartedly. He made it clear to Kalle that he 
would never be able to side with England and France since those two nations were 
responsible for everything bad that had happened to Spain in the previous 150 years.111 
At the end of 1914 Alfonso was convinced a victory of the Allies would ensure a further 
decline of Spain. He was hoping a victorious Germany would also have advantages for 
Spain such as the recognition of her rights in Morocco, regaining Gibraltar, a free hand 
in Portugal and closer ties with the German Kaiser Reich.112  
Responding to German complaints that the Spanish government was supporting 
the Allies by allowing exports of weapons as well as of horses and mules, Alfonso 
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pointed out to Kalle under how much pressure Spain was put by Britain in particular, 
often leaving the government no other choice but to cooperate in order to avoid a 
complete collapse of the country. He nevertheless assured Kalle that he would try to 
curb favours to the Allies as much as possible.113 Although many sources confirm 
Alfonso’s close ties with Britain and France,114 in keeping with traditional Spanish 
foreign policy, his continued contact with representatives of the Central Powers during 
the war could also be an indication of his hopes to fulfil territorial desires which had 
been blocked by the Allies. Alfonso’s wish was to elevate Spain back into a position of 
power amongst the European nations, and at the beginning of the war he hoped that a 
German victory would help to achieve that.115  
Throughout the war the king’s true sympathies remained ambiguous. Both 
belligerents, constantly vying for his favour, frequently claimed to have him on their 
side but what can be derived from his contradictory statements and assurances to the 
Allies and Central Powers is that Alfonso’s kept his politics flexible, reacting to internal 
demands and external pressures in accordance with the needs of the hour. British 
ambassador Hardinge stated in his memoirs that the king always remained strictly 
impartial in the European war but Hardinge also believed Alfonso's sympathies were 
with the Allies.116  
Equally, French diplomats attested to Alfonso having been a strict observer of 
neutrality at the outbreak of the war. The French ambassador claimed, though, that the 
king had confirmed to him that his sympathies were with France.117 Count Romanones 
felt a change in the king’s attitude after the first battle of the Marne, after which he 
observed a softening in Alfonso’s pro-German tendencies and a commitment to put his 
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love for Spain above anything else. From then on, Romanones argued, the Spanish 
monarch could not be accused of being either pro-German or pro-Allied in his 
politics.118 Alcalá-Zamora, on the other hand, argued that the king was undoubtedly in 
favour of intervention while the Austrian queen mother did not share this attitude but 
had little influence on her son in this matter. The Queen, who was English, naturally 
avoided the limelight in that difficult time for her.119 
The king’s predicament during the war was similar to that of many amongst the 
European aristocracy. National allegiances now took precedence over familial ties and 
relations. Alfonso’s wife, Queen Victoria Eugenia, had two brothers and an uncle 
fighting in the war while the brother of the queen mother, Maria Christina, was the head 
of the Austro-Hungarian army.120 Due to Alfonso’s family connections to both 
belligerents, the Spanish king was almost obliged to maintain good relations with both 
sides121 without antagonising either of them and, most importantly, without being 
accused of breaking Spain’s neutrality. His commitment was first and foremost to Spain 
as he tried to shield his country from the horrors of the war.122 Therefore his 
considerations for territorial offers by Germany can be viewed as an attempt to use the 
conflict amongst the greater powers to gain something for Spain rather than forging a 
closer alliance with the Central Powers. As already discussed in Chapter 1, the king 
often took the initiative in negotiations with foreign diplomats, sometimes without 
consulting his government. However, he generally fell in line with the political direction 
of his government and therefore his actions during the First World War should not be 
viewed as an attempt to undermine Spain’s position of neutrality.  
A positive aspect of the king’s attempts to navigate himself into a favourable 
position to take on a leading role in peace negotiations, was the humanitarian work 
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carried out by the monarch, helping POW’s and their families. Financed and initiated by 
Alfonso himself, an office in his Madrid palace, established in August 1915, dealt with 
inquiries relating to the treatment, whereabouts and repatriation of prisoners of war on 
both sides of the conflict. Forty employees, led by the king’s secretary, processed up to 
20,000 letters a month. Alfonso would even respond to some inquiries personally123 and 
was also called upon by Allied diplomats to prevent the execution of German death 
penalties.124 British ambassador Hardinge recalled how the king, as well as his 
representative in Brussels – the Marquis de Villalobar – repeatedly appealed to the 
German government for leniency in carrying out sentences. For example in the case of 
British nurse Edith Cavell, who was accused of aiding enemy troops and of having 
violated the neutrality of the Red Cross, Villalobar and his American colleague in 
Brussels petitioned the German government, though to no avail.125 In some cases, 
however, King Alfonso managed to convert death penalties into life sentences by 
appealing to the German emperor as well as the pope. The death sentence of two French 
women, who were accused of a similar offence to that of Cavell, was commuted into 
penal servitude for life due to Alfonso’s intervention. 126  
To prevent Allied hospital ships from being attacked, the king arranged for 
Spanish officers to be placed on board of these ships so that they could certify they were 
not ships of war in disguise when challenged by German submarines or other enemy 
vessels. Sir Arthur Hardinge stated that ‘It would indeed be difficult to exaggerate the 
beneficent effect of the Spanish Sovereign’s humanitarian activities in diminishing the 
destructive effects of the war, or the number of lives which they saved.’127 Although the 
king’s office offered support to prisoners of both belligerents, it was mainly the Allies 
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which benefited from Alfonso’s humanitarian organisation with the majority of requests 
coming from French and Belgian prisoners.128  
 Besides the king, Spanish diplomats often represented Allied interest in 
the support of prisoners of war. Polo de Bernabé, Spanish ambassador at Berlin, served 
as representative for most Allied powers in Germany and oversaw prison camp 
inspections, supervision of purchase and distribution of supplies and the allocation of 
financial assistance to prisoners.129 Already by the end of 1914 Polo had been entrusted 
with looking after French, Belgian and Russian interests in Germany receiving funds 
from the Russian and French government for the relief of their prisoners. Before 
entering the war, the United States often organised relief work in conjunction with other 
neutral powers such as Spain.130  
In Belgium it was the Marquis de Villalobar who was active in organising help 
for Allied prisoners. A plaque erected at the house in Brussels in which he had resided 
between 1913 and 1919 commemorates the work he did on behalf of the Belgian 
people. The inscription reads: ‘The Marquis de Villalobar, Spanish Ambassador, lived in 
this building from 1913 to 1919. During the Great War he made this the centre of the 
kind deeds of S.M. the king Alphonse XIII and of his own work on behalf of the 
Belgian population. Gratitude from the Belgian-Spanish Association.’131 Under the 
auspices of Villalobar and his American colleague, Joseph Brand Whitlock, the relief 
effort for the Belgian civilian population was organised, ensuring the distribution of 
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food.132 In view of the relief work undertaken by Spanish diplomats, Polo’s and 
Villalobar’s collaboration with the German administration becomes all the more 
puzzling. The realities of war and the suffering endured by POW’s and civilians must 
have affirmed their belief that Spain should stay out of the conflict, yet they did not to 
blame Germany and the Central Powers for that suffering.  
Alfonso maintained good relations with diplomats of both warring parties,133 
consulting with them frequently for updates on the progress of the war. Although he 
sought Ratibor’s opinion on the formation of a cabinet under Romanones at the end of 
1915, Alfonso ignored the German ambassador’s doubts and the cabinet was formed 
regardless.134 Despite Alfonso’s assurance that Ratibor could rely on him completely,135 
German diplomats started to question the king’s influence on Spanish politics and his 
willingness to counter the liberal pro-Allied policies of the Count Romanones.136 For 
now, though, Ratibor decided not to bring up previous offers of Gibraltar, Tangier and 
Portugal to encourage the king to take a more pro-German stance.137 Although the 
Spanish sovereign tried to restrict the economic concessions that Spain had to make to 
the Allies, he was unable to let all German activity go unnoticed. Due to pressure from 
France, Alfonso was forced to take measures against German activity in Morocco and 
could not prevent the expulsion of German agent Coppel from Melilla in September 
1916.138 German agents had been stirring up revolts in the French colony. The Spanish 
king, keen to extend his North African empire, had been in close contact with the 
German embassy, who kept him informed about the progress of their agents.139  
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In October 1917 Kalle had heard from an informer who was in close contact 
with the Spanish prime minister that the Allies had proof the king was allowing a secret 
news exchange between Madrid and Berlin behind the back of Romanones. As a result 
of that trade negotiations for coal deliveries to Spain had been abandoned and, 
according to Kalle, Spain was threatened with being sealed off economically.140 While 
Alfonso did not always keep his prime minister informed about his communication with 
the German diplomats in Spain, it was also the case that Kalle suspected that the king 
was not being informed properly by his government.141 This was not, however the case, 
as correspondence of the Spanish Ministry of State confirms that the monarch was 
always well and timely informed by the various Spanish diplomatic outposts.142 
British diplomats, on the other hand, expressed concern over Kalle’s influence 
on the king and blamed the German military attaché’s propaganda campaign for the 
king’s belief in a German victory.143 In order to counter that propaganda the Foreign 
Office suggested requesting audiences for allied military attachés.144 British diplomats 
were also worried about how events in Russia and Greece would affect the behaviour of 
the Spanish monarch, especially since German propaganda honed in on the aristocracy’s 
suspicion of Allied democracy.145  
 As the war continued it became increasingly difficult for the German 
diplomats to ascertain where Alfonso’s true allegiances lay. Some historians assessed 
the king began to take a pro-Allied stance as the war progressed.146 The economic 
pressure exerted by the Allies was certainly a reason why Alfonso often had to bow to 
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British and French demands which subsequently could be interpreted as a move closer 
to the Allied camp. With Portugal entering the war in March 1916, shortly followed by 
Rumania in August 1916, the king must have not only been aware of the decreasing 
likelihood of a German victory but was also faced with the reality of his country being 
surrounded by Allied states. An aggressive pro-German policy would have been 
economic and political suicide for Spain which would not have had the military power 
to defend its borders and would have been unable to survive without Allied trade. 
 By the end of 1917 German diplomats were openly concerned about what they 
saw as a change in the Spanish sovereign’s behaviour against Germany. Doubts were 
raised when, during the ruling crisis in November 1917, Alfonso attempted to replace 
Dato with Sanchéz de Toca, who was viewed as anti-German as well as pro-
interventionist by Ratibor.147 Only a month later though, Alcalá-Zamora confirmed to a 
German informer that the king was looking at Germany more favourably again and 
believed in a victory of the Central Powers.148 Alfonso’s changing view on the war, as 
put forward by Alcalá-Zamora, could well have been influenced by Russia’s withdrawal 
from the conflict after the revolution of October and November 1917. With the help of 
Villalobar, German diplomats tried to establish the reasons for the king’s change in 
attitude. The Auswärtige Amt warned however, to proceed with caution, since it was not 
clear whether Alfonso’s bad mood was caused by having found out about the German 
embassy’s relations with the military juntas.149  
An incident which also negatively impacted on relations between Germany and 
the Spanish king was the escape of a German U-boat from internment at La Coruña in 
October 1917. The captain of the UB-49 had given his word not to flee as a result of 
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which the security arrangements surrounding the submarine had been neglected. After 
its escape the Spanish government protested vehemently and demanded that UB-49 be 
sent back to La Coruña. Eventually Germany agreed to send a similar submarine to be 
interned in Spain in place of the UB-49.150 Alfonso, apparently, seemed to have been 
particularly upset about the German U-boat commander breaking his word of honour. 
After the incident he mentioned being unable to wear the German admiral’s uniform 
again.151  
Alfonso was also displeased about the behaviour of his military attaché at Berlin, 
Major Valdivia, who he accused of behaving more like a German agent than a Spanish 
military attaché when the latter defended the German position. This also sparked the 
concern of the OHL and Ludendorff reported to Great Headquarters that it would be 
regrettable if Valdivia, whose relationship with Alfonso had been used to the advantage 
of Germany, would fall out of favour with the king.152 The Spanish monarch further 
voiced concern over the reliability of the Marquis of Villalobar. According to the King, 
news of the ‘Berlin missions’ of the Spanish representative in Belgium reached Paris 
and London before Madrid. Alfonso also alleged that information from Berlin relayed to 
him by Villalobar was incomplete.153 The King’s changing attitude towards some of 
Germany’s most valuable Spanish collaborators must have been a cause of concern for 
Berlin. 
Despite his efforts on behalf of Allied POWs, the Spanish monarch was not 
favoured by Britain to lead a peace conference.154 While not entertaining all of 
Alfonso’s ambitions, British diplomats still needed to maintain good relations with the 
king. Spanish-British relations during the war, however, were marked by mistrust. As 
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Dirk Zeiseler assessed, a negative image of Spain persisted within British government 
circles and equally even amongst pro-Allied Spaniards historically grown prejudices 
against Great Britain prevailed.155 Although not thought of as an equal partner by the 
British Empire,156 Spain’s potential value as an ally in the war was assessed positively 
by the Foreign Office.  
Spain joining the Entente would have enabled the Spanish government to take 
measures against trading with the enemy, therefore opening up Spanish markets to 
British and allied trade. The disappearance of German businesses in Spain would have 
been profitable for Britain. Another advantage to the Foreign Office was the positive 
effect that Spain’s belligerence might have had on Catholic opinion throughout Europe 
and America – although it was doubtful whether that would have been of any practical 
value. Possible demands for colonies, in particular Tangier, Gibraltar and a free hand in 
Portugal, were seen as a considerable disadvantage of Spain joining the Allies. The 
Foreign Office assessed ‘Spain is quite incapable of developing Tangier efficiently’157 
and although a cession of Gibraltar would have been beneficial to British-Spanish 
relations, it was a highly unpopular issue in Britain. Allowing Spain a free hand in 
Portugal would have been a gross breach of faith to Britain’s oldest ally. Therefore, the 
Foreign Office considered a neutral Spain as most advantageous to Britain and was 
confident that if the Allies won the war, Spain’s material interests would forge lasting 
ties between both countries.158  
To counter German influence in Spain and curb Germanophile tendencies, the 
British government exercised economic pressure, threatening Madrid at times with coal 
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embargos.159 This method was also employed in relations with other neutrals such as the 
Netherlands and Sweden.160 The Spanish government, on the other hand, used Britain’s 
dependency on iron ore as a lever in negotiations. By early 1917 it declared that any 
ships coming from Britain were only allowed to transport iron ore if their load already 
consisted of one third of coal. Equally, any ships leaving Spanish iron ore ports had to 
reserve at least 33% of their loading space for Andalusian oranges.161 To formalise trade 
arrangements between both countries and to secure Spain’s coal supply, the Cortina 
agreement was signed on 19 April 1917. The British agreement was followed by 
contracts with the United States and France. In March 1918 the US government 
consented to cotton and oil exports in return for Spanish fruits and ore. The same month 
the Spanish-French agreement outlined unlimited exports of copper, zinc, lead, ore and 
wool to France, while the French government promised to import Spanish citrus fruits 
and wine and also permitted the transit of some goods from Germany and 
Switzerland.162 This undoubtedly brought Spain closer to the Allied camp, although 
with the country still maintaining its neutrality.  
Although aware of the Allies’ economic dominance in Spain, Germany also 
assessed Spain's potential as a partner and sought opportunities to forge closer ties 
between the two countries. When at the beginning of 1915 revolts broke out in Spanish 
Morocco, ambassador Ratibor, acting on behalf of the Auswärtige Amt, tried to 
negotiate a peace between local chiefs and the Spanish colonial authorities. Berlin also 
offered to give Spain a free hand in Tangier as well as granting them Portugal and 
Gibraltar.163 In return, Germany expected an equal share in economic profits gained in 
Tangier and stipulated that only German companies be employed in the extension of the 
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port.164 Naturally, German territorial offers to Spain were far more generous than those 
of the Allies since Germany was negotiating with land it did not yet possess. Spain, 
though very aware of the theoretical nature of German offers, was still lured by the 
prospect of expanding its colonial empire and German military documents hint at a 
collaboration between both countries in Morocco during the war.165 
Spain's rich mineral reserves, mainly taken advantage of by the British 
throughout the war, also made her an appealing ally to Germany. German mining 
companies hired engineers to acquire additional depots to existing German mines in 
Spain. They also sought to disrupt ore deliveries to Britain and France and boycott any 
business undertaken by the Entente in Spain.166 Through official diplomatic channels 
the Auswärtige Amt attempted to find ways of stopping trade between the Allies and 
Spain by appealing to the Spanish government to enforce strict neutrality and not aid the 
war effort of one of the belligerents.167 Spanish-German trade during the war, however, 
remained limited and was greatly hindered by Allied blockades. Another, far greater, 
obstacle impacting on Spanish-German relations was the German U-boat campaign. 
 
The effects of unrestricted submarine warfare on Spanish-German relations 
 
The use of unrestricted submarine warfare in general became a contested issue 
between the Auswärtige Amt, the navy and the army command. The Kaiser as well as 
Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg feared it would severely damage diplomatic relations 
with neutral states.168 Their fears were confirmed when, after the policy was first 
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introduced in early 1915, the most important neutral, the United States, protested 
vehemently, leading to the suspension of the blockade in September 1915.169 Although a 
defection of the United States into the Allied camp was temporarily avoided, military 
demands would eventually outweigh diplomacy. Encouraged by the outcome of the 
Battle of Jutland in May 1916, the navy successfully argued their case for a re-
instatement of unrestricted submarine warfare. With the losses endured by the German 
army in the great battles of attrition of 1916, the u-boat was now generally viewed as 
the decisive secret weapon in the European conflict.170  
Faced with large scale suffering of the German civilian population and a general 
weariness towards the war, Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg started his peace initiative at 
the end of 1916. His note to the American government in September 1916 to negotiate 
peace, however, was left unanswered. As could be seen during the U-35 incident [see 
above], Germany also used its diplomatic relations with neutral Spain in the hope that 
the Spanish government might be able to mediate terms of peace favourable to the 
German position. This, however, was to no avail. Though the German chancellor 
announced his peace offer in December 1916, before Woodrow Wilson's peace 
initiative, it was rejected by Allied governments. The Entente Powers would not submit 
to any peace negotiations with anyone whom they saw as the aggressor in the 
conflict.171  
With his peace initiative a failure, Bethmann was now unable to halt the 
submarine offensive. Despite his insistence that it was his decision to initiate the 
campaign, he had to concede that the opinion of field marshal Hindenburg held a greater 
weight in the matter. The Reichstag declared that the chancellor’s decision regarding the 
policy of unrestricted submarine warfare had to be informed by the assessment of the 
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supreme command and would have the full support of the Reichstag. This further 
highlights how political decisions were left to the military while the government had to 
submit to the demands of Hindenburg and Ludendorff in their desire to fight a total 
war.172 The U-boat offensive recommenced in spring 1916, being quickly followed by 
another suspension which was finally lifted in February 1917. Bethmann had to concede 
that ‘if the military authorities consider the U-boat war essential, I am not in a position 
to contradict them.’173 
German military tactics not only led to the entry of the United States into the war 
but also seriously impacted on Spain. While in the first two years of the war only eight 
Spanish ships had been sunk, the number rose to 31 by April 1917.174 Although the 
Spanish note following the sinking of the Giralda at the beginning of 1918 was less 
harsh than expected, it was made clear that repeated incidents would not be tolerated 
and force even germanophile ministers to demand more decisive actions from their 
government.175 The Auswärtige Amt agreed to issue transport permissions to Spanish 
vessels carrying vital goods for Spain, while German submarines were ordered to 
honour strictly Spanish territorial waters and compensation would be paid for unjustly 
sinkings.176 Ships navigating in the restricted zone or transporting contraband to the 
enemy, however, would not be spared. More importantly, the Auswärtige Amt left it to 
the navy to decide to what extent Spain could be accommodated.177 General Ludendorff 
vetoed any concessions being made to Spain, arguing they would complicate the 
execution of U-boat warfare and encourage other neutrals to make unrealistic 
demands.178  
                                                 
172Ibid., pp 290-1. 
173Ibid., p. 293, quoting from Bethmann Hollweg's Reflections.  
174Romero Salvadó, Spain 1914 – 1918, p. 72. 
175P.A., R12005, Spanien 61 – Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen Spanien und Deutschland Februar – 
April 1918, Ratibor to Äuswärtige Amt 8.2.1918. 
176B.A.M., RM5/3152, Admiralstab der Marine, Spanien Bd. 2 1918, Note Berlin 14.8.1918. 
177Ibid. 
178Rüchardt, Deutsch–Spanische Beziehungen, pp 216–7. 
185 
 
On the ground, German diplomats continued their campaign to uphold Spanish 
neutrality, successfully rallying anti-interventionist opinion. The Spanish government, 
however, became increasingly exasperated by Germany’s lack of response to their 
complaints regarding the sinking of Spanish vessels, a condition Maura called 
unacceptable.179 By August 1918 Spain’s favourable position towards Germany was 
waning180 and the Spanish government issued an ultimatum threatening to seize German 
ships lying in Spanish ports as compensation for sunk Spanish tonnage.181 Germany 
agreed to pay reparations for Spanish vessels sunk. The same concessions were made to 
Holland, while Norway also made similar demands.182  
Despite their relentless propaganda and constant wooing of Spanish politicians, 
German diplomats could not halt the damaging effect unrestricted submarine warfare 
had on Spanish-German relations. By August 1918 Germany had received over forty 
official complaints from the Spanish government lamenting the loss of their ships.183 
Steamers like the San Fulgencio for example, carrying coal from England,184 had been a 
frequent casualty of German naval warfare tactics, proving that the vague guidelines 
protecting neutrals rights were even less effective when it came to the war at sea. As 
was seen in Chapter 1, Count Romanones was prepared to take further measures after 
the sinking of the San Fulgencio in April 1917. However, under pressure from the king 
and his own party, Romanones was forced to resign as prime minister and Spanish 
neutrality was maintained. 
Keeping up trade during wartime was vital for Spain which was, as outlined 
above, particularly reliant on English coal deliveries. It was therefore not surprising that 
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the Spanish king, whose main interest was the protection of the Spanish people, voiced 
his concern over the German U-boat campaign.185 Joaquín Sánchez de Toca, a 
Conservative who had been speaker of the upper house and minister several times, 
while approving of unrestricted submarine warfare as a legitimate weapon against 
belligerents, called German attacks on the Spanish merchant navy attacks on Spain’s 
sovereignty which could not be tolerated.186 Alfonso was also irritated by Berlin’s delay 
in responding to complaints regarding the sinking of Spanish ships.187 He relayed to 
Kalle that he was under the impression that the German government was deliberately 
holding up investigations into attacks on neutral vessels and demanded immediate 
concessions such as the safe return for Spanish steamers in English ports, guaranteeing 
Spanish trade with North and South America, continued trade between Great Britain and 
Spain excluding contraband and war material and an assurance that Spanish ships would 
not be attacked. If those demands would not be met, Alfonso was unsure of how long he 
would be able to resist pressure from the Entente and continue to uphold neutrality.188  
The Foreign Office also observed a change in attitude amongst Spanish military 
circles which had been hitherto friendly towards the war effort of Germany and the 
Central Powers. Ambassador Hardinge passed on to his superiors an article from El 
Ejercito Español from January 1917 which severely criticised the German U-boat 
campaign as well as the attacks in the Spanish press against Count Romanones. The 
article took particular offence in German interference in Spanish domestic affairs and 
clearly outlined the devastating effects unrestricted submarine warfare was having on 
the Spanish economy. While not turning against the German nation as such, it was made 
clear that the tactics employed in the German war effort could not be accepted by Spain:  
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‘We like the Germany of method, of organisation, of order, we like heroic 
Germany which has handed over her entire youth for her aggrandisement, we 
like the disciplined patriotic Germany which undergoes every kind of privation 
and want for her national ideal, we like the Germany of science, of industry and 
of world-civilisation; but we cannot applaud, justify or in any manner excuse the 
torpedoing of Spanish ships, nor pretend that in order to please her we will close 
our frontiers to die of hunger.’189 
In their tactics the German admiralty tried to consider Spain’s economic and 
political interests since the country constituted to them the most important of all 
neutrals, now that the United States had entered the war.190 The Auswärtige Amt was 
still faced with a dilemma. The policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, a crucial if not 
the most important part of the German campaign, made it impossible to protect Spanish 
vessels, which in turn pushed Spain further into the Allied camp. Aware of this 
predicament, Kalle urged the German military command to protect shipments between 
Spain and North and South America and assure the Spanish government that everything 
would be done to guarantee the safety of their ships.191 Otherwise, he feared, a complete 
rupture in relations with Spain would be the inevitable result.192  
As the war dragged on and a German victory was becoming increasingly less 
likely, anti-German propaganda in Spain began to feature more prominently.193 Ratibor 
tried to fend off attacks against the Kaiser and the army by complaining to the Spanish 
government and demanding action to be taken.194 However, those were not the only 
attacks the ambassador had to deal with as voices of concern over Ratibor’s methods 
were growing louder in the Auswärtige Amt. Following complaints from the Spanish 
government about the embassy’s interference in internal affairs, Ratibor’s attitude and 
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that of some of his staff was described as unbearable and intolerable.195 Major Valdivia 
stated that the ambassador had pursued a position of ‘whoever is not for me, is against 
me’ from the outset of the war and made a grave mistake by cooperating with the 
Carlists. He also criticised the German press propaganda campaign for being unsubtle 
and overtly pro-German196 and claimed nothing had been done to win over neutral 
Spaniards.197  
Ratibor’s position was further compromised when in a series of articles El Sol 
disclosed the dealings of the German embassy with an Anarchist called Manuel Pascual, 
who allegedly was paid to carry out anti-interventionist propaganda. The allegations 
went so far as to connect the German embassy with plans to assassinate Count 
Romanones.198 As proof El Sol printed a letter from the German embassy addressed to 
Pascual ordering him to print a flyer. Ratibor denied those accusations and argued the 
campaign was instigated by French intelligence services.199  
Although the Spanish government, on demand of the German embassy, seized 
some of the publications reporting on the scandal, the news caused a sensation and 
posed a serious threat to Ratibor’s position in Spain. According to British reports, El Sol 
had received help from the secret service department of the French embassy, which had 
uncovered the German plots.200 French intelligence had secured Pascual for their 
services and subsequently mounted an attack against the personnel of the German 
embassy. British ambassador Hardinge remarked that a skilful blow had been dealt at 
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the ‘Prussian Hydra’.201 In other words, Ratibor was not entirely wrong in his 
assumption the campaign had been part of Allied propaganda against Germany. 
The German ambassador, however, had to admit that Pascual had made contact 
with the embassy in October 1916 and was used on two or three occasions for 
propaganda purposes. What Ratibor described as propaganda purposes, El Sol alleged to 
have been the stirring up of revolutionary strikes and connected the activities of the 
German embassy with unrest in the summer of 1917.202 Ratibor maintained the embassy 
immediately cut off any contact with Pascual when it transpired that he was a radical 
anarchist suggesting the assassination of Romanones and destruction of newspaper 
offices. After the end of this collaboration, Pascual started a press campaign against the 
embassy with what Ratibor called invented stories.203 In a meeting with embassy 
secretary von Stohrer, Count Romanones assured the German diplomat that he did not 
give any weight to the accusations and saw them merely as a passionate outburst by 
Germany’s enemies.204 Ratibor, on the other hand, was convinced the Count was behind 
the campaign.205 Through Villalobar in Belgium complaints were made protesting 
against the attacks on the ambassador and German embassy staff. Villalobar also 
pointed out that Ratibor had brought this on himself by relentlessly campaigning against 
Romanones.206 The documents do not reveal whether there was an actual German plot 
to kill Count Romanones but undoubtedly everything was done by German diplomats to 
remove him from office. Romanones himself felt he was the only one in Spain opposing 
Germany and that therefore, the Germans wanted his political death if not even his 
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206P.A., R12005, Spanien 61 – Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen Spanien und Deutschland Februar – 
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personal one as well.207 Beside damaging the reputation of the German embassy and 
compromising the position of the German diplomatic corps in Spain, the Pascual case 
was not further pursued by the Spanish authorities.208 
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Mundo Gráfico, 13 Mar. 1918. Reporting on the ‘Sensational News’ as revealed in El 
Sol. The main protagonists in the affair are introduced. 
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Undeterred by this, the ambassador continued his attempts to counter allied 
propaganda by complaining to the Spanish government about Entente activity and 
asking for the neutrality law to be effected.209 In his correspondence with the Spanish 
government, Ratibor brought their attention to planned anti-German public protests210 or 
newspaper articles which supposedly agitated against Germany, arguing that these 
incidents posed a threat to Spanish neutrality.211 The Spanish authorities assured Ratibor 
that everything would be done to ensure public order212 and explained that the 
publication of anti-German articles was a regrettable mistake.213 Kalle viewed the 
increased press attacks on the German embassy as an attempt by the Allies to force the 
recall of Ratibor and severely hinder German diplomatic activity on the peninsula.214 He 
also expressed concern over the lack of activity on part of the Spanish government 
which allowed the anti-German campaign to continue.215 In light of Allied successes on 
the Western front, pro-German sentiment in Spain had subsided considerably by August 
1918 and Francophile politicians like Romanones were gaining the upper hand216 while 
the Germanófilos became less vocal in their opposition.217  
Following the First World War, in December 1918, Count Romanones was back 
in power as prime minister after the collapse of the Maura government. On 14 
November 1918 ambassador Ratibor was informed by the Ministry of State that with the 
abdication of the Kaiser and subsequent political changes in Germany the Spanish 
government considered Ratibor’s mission to be finished since the regime he had 
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represented no longer existed.218 In the press the disgraced German diplomatic corps 
was now referred to as ‘undesirables’ and due to their intrigues and interferences in 
Spanish politics Ratibor and his men were deemed personae non gratae.219  
Despite his work in aid of POWs as head of a central bureau for prisoners, the 
Spanish government became dissatisfied with Polo de Bernabé’s services towards the 
end of the war. In a telegram to Madrid, seemingly intercepted by the Germans, Polo 
reported of a campaign waged against him. He also pointed out that a similar campaign 
had been staged the previous summer, accusing the Spanish ambassador of refusing to 
pass on official notes to the German government, accusations which Polo denied.220 It is 
possible that Polo’s behaviour towards the German administration seemed too friendly 
for some. In July 1917, for example, he held a reception at the Spanish embassy for a 
German captain and captain lieutenant who returned the flag of a Spanish steamer that 
had been sunk off the coast of England. After the official reception Polo invited both 
captains for breakfast and assured them of his pro-German leanings.221 In view of the 
detrimental effect unrestricted submarine warfare was having on Spain, this could have 
been viewed as unfitting behaviour for the representative of a neutral nation. Some 
papers wrote that Polo had caused Spain enormous damage by refusing to pass on 
complaints about the sinking of Spanish ships.222 In August 1918 the Dato government 
accepted Polo’s resignation. The prime minister pointed out that he and his cabinet 
believed Polo had misunderstood the meaning of official government notes and 
therefore had failed in supporting the government adequately.223 Polo insisted he had 
done nothing wrong and felt hurt by the accusations against him and the way his 
                                                 
218A.M.A.E., H2291, Politica exterior Alemania 1917–19, undated note Ministry of State. 
219Ibid., Extract from The New York Herald, 9.12.1918. 
220P.A., R20655, Funksprüche Spanien 1917, telegram Berlin to Madrid, subsecretario, 23.4.17. 
221B.A.M., RM5/906, Bericht des Militärattachés in Madrid betr. Audienz beim König von Spanien (U-
Bootkrieg), Head of Admiralty, 3.7.1917. 
222A.M.A.E., H2291 Politica exterior Alemania 1917–19, El Figaro [?], 5.12.1918. 
223P.A., R20659, Funksprüche Spanien 1918, San Sebastian to Berlin, Dato to Polo, 23.8.1918. 
194 
 
government handled his dismissal after having served over forty years in the Spanish 
diplomatic corps.224  
In December 1918 Ratibor and the entire embassy staff received a request from 
Romanones to leave Spain. At the same time the Spanish prime minister expressed the 
wish to maintain good relations with Germany.225 On 22 December 1918 the business of 
the German embassy at Madrid was transferred to Count Bassewitz.226 While 
Romanones must have been revelling in the fact that he was finally able to send his 
adversary home, he did not use Ratibor’s departure as an opportunity for a personal 
vendetta and remained civil in his correspondence with him. In a letter dated 27 
December 1918 he confirmed to Ratibor that his daughters as well as his wife could stay 
in Spain as long as they wished without fearing expulsion by the Spanish 
government.227 The ambassador himself was asked to leave Spain until 17 January 1919 
while his staff had to leave by 29 December 1918. On their departure the German 
diplomats were only allowed limited luggage and they were also not permitted to take 
documents of any kind with them.228 Ratibor, though, did not relent; stubborn as ever, 
he left Spain saying he had saved Spanish neutrality by fighting Allied influence and 
had managed to temporarily remove Spain’s most important statesman from power. 
Romanones, he argued, owed his return to power only to a victory of the Entente and 
not his own doing.229 In an interview with a Swiss newspaper Ratibor said he was sad at 
having to leave Spain but felt no bitterness. He felt he had done everything possible to 
keep up warm relations between Germany and Spain even throughout the war. The fact 
that several hundred people gathered at his departure from Spain was proof for Ratibor 
that he had succeeded in his mission. He strenuously denied any accusations made in 
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the Allied press against him regarding inciting strikes and causing revolutionary 
upheaval. Ratibor also declined to comment on the reasons for his dismissal.230 
 
Conclusion 
 
Spain during the First World War constituted a great paradox. The support for 
liberal and democratic ideas propagated by Britain and France was championed by 
revolutionary factions within Spain whose actions severely hampered vital trade with 
the Allies. Therefore, it was more beneficial for the Entente’s war effort to ensure the 
maintenance of a conservative Spanish government which would suppress those 
revolutionary elements. However, the Allies also needed to ensure that the pro-German 
parts of Spanish society did not gain the upper hand but failed to offer sufficient 
concessions which would have enabled Spain to break off relations with Germany. 
Germany, on the other hand, supported left-wing workers organisations, Republicans 
and Anarchists in the hope of causing great instability in Spanish domestic affairs, 
which in turn would negatively impact on trade with the Allies. Interference in Spain's 
politics was pursued by German diplomats only with the short-term war effort in mind 
and without considering the long-term consequences this would have on an already 
highly fractious country.  
Since the intrigues of the embassy throughout the war were often only thinly 
disguised, many Spaniards were relieved to see the German diplomats finally expelled 
from Spain. The liberal paper España showed their delight by delivering a clear 
message to ambassador Ratibor – ‘el coloso germanico’ – ‘Auf Nimmerwiedersehen! 
Hasta nunca!’ 231 (May we never see you again.). El Sol called the embassy’s meddling 
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in Spanish affairs intolerable and saw Romanones’ actions to dismiss the German 
diplomatic corps as justified.232 With the fall of Ratibor it was hoped that the Spanish 
politicians, journalists and newspaper editors who had supported him and benefited 
from their links with the German and the Austrian embassy would also be exposed.233 
According to El Parlamentario, the war had only highlighted the divisions within 
Spanish society and the existence of Spanish germanophilism confirmed the image of 
Spain as a country of paradoxes and absurdisms.234 At the end of the First World War 
the activities of the German embassy at Madrid were further exposed, revealing a 
network of espionage and support for anti-dynastic agitation.235 In their attempts to 
promote their friends into power and dispose of their enemies, Ratibor and his men 
employed methods which not only breached Spanish neutrality but also caused further 
disintegration in Spanish domestic affairs by supporting groups within Spanish society 
that were opposed to each other. While Ratibor and his diplomats had to maintain an at 
least outward appearance of keeping up with their diplomatic duties, it was left to the 
German military and naval attachés to galvanise destructive forces that would threaten 
Spain’s stability. 
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Chapter 5 
German military intelligence and espionage activity in Spain 
 
Maintaining Spain’s neutrality and curbing Allied influence was not the main 
concern for German diplomats and propagandists only; it was also the principal 
preoccupation of the German military personnel stationed in the country. Military 
attaché Arnold Kalle and naval attaché Hans von Krohn had the task of supporting 
German military strategy in the Mediterranean by watching ship movements and 
devising ways to refuel and restock submarines safely. As a neutral country, Spain also 
offered an ideal outpost for espionage. The attachés were entrusted with the unofficial 
task of building up a network which would enable them to observe enemy activity 
closely. Kalle and Krohn’s services were also required to counter and prevent Allied 
activity on the Iberian Peninsula. Due to the restrictions imposed by the Allied 
blockade, Spain’s main trading partners during the war were France and Britain. 
German covert activities attempted to hinder that trade greatly in order to undermine the 
Allied war effort. In doing so, the commercial interests of Spanish firms and individuals 
who were profiting from trade with the Allies also suffered. To carry out their task 
effectively the attachés not only had to violate Spanish neutrality, an illegal activity 
frequently engaged in by both belligerent camps, they also galvanised opposing forces 
within Spain, accelerating a process of social upheaval which had begun at the end of 
the nineteenth century.  
At the beginning of this chapter a brief examination of the service attachés’ 
official role before the war is given in order to enable a better understanding of the 
conflict that arose between Germany’s civilian leadership and the military High 
Command, as already outlined in the previous chapter, and also to highlight how the 
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role of military and naval attachés changed throughout the war. This is particularly 
important in view of service attachés deployed in a neutral country. As the example of 
Spain shows, the role of the attachés changed from an advisory position to that of an 
active agent of war willing to target civilians on neutral territory in order to further the 
German war effort. The secret work of the attachés in Spain had the potential to 
undermine severely official diplomatic relations between Germany and Spain and, if 
uncovered, could have led to a complete break down of the relationship between both 
countries. 
Given the secretive nature of covert activity, not all German operations in Spain 
during the First World War were fully documented. In addition to that some files were 
destroyed immediately after the war in order to not expose German agents and other 
archival material did not survive the Second World War. However, for this investigation 
the German intelligence network in Spain during the First World War has been largely 
reconstructed thanks to extensive research in the German diplomatic and military 
archives. The work was further complemented by an examination of British Foreign 
Office correspondence as well as a survey of Spanish, British and American 
newspapers. Together with existing works, which point out individual German agents 
and some of their espionage activity in Spain during the war, this chapter will outline in 
detail how the German intelligence network was set up, how it operated and who were 
its main agents involved in covert activity.  
The organisational chart and the map1 provided in the chapter give a clear 
overview of the hierarchical structure of the German naval intelligence service in Spain. 
Individual German agents, as identified in the works of Spanish historians on the First 
World War,2 can now be assigned a definite role in the network which also enables us to 
                                                 
1See below, pp 208-9. 
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inteligencia británicos en España durante la Primera Guerra Mundial’ in Revista de Historia Militar, xlix 
199 
 
understand the lines of communication between the naval attaché and his various 
agents. As pointed out by biographers of Wilhelm Canaris, Hitler’s head of military 
intelligence, Canaris was responsible for setting up an intelligence network in Spain 
during the First World War. However, none of these works outline this network in any 
great detail. In this chapter the reports produced by Canaris during the war are used to 
show the various subsections of the German intelligence service in Spain as well as the 
different information outposts set up by Canaris and his agents. 
The activity of German agents was mainly aimed at damaging the Allied war 
effort by disrupting trade between the Allies and Spain and also by sabotaging and 
destroying Allied property. The chapter will outline the extent of this activity and also 
explain how German agents were able to exploit the growing dissatisfaction amongst 
Spanish workers to their own advantage. The discontent of the Spanish working class, 
which did not profit from Spain’s wartime boom, an aspect of the impact of the First 
World War on Spain that will be briefly discussed in this chapter, allowed German 
agents to foment strikes and cause civil unrest which in turn hindered trade with the 
Entente. While only a short-term, opportunistic measure of Germany’s wartime effort, 
agitation of oppositional movements would cause further instability in Spain.  
A similarly destabilising effect could be observed with German activity in 
French Morocco which sought to oust French control in the region by supporting local 
tribes in their fight against colonial rule. This activity was largely organised by the 
German service attachés and their agents in Spain and will therefore be included in this 
part of the investigation. German activity in North Africa was sometimes carried out 
with the help of Spanish collaborators who hoped to extend their part of the colonial 
empire and minimise French influence in the area. However, encouraging Moroccan 
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tribes to revolt against their colonisers was a dangerous tactic for Spain since it certainly 
did not benefit stability in Spanish Morocco and did nothing to strengthen Spanish rule.  
Given Germany’s heightened activity in Spain, the Entente also thought it 
necessary to organise a counter-espionage effort on the Iberian Peninsula. How British 
and French services operated and attempted to curb German operations will be outlined 
in this chapter. Towards the end of the war German covert activity was suffering some 
set-backs due to the exposure of a number of their Spanish collaborators in the Spanish 
press as well as revelations which seriously compromised naval attaché von Krohn. The 
chapter will conclude with a look at those scandals exposing German espionage activity 
in Spain, and also explain how the Spanish government attempted to combat this kind of 
activity by the belligerents at the very end of the First World War.  
Similarly to the German propaganda effort, which in the aftermath of the 
German defeat was deemed a failure, the German information and intelligence service 
during the war was also seen as far inferior to that of the Allies.3 Referring to neutral 
territories, Walter Nicolai, head of German military intelligence during the First World 
War, even claimed that no German information services existed in those countries and 
all intelligence activity had to be carefully executed from Germany. Nicolai also noted 
that German residents in neutral countries could not be relied upon since, although they 
were willing to help, their activity was lacking sufficient guidance and was therefore in 
vain.4 As the previous chapters have demonstrated, and as will be further highlighted in 
this chapter, this assessment could not be further from the truth. German covert activity 
in Spain during the First World War was flourishing due to the efforts of German 
military personnel as well as German diplomats, private residents and Spanish 
collaborators. The military information service during the war, as Nicolai later recalled 
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4Ibid., p. 73. 
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it, was not merely a tool for strategic and tactical decisions but an instrument serving 
the entire war effort – warfare and politics became one. Military news services thereby 
worked hand in hand with their respective governments.5 On the level of diplomatic 
missions, this meant that the areas of responsibility of the ambassador and the service 
attachés often crossed which could have provided a source of conflict.6  
The German secret service during the First World War was Abteilung IIIb, a 
department of the General staff of the army headed by the aforementioned Nicolai. The 
navy maintained a separate information service, Nachrichtendienst N, led by Captain 
Walter Isendahl. Abteilung IIIb gathered secret intelligence from neutral and enemy 
countries and carried out counter-intelligence operations. In addition the department 
was responsible for press and censorship matters. Officially, military and naval attachés 
were not entrusted with espionage activity but had a purely advisory function. Military 
attachés were established in the 1850s in order to keep the general staff updated on 
technical developments of foreign powers. In addition to them, naval attachés also 
became widely deployed at diplomatic posts during the latter part of the nineteenth 
century due to rising interest in naval matters.7  
David Stevenson, in the recent Cambridge History of the First World War, notes 
that so far reports produced by military and naval attachés of the belligerent countries 
have been largely neglected by historians despite being a rich source of information.8 
The official and public tasks of the attaché were often of a representative or ceremonial 
nature. Their role as ‘diplomat-soldiers’ also prohibited them from fighting at the front, 
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which could explain the oversight by historians.9 As advisors to the ambassador, the 
attachés were part of the diplomatic staff of an embassy and as such they answered to 
the ambassador and were officially required to send their reports through diplomatic 
channels via the embassy. However, they also maintained a direct link with the army 
command and admiralty from which they also took orders.10 This two-fold role, 
diplomat and officer, made communications difficult and could cause confusion in the 
chain of command.11 As will become apparent in this chapter, with the growing strength 
of the German military, the role of the service attachés was to change greatly throughout 
the First World War. 
 
The German intelligence network in Spain – Organisation, personnel and sabotage 
activity 
 
While Major Arnold Kalle had been officially entrusted with the position of 
military attaché since April 1913, Lieutenant Commander Hans von Krohn was initially 
deployed to Madrid in September 1914 to oversee the activity of the secret navy 
information service in Spain and to ensure the supply of German war ships with goods 
and news regarding the enemy and its whereabouts.12 Only in September 1916 did the 
Spanish government give its consent to the creation of the position of naval attaché at 
the German embassy, a position which Krohn took on. As Carolina García Sanz pointed 
out, the idea of a short war played a crucial part in the mobilisation effort, which would 
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explain Krohn’s delayed appointment. France, for example, decided initially not to send 
a naval attaché to Madrid.13  
The division of responsibilities between the two German attachés was not 
always clear. 14 Kalle’s close friendship with King Alfonso XIII certainly gave him 
additional importance and therefore more room to manoeuvre. Despite the importance 
of naval warfare for Germany, Krohn was relegated to a secondary position and, as 
Heinz Höhne assessed, was not forceful enough to stand up to Kalle, who was seen as 
the head of German espionage activity in Spain.15 He frequently complained about 
Kalle failing to inform him about missions and poaching his agents without his 
consent.16 Krohn also criticised Kalle for discussing naval matters, such as the sinking 
of Spanish ships by German submarines, with the Spanish king.17  
To not compromise Kalle’s and Krohn’s position as official members of the 
German diplomatic corps, it was necessary to employ additional support for organising 
German espionage and counter-espionage activity in Spain. Somebody was needed that 
worked completely in the background, coordinating the various activities carried out by 
Germany’s agents. In October 1915 the head of the admiralty requested that Captain 
Lieutenant Wilhelm Canaris, then a u-boat commander, be put in charge of establishing 
an information service at the Swiss border for gathering news in Italy and France. There 
                                                 
13Carolina García Sanz, La primera guerra mundial en el estrecho de Gibraltar: Economía, política y 
relaciones internacionales (Madrid, 2011), p. 227. 
14B.A.M., RM5/2409, Admiralstab der Marine, Schrift–pp. Verkehr mit Vertretern der Marine, ab Sept. 
1916 dem Marineattaché, und anderen Personen in Madrid Bd. 2 Juni – Nov. 1915 [between May and 
August 1915 various correspondence on argument between Krohn and Kalle regarding Ratibor passing on 
information about secret naval activities to Kalle]. 
15Höhne, Canaris, p. 46. 
16B.A.M., RM5/2410, Admiralstab der Marine, Schrift–pp. Verkehr mit Vertretern der Marine, ab Sept. 
1916 dem Marineattaché, und anderen Personen in Madrid Bd. 3 Nov. 1915 – Jan. 1916, Krohn to P.H. [?] 
Madrid, 13.12.1915. 
17B.A.M., RM5/2414, Admiralstab der Marine, Schrift–pp. Verkehr mit Vertretern der Marine, ab Sept. 
1916 dem Marineattaché, und anderen Personen in Madrid Bd. 7 Okt. 1916 – März 1917, Admiralty, 
Code bureau via Auswärtige Amt from Madrid, 18.1.1917. 
204 
 
was also the possibility of gathering intelligence on the war in the Mediterranean via 
Spain and allowing agents to act on Spanish soil.18  
With the outbreak of the First World War Canaris found himself serving as an 
officer on the SMS Dresden which, unable to return home due to the war, was trapped 
in the Amazon Delta. British cruisers quickly detected the presence of the German ship. 
The Dresden, in order to avoid being attacked by the enemy, tried to steer into neutral 
waters asking for the help of the Chilean government. Despite being interned in neutral 
waters, British cruisers attacked the German ship and argued the internment was a 
breach of neutrality on behalf of Chile.19 The Dresden was sunk, its crew was forced to 
surrender and subsequently interned on the island of Quiriquina situated north of 
Coronel Bay. While most of the crew stayed on the island for the duration of the war,20 
Canaris fled from Quiriquina on 5 August 1915. Notes filed by Admiralty staff in 
October 1915 give an idea what his escape entailed and how he managed to reach home. 
After leaving the island he travelled, disguised as a peasant, to Osorno in southern 
Chile. He then crossed the Andes on horseback in order to reach the city of Neuquen in 
the west of Argentina from where he travelled to Buenos Aires by train.21 His lingustic 
abilities – he spoke fluent English and Spanish22 – undoubtedly aided him greatly on his 
journey and were also of advantage for his future intelligence work. On his arrival in the 
Argentinian capital on 21 August 1915 he reported to the German attaché and then, with 
the help of a false Chilean passport, boarded a Dutch steamer with destination 
Amsterdam. Canaris finally arrived in Germany on 30 September 1915.23  
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Not long after he had returned home, Canaris was sent to Spain, where he spent 
ten months (January to October 1916)24 building up an extensive intelligence network. 
Although the request to bring him to Spain was initially refused,25 he eventually arrived 
in Madrid on 4 January 1916 together with Albert Hornemann, who was going to assist 
him. From then on their respective codenames were Carl and Horst.26 Canaris’s task was 
to establish a supply system for submarines operating in the western Mediterranean and 
improve the information service gathering details about ship movements.27 By the end 
of the nineteenth century German naval intelligence had begun to set up a network of so 
called Etappenstationen. These were posts, run by German naval officers, which 
recruited foreign shipping agents, ship chandlers and coal suppliers in order to 
guarantee the availability of vital supplies for German war ships in the event of war. 
Information from pro-German agents was gathered and it was ensured communication 
links were kept open. Canaris had been part of organising such espionage posts in Brazil 
and Argentina in 1908.28 
With his previous intelligence experience and the skill and resilience he had 
displayed during his spectacular escape from Chile, Canaris appeared to be the ideal 
candidate for the job in Spain. The network which he organised together with Albert 
Hornemann was made up of an information service (Ausfragedienst), an agent service 
(Agentendienst) and a service for political news (Politische Nachrichten).29 Canaris 
operated mainly from the home of von Krohn and frequently changed his address in 
Madrid to avoid being discovered. Since the British and French had already broken the 
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German codes, enemy agents were close on Canaris’ heels.30 However, official German 
correspondence reveals very little about Canaris and his name rarely features in the 
communication between the embassy at Madrid and headquarters in Berlin, unlike that 
of his collaborator Hornemann, who is frequently mentioned. 
In order to gather news on ship movements, information services were 
established in all major Spanish ports and coastal towns. In other neutral countries, like 
the Netherlands for example, Germany established similar intelligence networks 
focussing on recruiting informants within the shipping and trade industries. Similarly to 
Spain, Dutch ports became important centres for German covert activity.31  
By October 1916 Canaris was able to report that German information centres 
had been set up in Barcelona, Valencia, Alicante, Cartagena, La Linea, Cadiz, Jerez de 
la Frontera, Huelva, Seville, Vigo, Villagarcia, La Coruña, Gijon, Santander and Bilbao. 
Barcelona had the highest amount of traffic amongst the Spanish ports and was 
therefore deemed the most suitable location for information gathering.32 Nine agents, 
two of whom were Spanish ships’ officers and one was a female cabaret dancer, were 
working for the German administration in the Catalan capital. In general the information 
service posts were run by German navy personnel in co-operation with Spanish captains 
and dock workers. In Seville, a Dutch captain called Hammerstein was in charge of 
intelligence gathering for Germany. Agents were also recruited for the German 
information service to work on neutral or allied vessels. A Spanish ship’s officer who 
was stationed on an English steamer operating between Gibraltar and Tangier regularly 
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passed on any important news to the German information service office at La Linea.33 
Canaris and his men also successfully managed to employ a large majority of captains 
on neutral vessels frequenting the ports at Barcelona, Santander, Bilbao, Huelva, Seville 
and Cadiz. They were paid according to the value of the delivered information.34  
While agents working for the information service were mainly concerned with 
collecting intelligence in Spain, those employed for the agent service also operated 
outside the Iberian Peninsula. In order to find collaborators, the German intelligence 
officers utilised established political and commercial links. In Madrid Eduardo de 
Riquer, an employee in the Spanish Ministry of State (which became the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs in 1938), was hired to obtain news from various Spanish ministries and 
to recruit further agents. In Barcelona five Spanish merchants were also in charge of 
finding agents. The dancer, who was already working for the German information 
service, was also approached for further services since she occasionally travelled to 
England. In southern Spain Albert Hornemann made contact with Spanish fruit, oil and 
wine merchants who were exporting to Britain. Through Riquer two additional 
employees in the Ministry of State were hired for the German intelligence services. 
They were responsible for passing on all information coming from the British and 
French diplomatic representations in Spain.35  
All news of a political nature was forwarded to the embassy at Madrid, which 
was also responsible for paying agents in Spanish ministries. The political news service 
of the German intelligence operation was largely supplied with information coming 
from Hornemann and Reserve Lieutenant Commander Friedrich Rüggeberg, both 
located in Barcelona. For the surveillance of persons of interest to the German 
administration, two Spanish secret police officers, who also reported on any allied 
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counter-espionage activity, were hired. Four agents recruited by Canaris from Spain 
operated in England and three female agents (a pilot and two anarchists) were active in 
France. A further agent was hired in Lisbon.36 In Madrid, Antonio Arregui was in charge 
of an office, provided to him by the director of the German potash syndicate, which 
processed all intelligence from the information and the agent service and then passed it 
on to Krohn.37  
Albert Hornemann was responsible for the recruitment of agents in Barcelona 
where he enjoyed a good reputation amongst non-German economic circles. Due to the 
city’s extensive trade links with Great Britain, German intelligence officers focussed 
their efforts onto finding collaborators in Barcelona. Hornemann communicated all 
information, with the help of German banks in Barcelona and Madrid, to Arregui, who 
subsequently forwarded it to the naval attaché. Attempts were made to send Spanish 
agents to England, which proved difficult since not many possessed the necessary 
language skills and had legitimate reasons to travel to Britain. While exact details of 
agent activity were not revealed, Canaris mentioned in his report from October 1916 a 
destruction service (Zerstörungsdienst) operating in Barcelona, Huelva, Cartagena, 
Santander and Bilbao which had delivered its first results in mid-August in Barcelona.38 
One could speculate that the sabotage activity outlined below in the chapter could have 
been organised with the help of this destruction service. For his services in Spain 
Canaris received glowing praise from his superiors and in October 1916 he was 
awarded the Iron Cross First Class.39
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As outlined above, Barcelona became an important centre for German covert 
activity in Spain. In addition to the city’s extensive trade links with Britain, the Catalan 
capital was also a stronghold of the CNT which German agents managed to infiltrate 
successfully. 842 While Catalan industrialists were reaping high profits thanks to Spain’s 
neutrality, workers’ living conditions were worsening during the First World War. 
German covert activity sought to use that potential for civil unrest and conflict by 
mobilising workers to strike action which would disrupt trade between Spain and the 
Allies. 
The economic boom Spain experienced during the First World War was a result 
of increased demand from the belligerents and the opening up of markets hitherto 
supplied by the Allies or the Central Powers. Aided by the country’s position of 
neutrality, Spanish business was able to flourish, giving the national economy an 
impulse to modernise and to become competitive in a world market.843 Due to the Allied 
blockade, Spain’s main trading partners were Britain and France, which, as was noted in 
Chapter 4, led to an economic co-dependency and Spain moving closer towards the 
Entente. Wartime demand from the Allies for raw materials and consumer goods meant 
Spanish business reaped profits unimaginable during peace times.844 The Catalan textile 
industry, which had suffered great losses after the Spanish-American War of 1898, was 
now one of the main benefactors of the wartime boom, facilitating the increased demand 
in uniforms and other products made from cotton. Equally the Spanish chemical and 
shipping industry, as well as the banking sector, were able to expand during the war.845 
Spanish mining companies trebled their profits between 1913 and 1918.846 Profits also 
allowed reducing the large part of foreign capital in the railway and mining sector. The 
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surplus created during the war not only enabled Spain to pay off its high foreign debt, 
but also made it possible to accumulate financial reserves. Within four years Spain had 
transformed from a highly indebted country to a creditor for a belligerent.847  
However, as Dirk Zeiseler pointed out, this economic development was 
unnatural and only the result of the artificial protectionist system brought on by the war 
demand of the Entente. Profits were largely based on an increase in price while 
production output remained at pre-war level. The Spanish iron and steel industry, for 
example, showed only a minimal rise in production between 1914 and 1918 but was 
able to record a five times higher profit. 848 As export grew in value but not in quantity, 
imports were drastically reduced, resulting in a disproportionate trade balance. The so 
called boom was accompanied by an inflation in prices and a sharp decline in imports. 
While import of raw materials and foodstuffs dropped significantly between 1916 and 
1917, exports to the Allies remained at the same level throughout the war.849 Another 
reason for Spain’s wartime inflation were artificially created shortages whereby 
producers or middle men hoarded produce in order to increase their profits.  
The inflation Spain experienced during the war, however, was lower than in 
other neutral countries. Nonetheless, its impact was severe, especially by 1918, when 
prices had risen by 61.8% while wages had only increased by 25.6%.850 Therefore the 
large majority of Spaniards did not feel the benefits of the economic boom but had to 
endure rising prices and shortages of food and fuel.851 The agrarian sector experienced 
difficulties in finding markets for its products. In particular the citrus-fruit-growing 
regions of Spain were unable to sell their produce, one of the country’s leading exports 
before the war, since it was considered a luxury item and not essential for the war 
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economy.852 Equally wood imports declined, leading to increased construction costs. 
The Spanish railways were not able to keep up with the rising demand due to the high 
costs and lack of coal.853 Overall the war mainly benefited the urban-industrial zones. 
The imbalance in the distribution of profit between rural and urban zones led to a 
population flow to the cities which were struggling to absorb all the rural migrants. 
Other alternatives for rural workers were to seek employment across the border in 
France.854  
A reaction to the economic crisis was a significant growth in membership of the 
UGT and the CNT. The UGT gained 97,000 members during the war counting, 211,000 
members in 1920. Its Anarcho-Syndicalist rival, the CNT, made even more impressive 
advances, gaining 685,000 members and rising to a total of 700,000 members in 
1919.855 This political mobilisation produced by wartime inflation was also fuelled by 
the spread of the negative image of the greedy wartime profiteer, fostering the idea that 
wartime profits only benefited a few. Combined with an economic crisis it produced a 
wave of public protest and civil unrest.856 
Madrid did little in way of alleviating the hardship endured by large parts of the 
Spanish population and did not introduce any export restraints and regulations until 
early 1918, allowing speculators for most part of the war to export anything without 
consideration for the needs of the Spanish people. Equally no tax on wartime profits 
was introduced.857 In 1916 finance minister Santiago Alba had to abandon plans to 
implement such a tax and bowed to pressures from Spanish industry and business. 
Therefore profits were not invested sufficiently to carry out a reform of the Spanish 
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economy. Many government officials also held personal business interests as board 
members or share holders in co-operations, so that the intertwined relations between 
politics and economy did not allow for long-term and lasting reforms financed through 
war profits.858  
The dissatisfaction amongst those Spaniards not profiting from the war was 
opportunistically used by Germany to disrupt Allied trade with Spain in the hope of 
inflicting serious damage on Britain and France. This formed the core of German 
intelligence activity in Spain. In addition, Germany also benefited from the pro-
neutrality position of Spanish business and industry which pressurised Spanish 
governments not to abandon neutrality. Due to the blockade and geographical distance, 
Germany was unable to build up closer economic links with Spain which could have 
rivalled Spanish-British trade and undermined Britain’s dominant position on the 
Iberian Peninsula.  
The option left to the German administration was therefore to disrupt trade 
between Spain and Britain in order to disrupt, as much as possible, the Allied war effort. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Britain’s arms industry heavily depended on Spanish iron ore 
deliveries. Thus it was in Germany’s interest to delay exports to Britain. German 
intelligence sought to cause unrest in those mines delivering to Great Britain by stirring 
up strikes amongst workers already dissatisfied with their working conditions and 
facing a worsening of their living circumstances due to the war-related inflation. In June 
1915 the instigation of strikes in the pyrite mines of the Rio Tinto company in the 
Huelva district was suggested to the Zfa. Despite a flourishing trade with the Allies, 
miners were only receiving a meagre pay and several conflicts between owners and 
workers had already occurred.859 Since propaganda alone was insufficient to damage the 
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Allied war effort from Spain, direct action was sought by supporting those groups in 
Spanish society that did not profit from the war. Agitation of strikes and causing unrest 
amongst Spanish workers was a means frequently employed by the German embassy at 
Madrid. 
By December 1914 the embassy at Madrid was reporting back to Berlin with 
great concern about weapons deliveries from Spain to Britain. Spanish ships leaving 
Seville were loaded with weapons declared for Morocco, then re-loaded en route and 
sent to Britain instead. It was assumed by the German military that the Spanish 
government complied with British demands out of fear.860 It is more likely though that 
the profit from arms sales provided a welcome boost to the Spanish economy.  
Reports of the Spanish munitions factory ‘Palencia de las armas’, delivering 
weapons to Britain from Bilbao,861 further alarmed the Auswärtige Amt and the High 
Command. German residents in San Sebastian and Bilbao had been informed that the 
Spanish arms company, in which the British Vickers group held 80% of shares, was 
shipping weapons marked as machine parts to Britain.862 According to information 
passed on by informants, the German consul at Bilbao was able to verify that seventeen 
field artillery guns, four heavy artillery guns, thirty machine guns and thousands of 
bullets were part of the shipment.863 Despite a complaint to the customs and harbour 
office, the load was allowed to leave Bilbao. The company stated it was only fulfilling 
agreements for deliveries which had been ordered prior to the war. Vickers on the other 
hand declared it would be unable to supply artillery ordered for new Spanish ships if 
their own deliveries failed to materialise.864  
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As already outlined, the Spanish shipping industry, especially those companies 
situated in Bilbao and San Sebastian, made large profits during the war,865 which could 
explain why German complaints fell on deaf ears. Since the Hague Conference clearly 
declared it legal for private companies to sell weapons and munitions to a belligerent, 
the German government did not have many options other than protest. Berlin therefore 
depended on the good will of the Spanish government to stop such deliveries. Given the 
increase in prosperity Spanish business and industry was gaining from Allied trade, it 
was doubtful any government would curb that trade, especially since Germany and the 
Central Powers were unable to make any alternative offers. German residents in Spain, 
alarmed by the increased trade with Britain and France, expressed doubts whether the 
Spanish government would be able to resist Allied pressure and hinted at the need for 
military intervention. The Germans suspected that the newly established post steamer 
between Bilbao and Falmouth, which had been subsidised by Britain, would likely be 
used for more than just passenger and post traffic. A suggestion was made to the 
General Staff to give the steamer a warning sign it would not forget in a hurry in case a 
German U-boat came across it in the Channel.866  
Besides weapons, Spain was also supplying men, horses and mules to the Allies, 
in particular to France. As Krohn was able to report in January 1915, France was trying 
to attract Spanish workers across the border for employment as metal workers, 
chauffeurs or in agriculture. Workers, especially in rural Spain, were greatly affected by 
the uneven distribution of wartime profits, as outlined above. At the beginning of the 
twentieth century wages in Spain were amongst the lowest in Europe. The living 
expenses of a working class family in Madrid were 23% higher than in Paris while their 
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average income was 68.33% lower.867 Therefore it probably did not take much of an 
effort by the French government to encourage Spaniards to leave for France. Moreover, 
since various Spanish governments failed to halt social instability during the war, 
immigration of an impoverished working class also meant less potential for unrest. 
Gerald Meaker has pointed out that migration to the New World lessened the pressure 
on the threatened stability of the restoration system in pre-war times.868 Since the war 
put an end to that migration, successive Spanish governments, which were either unable 
or unwilling to improve declining living conditions, must have welcomed any 
opportunity to minimise potential threats to the system.  
The transfer of horses and mules to France was flourishing as well, despite an 
official export ban by the government.869 Prime Minister Dato declared that the 
prohibition of exporting animals and foodstuffs was subject to national economic 
considerations but in actuality the cross-border smuggling was accepted by officials.870 
In matters of arms deliveries to the belligerents, Dato concurred with the position of the 
United States in that the supply of war material by private companies did not constitute 
a violation of neutral duties.871 Ratibor feared the prime minister’s comments would 
result in an increase in weapons exports to the Allies, especially in view of several 
newly built and planned weapons and munitions factories.872 He suggested attempting 
to sway the Spanish government by stressing that hindering private weapon deliveries 
would be completely within the rights of the government and be a sign of true 
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neutrality.873 Dato declined to comment on Germany’s views on true neutrality and 
Ratibor doubted the prime minister would take any action in the matter. The ambassador 
conceded that the matter of stopping weapons deliveries from Spain to the Allies would 
have to be taken care of by Germany.874 Spain’s position of neutrality largely facilitated 
the economic boom the country experienced during the First World War, therefore 
Ratibor was correct in his assumption that trade with the Allies would not diminish.  
To sabotage the munitions and weapons factories delivering to the Allies, the 
German War Ministry agreed with Ratibor to place agents in those factories and also 
have men reporting from shipping ports. Kalle had identified the most important 
factories, which were ‘Unión Española Fabricas de Superfosfato’ in Seville and 
Valencia producing sulphuric acids, as well as a hand grenade factory in Mondragon.875 
If necessary, the destruction of the factories had also to be considered.876 This of course 
represented a complete violation of neutral rights and, similarly to the tactics of 
unrestricted submarine warfare targeting Spanish vessels, could have led to a 
deterioration in Spanish-German relations if the embassy was implicated in any 
sabotage plots. After consulting with the High Command, Kalle was advised to refrain 
from any attacks on Spanish factories and instead target transports coming from Spain 
on French soil.877  
While attacks on Spanish property in Spain were momentarily deemed too risky, 
Spanish ships used for trade with Britain were not only casualties of unrestricted 
submarine warfare but also direct targets of German sabotage acts. The Foreign Office 
was alarmed when it received a report from the chief officer of the SS Queensland 
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informing it of a possible attack on the ship while en route to Britain from Bilbao.878 
Trade between Spain and the Central Powers had decreased considerably by the 
beginning of 1916 and the Foreign Office suspected German agents would try to disrupt 
trade between Britain and Spain.879 A report from naval attaché von Krohn from August 
1916 confirmed British suspicions. The destruction of Belgian steamer Emanuel Nobel 
was initiated from Barcelona and carried out through middlemen who placed a bomb on 
the ship.880 Further attempts to destroy British ships or ships destined for Britain were 
made in December 1916, when explosives were found on the SS Juan arriving from 
Bilbao.881 In January 1917 the British consulate at Bilbao reported a bomb that was 
found on a wagon of iron about to be loaded onto the SS Juliston.882 Two bombs were 
discovered on the Norwegian steamer SS Gyldempris which had loaded a cargo of iron 
ore in Cartagena with destination Barrow in Furness.883  
Covert activity organised by the German military attaché in Madrid also 
extended into Portugal, where the German administration sought to disrupt the Allied 
war effort. As outlined in Chapter 4, in October 1914 German diplomats put pressure on 
King Alfonso XIII to openly side against Portugal’s pro-Allied stance in return offering 
a free hand in Portugal and Gibraltar. Since the king declined to take any such action, 
however, other means had to be found to destabilise Portuguese affairs. Unlike in Spain, 
the German administration could not rely on pro-German attitudes amongst the 
Portuguese government or elite. After Portugal entered the war at the beginning of 1916, 
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German policy was to cause as much unrest as possible in order to hinder Portuguese 
troops from leaving for the front. This was achieved by supporting groups, such as the 
monarchists, who sought to overthrow the Republic. 884 Similar to covert activity in 
Spain, Kalle organised the destruction of Portuguese factories which produced weapons 
and war materiel.885 
Krohn also attempted to find other, less dangerous, means of stopping Spanish 
exports from reaching the Allies. He endeavoured to identify which Spanish shipping 
companies would consider not carrying contraband for the Entente. As it transpired, 
none of the companies were interested in missing out on a considerable profit and 
accepted the risk of losing their shipment, which in any case were insured by the 
shipper, who in most cases was British. Therefore Krohn had to revert back to 
propaganda which focussed on the high amount of tonnage going to the Allies while 
Spaniards had to suffer food shortages. A series of articles published in La Acción and 
other newspapers also named all ships not running for their own country.886 Since the 
observation of trade was a vital part of German intelligence activity, agents worked hard 
on influencing and establishing contacts with Spanish seamen, captains and port 
authorities.887 
The above mentioned plan by the embassy to stir up strikes in the Rio Tinto 
mines also took on the scope of a sabotage plot. Ratibor had found a suitable 
middleman to carry out the necessary work and estimated the costs to be around 700 to 
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800,000 pesetas per month to be guaranteed for at least three months.888 According to 
the ambassador, the time was right in July 1915 to implement the plan since production 
output of the mine had increased and the overall mood amongst the workers was 
worsening.889 The German Ministry of War, however, thought it would be more 
effective to destroy the railways transporting material from the mines since these 
stocked enough material which could be sent out in case of a disruption in production. 
An explosion of a railway tunnel was suggested while simultaneously a strike should be 
instigated which could then be blamed for the destruction of the railway.890 
This aggressive plan highlights the High Command’s drive for total war and 
preparedness to target civilians of a non-belligerent country all for the sake of causing 
injury to the Allies. As the submarine campaign claimed the lives of Spanish merchants, 
Spanish workers were also seen as targets equal to soldiers in the field.891 According to 
Alan Kramer, the enemy was not just the enemy army but was represented by its nation 
and culture, a view which subsequently led to a radicalisation of warfare giving way to a 
systematic and total exploitation of enemy civilians and resources of conquered and 
occupied territory.892 The divide between combatants and non-combatants gradually 
disappeared and atrocities against civilians, although they had also been committed in 
earlier wars such as the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War, reached an 
until then unprecedented extent in the First World War.893  
Atrocity stories, which sprang up during the German invasion of Belgium, 
became a prominent feature of the war, repeatedly highlighted by Allied propaganda. 
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While neutral Belgium held a strategic importance in Germany’s initial war plans, even 
more distant neutrals such as Spain found themselves targets of Germany’s ‘war of 
annihilation’. This military destructiveness, which also spread into non-belligerent 
territory affecting the lives of civilians, originated from strategic, political and economic 
considerations.894 Spain, as an important supplier for the Allied war industries, was 
therefore seen as a fair target for German military planners. In their pursuit to damage 
the war effort of the Entente, the campaigns carried out by the German diplomatic corps 
in Spain, whether they were propaganda or covert activities, showed no regard for the 
rights of a neutral country. As Eric Hobsbawn noted, the First World War was a war 
waged for unlimited ends with the sole aim of a total victory.895 The example of Spain 
highlights how this type of total warfare left no room for neutrality. 
Although the plan to destroy the railway tunnel had been set in motion, the 
German embassy was unable to carry it out since details of the sabotage plot were 
leaked to the British embassy.896 Ratibor suspected that labour leader Palacio, who was 
involved in the negotiations regarding the Rio Tinto plot, had passed on some 
information.897 The War Ministry also thought it possible that German telegrams had 
been decoded or Allied espionage had managed to uncover the plot.898 Nevertheless, 
German agents managed to infiltrate other workers’ organisations such as the Unión de 
Obreros Constructores Mecánicos, with the aim of enforcing strict neutrality. Their 
efforts proved successful when the union agreed to take industrial action if Spanish 
neutrality came under threat.899 
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As could be seen in Chapter 4, while the Auswärtige Amt viewed Ratibor’s 
covert activities with concern, those concerns were often overruled by the High 
Command. The German ambassador to Spain, however, did not share the fears of his 
colleagues in Berlin. On the contrary, he seemed to have always been in support of more 
drastic measures and therefore approved of Krohn’s and Kalle’s activities. The 
Auswärtige Amt, though, became increasingly worried about the service attachés’ 
changing role during wartime which saw them collaborate much closer with their army 
and navy superiors while bypassing the Auswärtige Amt altogether. General Ludendorff 
even attempted to release some military attachés from their subordination to a 
diplomatic mission and suggested instead placing them directly under the command of 
the OHL for the duration of the war. Specifically he was referring to the attachés 
stationed in Constantinople, Vienna and Sofia, who now served as a link between the 
head of the General Staff, the War Ministry and the general staffs of the other Central 
Power allies. Ludendorff assured the Auswärtige Amt that the military attachés at these 
posts would keep in close contact with the heads of their respective diplomatic 
missions.900 The Auswärtige Amt, however, rejected the idea, fearing that attachés 
operating separately to the embassy might lead to uncoordinated activity which could 
result in political problems.901  
It was not only the activity of military and naval attachés stationed in the allied 
states of the Central Powers that were cause of concern for the Auswärtige Amt but also 
the activity of service attachés in neutral countries, as a circular from the chancellor in 
March 1917 to the missions in Bern, Den Haag, Copenhagen, Oslo, Madrid and 
Stockholm shows. Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg stressed that, although he welcomed 
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attachés reporting on political and economic matters in addition to military concerns, 
the attachés were required to report any non-military matters directly to the head of the 
diplomatic mission and not send reports directly to their superiors in the army or navy. 
This, as the chancellor pointed out, was necessary to keep him and the Auswärtige Amt 
informed on political developments.902 The circular can be interpreted as an attempt to 
curb the influence of the ‘silent dictatorship’ of the OHL.903 During wartime the attachés 
clearly felt a stronger allegiance to their military superiors rather than to the Auswärtige 
Amt, although they were meant to serve both as outlined at the beginning of the chapter. 
This resulted in an advantageous position for the OHL and led to further interference of 
the military in political and economic matters while the German government was 
steadily losing influence. 
In Spain, ambassador Ratibor, although not always aware of every detail of 
Kalle’s and Krohn’s activity, had no problem with the mixing of military and political 
interests and supported his attachés in their pursuit of pro-German and pro-neutrality 
elements of Spanish society. One of those groups was the military juntas which 
collaborated with the German administration. As outlined in Chapter 1, the army had 
become a defender of the monarchy and was in charge of restoring public order in times 
of civil unrest. Tapping into strong pro-German sentiments amongst the majority of 
officers, German diplomats sought to foster anti-Allied feeling and maintain pressure on 
the king and government not to join the Entente. While on the one hand German agents 
agitated workers into strikes, on the other hand they assured the juntas of their support 
for maintaining order in Spain904, blaming civil unrest on English and French liberal 
ideas. By playing opposing groups in Spanish society against each other, instability was 
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further increased, not only making Spain unreliable as a potential partner in war for the 
Allies but also jeopardising trade with France and Britain. The German diplomats on the 
ground in Spain, as well as the Auswärtige Amt in Berlin, did not intentionally follow 
this strategy but rather opportunistically sought out collaborations only with the German 
war effort in mind. Though aware of the immediate consequences of their interference, 
German diplomats showed no consideration for the long-term effects this might have on 
Spain. Similar tactics were also employed by Germany in other countries with the aim 
of promoting the collapse of enemy home fronts through subversion and sabotage. A 
jihad was incited against imperial rule in Britain’s Muslim territories, subsidiaries given 
to Russian revolutionaries and colonial revolt encouraged against the French in 
Morocco.905  
While the Juntas were trying to secure military and financial help from Germany 
in case of Spain joining the war on the side of the Central Powers, Berlin only offered 
cautiously to consider supporting the junteros.906 In their collaboration with the Spanish 
army unions, German diplomats had to tread carefully, ensuring King Alfonso 
especially did not learn about the connection.907 Contacts with the juntas were held 
through a middleman who was not a member of the embassy.908 Despite the king's 
friendly relationship with military attaché Kalle, it was feared any outside interference 
with the army, one of the country's most important power brokers, could be seen as a 
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gross breach of trust and lead to Alfonso turning to the Allies. With the culmination of 
public unrest in the summer of 1917 the Spanish monarchy was further under threat.  
As was shown in Chapter 4, German diplomats in Spain often indulged 
Alfonso’s imperial ambitions in order to keep the king on Germany’s side. While unable 
to offer the Spanish monarch any actual territory, by extending covert activity into 
Morocco and undermining French rule in the area, Germany was able to give Alfonso 
some hope that his plans for extending the empire might come true eventually. Spanish 
colonial ambitions in Morocco had been frustrated by French dominance in the area, 
therefore making Spain more susceptible to German plans in North Africa. Those plans 
included using Spanish Morocco as a base for preparing attacks on French territory.909  
German interest in the region dated back to the beginning of the twentieth 
century and first manifested itself in the two Morocco crises of 1907 and 1911.910 It is 
difficult to reconstruct the complete picture of German covert activity in North Africa 
during the First World War since all the relevant files produced by the embassy in 
Madrid were destroyed immediately after the war.911 A close examination of German 
diplomatic and military files, however, does reveal that the German military personnel 
at Madrid was heavily involved in such activity. The files further disclose that the 
Spanish king was complicit in German covert operations carried out in North Africa 
during the war. Ratibor confirmed to the Auswärtige Amt that Alfonso was informed 
about ‘Aktion Marokko’ [Operation Morocco] and approved of it.912  
Operations in North Africa seemed to have been initiated by the German 
military attaché as early as autumn 1915. German agents in Morocco were responsible 
for watching any activity in the strait of Gibraltar reporting back to the naval and 
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military attachés via an outpost in Algeciras.913 The southern Spanish town, with its 
close proximity to Gibraltar and North Africa, was an important centre for German 
agent activity. In the recruitment of agents the military and naval attachés were 
sometimes able to call on their political contacts. Such was the case when Carlist leader 
Vazquez de Mella recommended Gabriel Vichy Torres to Krohn. Torres had been 
responsible for hiring guards for the Carlist party and also had organised transports and 
hide outs in Portugal. Now he was employed by the German naval attaché as an agent 
for covert missions in Algeciras.914  
German agents operated from Larache and Melilla while the beaches in the far 
south of Spanish Morocco were used as landing sites for arms.915 Archaeologist and art 
historian Ernst Kühnel, stationed in Larache, worked together with the German and 
Austro-Hungarian consulates at Larache and Melilla in organising propaganda. Until 
1917 he was also responsible for covert activity such as the fomenting of rebellions and 
the destruction of railways in French Morocco and Algeria.916 In Eastern Morocco, 
agents Hauck and Koppel917 were entrusted with an intelligence mission whose exact 
details remain unknown. What the files reveal, however, is that they were arrested in 
Melilla in January 1916 and threatened with expulsion. German diplomats sought the 
help of King Alfonso who assured them that an order would be given to let the captured 
German agents go free.918 A few months later, following pressure from the Entente, it 
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seemed unlikely that Alfonso would be able to keep his promise.919 The punishment for 
the German agents could have been severe. Generally activities of German citizens in 
many British and French colonies were restricted from 1914/1915 onwards.920 At the 
beginning of August 1914 German businessman Carl Ficke, together with three 
colleagues, had been executed in Morocco.921 Koppel, though, together with six other 
Germans, was eventually expelled from Morocco and brought to Spain at the end of 
1916 or the beginning of 1917.922  
In response to Allied notes directed to the Spanish government regarding 
German conduct in French territories in Africa and submarine warfare, Romanones 
wrote a report to the king on 1 September 1916 detailing German activity in Spain. In 
his report the Count detailed arms and munitions deliveries made to the German 
embassy in Madrid, which he claimed could only have been intended for Morocco. 
Based in the Spanish zone of Morocco German agents, according to Romanones, had 
initiated their illegal activities from the beginning of the war causing great harm not 
only to France but also to Spain. Such activities included inciting a rebellion against 
French rule and facilitating rebels with arms and munitions.923 Romanones was correct 
in his assessment: rebel leaders Raisuli and Abd-el Malek did indeed receive financial 
support and supplies from German agents.924 Raisuli, who tried to play off the Spanish, 
Germans and French against each other, received a total of one million pesetas from 
Germany. Abd el Malek was also supported by Germany, receiving substantial funds 
that had reached 600,000 pesetas per month by March 1918.925 German agent Hermann 
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Bartels acted as an intermediary between the German administration and the rebel 
leader with the aim of organising an uprising against the French in Morocco.926  
While the Spanish were prepared to overlook German propaganda efforts in 
Morocco and also turned a blind eye on the financial support of tribal leaders, weapon 
deliveries were a different matter. German guns supplied to Moroccan rebels, while 
intended to fight the French, could have been used against the Spanish as well and 
therefore posed a potential threat to the Spanish Protectorate.927 To stop weapon 
supplies to the Rif, Spain enforced stricter customs regulations928 and a planned 
shipment of 5,000 rifles and 500,000 rounds was successfully blocked.929 In January 
1916, the port authorities at Malaga discovered a shipment of weapons from Germany 
possibly destined for Morocco.930 To support Spanish port authorities and border 
patrols, a small French surveillance service was also operating in Morocco with the task 
of intercepting and uncovering German arms deliveries and financial transactions.931 
However, German arms still reached the area but German agents were unable to control 
their distribution since they often went to those tribes closest to the coast.932 For 
example, a shipment of 3,000 rifles and two million rounds reached tribes in July 
1916.933  
By September 1918 French forces had fought down Abd el Malek’s rebellion 
and the rebel leader was forced to retreat into Spanish Morocco by November 1918.934 
Hew Strachan assessed that Germany’s activities in the French colony did not present a 
coherent effort that could have seriously undermined French control over the region. On 
the contrary, Strachan argues that the French, despite not making any territorial 
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advances, were able to strengthen their rule in Morocco.935 While German activity in 
North Africa did not produce the desired effect of ousting the French colonisers from 
the region, it certainly forced the Allies to further divert their war effort and also 
contributed to encourage the on-going struggle of the rebels against colonial rule. This 
would have a disastrous effect particularly on Spanish authority in their parts of 
Morocco, despite German assertions of support for Spain’s colonial enterprise. 
Germany opportunistically manipulated Spanish interests to its favour without 
considering the long-term ramifications.  
 
The Allied information services in Spain 
 
Similar to their propaganda effort, Germany also had a head start when it came 
to intelligence activity in Spain. With increased sabotage activity and rising social 
unrest fomented by the German embassy, the Allies had to counter German activities in 
order to ensure stability and secure trade vital for their war economy. By 1915 the 
French had begun to establish an intelligence service in Spain in order to combat enemy 
activity. Prior to that Spain had held little strategic importance for France but the 
realisation that the war was going to be longer than initially anticipated made an 
organised counter-espionage effort in Spain necessary. Shortly after intelligence 
operations were established by the French in December 1915, the Italians quickly 
followed suit.936 All French activity was coordinated by Lieutenant Neufville at the 
embassy in Madrid. Since February 1915 Joseph Crozier, an official of the French secret 
service Deuxième Bureau, operated in Spain.937 By the end of 1915 the French counter-
espionage service on the Iberian Peninsula was beginning to take shape with Coronel T. 
                                                 
935Ibid, p. 769. 
936García Sanz, La primera guerra mundial en el estrecho de Gibraltar, pp 264–5. 
937González Calleja, ‘Nidos de espías’ in Revista de Historia Militar, pp 179–226. 
231 
T. Denvignes, who in September 1916 was officially appointed as military attaché, at 
the head of the service. In addition to that, Lieutenant Roucy was appointed naval 
attaché in November 1915.938  
French intelligence efforts focussed on border control with information services 
established in Barcelona, San Sebastian and Bilbao. Additional observation posts 
existed in Zaragoza, Pamplona and Salamanca. The post in Salamanca, which had a link 
to Lisbon, allowed the French to control the Spanish-Portuguese border as well. From 
Seville and Malaga French agents observed German activity in Morocco and kept an 
eye on contraband and arms trade. Similar to the German intelligence service, the 
French also monitored ship movements and maritime traffic in general while also 
surveying enemy ships and their crews interned at Spanish ports. Agents were hired and 
deployed on Spanish ships in order to gather information and post as well as telegraphic 
communication was intercepted to help uncover German plots.939 
In gathering intelligence the French military and naval attachés were sometimes 
facilitated by Count Romanones, who passed on information to the French services. 
Occasionally information could be gleaned from official audiences with King Alfonso 
XIII – usually on the general development of the war and the politics of the Central 
Powers.940 Another way of obtaining information on German activity in Spain was by 
observing the transactions of German companies and banks in the country. By following 
receipts and bills, it was hoped that possible payments for propaganda services or even 
contraband deliveries could be identified. The French used this information to develop 
an official and confidential black list of companies and businessmen which was kept up 
until the spring of 1919.941 By mid-1918 French intelligence activity focused on the 
strategic areas of Catalonia and the Baleares with a post in Barcelona, in the North on 
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San Sebastian, the centre with Madrid, in the South on Granada, Sevilla, Salamanca and 
Valencia. Military attaché Denvignes was replaced by Coronel J. Tisseyre in February 
1918 and naval attaché Roucy was succeeded by Captain Bergasse du Petit Thouars in 
July 1917.942 
The British intelligence effort in Spain had its centre at the embassy in Madrid 
and although ambassador Hardinge was not officially part of the British secret service 
mission, he was kept informed on all activity. This activity was coordinated by the 
embassy secretary, Sir Percy Lorraine, who worked for the intelligence division of the 
Admiralty’s war staff and had been in Madrid since 1916.943 Josceline C.H. Grant, 
military attaché from 1916 to 1919, was in charge of military intelligence. Grant also 
assumed the position of naval attaché until Captain John Harvey, who had been serving 
in Gibraltar, was appointed at the beginning of 1918. Harvey arrived in Madrid in 
March 1918. Prior to his appointment, Coronel Charles Thoroton operated as a British 
agent in Gibraltar and was in charge of creating a navy information and espionage 
network.944  
From the beginning of the war Britain had preferred to use economic pressure 
against Spain, by withholding vital coal exports, for example,945 which explains the 
delay with which they initiated their secret service mission on the peninsula. Spain’s 
economic dependency on Britain ensured to a great degree that Spanish governments 
would comply with British demands. With on-going unrestricted submarine warfare and 
rampant German activity in Spain, however, it became necessary for the British to take 
further action. British intelligence sought to establish regular contacts in Spain’s 
political world and other influential sectors of the country. It was also concentrated on 
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keeping up commercial relations between both countries in order to guarantee a supply 
of products necessary for the Allied war effort. Commercial propaganda became the 
focus of the British attachés, who tried to create a climate favourable to the conclusion 
of commercial treaties. A commercial propaganda office was established in the first half 
of 1918 under the supervision of embassy secretary Lorraine.946 Besides these efforts, 
British intelligence also engaged in counter-espionage against German activity and tried 
to prohibit any possible support of Spain for the Central Powers.  
Since it was known to the Foreign Office that the German embassy was involved 
in strike agitation amongst Spanish workers, any unrest, especially in the mining 
industry, was viewed with suspicion by the British intelligence services, whose agents 
tried to identify the main agitators and expose them. Repressing social unrest in 
particular in the mining industry was therefore an important aid to British intelligence 
which benefited from the temporary suspension of constitutional guarantees in 1917.947 
As outlined in Chapter 4, Britain’s considerations regarding Spain’s value as an 
ally led to the conclusion that the territorial offers that would have to be made in order 
for Spain to abandon neutrality were far too great and outweighed what Spain could 
offer. Nevertheless, the British made an effort to convince Spain to break off relations 
with Germany.948 This would have allowed the Allies to fully expose the German 
network and ensure a stabilisation of commercial relations beneficial to the Allied war 
effort. Spanish governments, though, were unable to deviate from the course of 
neutrality which was favoured by the majority of Spanish society and, most importantly, 
by powerful sectors of Spanish politics.   
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There was no coherent collaboration amongst the Allies in their intelligence 
activities in Spain, especially in the first years of the war. British and French services 
competed rather than collaborated. Thoroton, the British agent in Gibraltar, for example, 
did not deem it necessary to exchange information with his French and Italian 
colleagues since he thought they had little to offer in return.949 British intelligence 
agents in general were distrustful of their French colleagues and only reluctantly and 
less often collaborated with the Italians, while they only had contempt for the 
Portuguese. However, they enjoyed very good relations with their American 
counterparts.950 Only towards the end of 1918 did the various Allied intelligence 
officials in Spain begin to have regular joint meetings.951  
 
Espionage scandals at the end of the war 
 
Allied and German intelligence activity in Spain clearly demonstrate how the 
country became a hotbed for spies during the First World War. One of the more 
illustrious spy stories from the period involves German military attaché Kalle. In 
December 1916 the military attaché was contacted by a Dutch woman who requested a 
meeting with him. This woman turned out to be no other than the infamous Mata Hari – 
Margaretha Zelle who, after being detained by the British in Falmouth on suspicion of 
being a German spy, had arrived in Madrid with the hope of extracting some 
information out of Kalle that she could sell to the French.952 Although she successfully 
seduced Kalle, the information he gave her regarding a submarine landing on the coast 
of Morocco and his admission that the Germans had broken the French codes were 
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false. The German military attaché wanted to see how much information would get back 
to the French but left Zelle in the belief she was now a double agent working for him 
and paid her 3,500 pesetas.953  
In Madrid Zelle was staying at the Hotel Ritz where another French agent, 
Marthé Richard, stayed as well. In contrast to Zelle’s espionage activity, Richard’s work 
was highly valued by the French secret service. Georges Ladoux, head of French 
counter espionage, had only initiated a collaboration with Zelle in order to expose her as 
a German agent.954 Mata Hari's liason with Kalle would be her downfall. In full 
knowledge that the French would intercept his messages, Kalle sent radiograms to 
Berlin compromising Zelle as the German agent known as H-21. Despite not having 
concrete evidence that Zelle was indeed the spy operating under the code name H-21 
and being aware that the German messages were false, Ladoux, desperate to arrest a 
German spy, sacrificed Zelle.955 Mata Hari was condemned to death by firing squad. 
While Kalle successfully dealt with Allied counter-espionage without 
compromising the German diplomatic mission in Spain, his colleague von Krohn was 
less fortunate. In October 1917 the embassy received news from Berlin that the Spanish 
government had requested the naval attaché’s recall with immediate effect. No 
explanation was given.956 Over the next few months, however, it emerged that Krohn’s 
dismissal was due to an affair he had with a French woman, an affair which, according 
to ambassador Ratibor, had caused much annoyance in the German community in 
Spain. Ratibor felt that the naval attaché had completely fallen under the influence of 
that woman who he considered to be of the demi-monde. Krohn’s dependence on this 
woman was explained by Ratibor as a mental illness and he recommended the naval 
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attaché’s referral to a sanatorium.957 Prior to the incident Krohn had indeed requested 
leave due to nervousness stating the need to relax.958 This picture of Krohn’s personality 
stands in stark contrast to that his enemies had of him. Allied agents described the 
German naval attaché as a mysterious man of action, without scruples and prepared to 
do anything – a ‘crazy sadist’.959 The revelations around Krohn’s liason, however, let 
him appear in a very different light. 
The problem caused by Krohn’s affair was not so much a moral one (he was 
separated from his wife as can be seen in his correspondence arguing about alimony 
payments960), but a political one since the woman he was having the affair with turned 
out to be a French agent who started blackmailing the German embassy after Krohn 
ended the relationship. She threatened to have Krohn’s letters to her published and to 
disclose any information passed on to her by the German naval attaché.961 Although it 
appears no vital information was leaked, in the wake of the scandal even the Spanish 
king demanded Krohn’s dismissal. The French double agent who threatened to 
compromise the German naval attaché was the above mentioned colleague of Mata 
Hari, Marthé Richard.962  
Krohn had already come under fire during events leading to the escape of the 
German submarine UB-49 which was interned in Spanish waters.963 Although the 
German naval attaché had advised the captain of the UB-49 against an escape from La 
Coruña, Krohn received the blame for the incident and Madrid now demanded his 
                                                 
957P.A., R12004, Spanien 61 – Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen Spanien und Deutschland Dez. 
1917 – Jan. 1918, Ratibor to Auswärtige Amt, 11.12.1917. 
958B.A.M., RM5/2414, Admiralstab der Marine, Schrift–pp. Verkehr mit Vertretern der Marine, ab Sept. 
1916 dem Marineattaché, und anderen Personen in Madrid Bd. 7 Okt. 1916 – März 1917, Admiralty via 
Auswärtige Amt, 19.11.1916. 
959Fernando García Sanz, España en la Gran Guerra: Espías, diplomáticos y traficantes (Barcelona, 
2014), pp 100-1. 
960B.A.M., RM5/2413, Admiralstab der Marine, Schrift–pp. Verkehr mit Vertretern der Marine, ab Sept. 
1916 dem Marineattaché, und anderen Personen in Madrid Bd. 6 Juli – Nov. 1916, Krohn to Justizrat 
Schwickerath, 22.9.1916. 
961B.A.M., RM5/906, Bericht des Militärattachés in Madrid betr. Audienz beim König von Spanien (U-
Bootkrieg), Secret report, Berlin, 16.12.1917. 
962Wheelwright, The fatal lover, p. 52. 
963See chapter four. 
237 
recall. His affair with a French agent allowed the German embassy to dismiss him 
without having to give in to requests from the Spanish government which, as Ratibor 
feared, might have set a precedent and led to recalling other members of the embassy.964 
Krohn’s dismissal at the end of 1917 came in the wake of the Zimmermann Telegram 
scandal which not only had exposed German covert activity against the Allies but also 
led to the United States joining the war, an outcome that had to be avoided in the case of 
Spain. Krohn himself blamed his departure from Spain on intrigues by the English 
ambassador Hardinge. And although the German naval attaché post at Madrid was a 
position under considerable attack from the Allies, due to Spain’s geostrategic 
importance, which allowed observation and disruption of transatlantic trade, it is more 
likely that Krohn had fallen out of favour with the embassy staff due to his behaviour.965  
In February 1918 Krohn left Spain with the French government granting him 
safe conduct, and was replaced by Lieutenant Steffan.966 The news of Krohn’s dismissal 
even reached other neutral countries. As the German naval attaché in Oslo passed on 
from Norway, newspapers there reported on the scandal as well as the suspected links 
between the German embassy at Madrid and anarchist elements in Spain.967 Krohn’s 
successor Steffan was not officially appointed as naval attaché968 but, undeterred by the 
scandal around Krohn’s dismissal, he continued his predecessor’s espionage and 
counter-espionage work. In addition to putting in place a sabotage service in the United 
States and Cuba to disrupt trade between the Entente and the US, he also organised the 
destruction of food exports in the US destined for Britain. In Spain he continued to 
foment unrest amongst Spanish dock workers to disrupt trade and delay transports to 
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Britain. Steffan also tried to establish commercial relations between Germany and Spain 
by negotiating Spanish wolfram exports to Germany.969  
After the scandal surrounding Krohn’s dismissal and the collaboration between 
the German embassy and anarchist Pascual, which had been uncovered by El Sol,970 
another scandal regarding German covert activity hit Spain in the summer of 1918. In 
June 1918 Barcelona’s chief of police, Manuel Bravo Portillo, was implicated in the 
passing of information about ship movements to German agents, which subsequently 
led to the torpedoing of steamers. It was revealed that Portillo had worked for the 
German administration since 1915 and that, besides delivering information on ship 
movements, he was also involved in organising disruptions in factories that supplied the 
Allied market.971 According to the newspaper La Publicidad Bravo Portillo was 
working for the German agent Baron von Rolland for a monthly salary of 2,000 
pesetas.972  
Furthermore, it soon transpired that Bravo Portillo had been behind the killing of 
José Barret in January 1918. Barret was a leading employer in the Catalan metallurgy 
industry. His murder led to the arrests of several syndicalists and constitutional 
guarantees were suspended in Barcelona for over two months.973 Although a suspect 
was found in former policeman Guillermo Belles, he was released after Portillo 
intervened personally in the case. After Portillo was exposed as a German agent, it also 
became evident that Belles too had cooperated with the Germans. He had infiltrated 
Anarchist groups and ordered the killing of Barret. German agents had been quite 
successful in infiltrating the CNT while the more pro-Allied UGT remained immune to 
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such advances. Despite Portillo’s and Belles’ arrests, the case was dismissed and Portillo 
escaped unscathed thanks to his connections in Spanish society.974 
With the introduction of the neutrality bill in July 1918975 the Spanish 
government did, however, react to the series of scandals exposing the far-reaching 
interference of the belligerents, Germany in particular, in Spanish affairs. In addition to 
curbing the press war between the Germanófilos and Francófilos the bill also enabled 
the government to impose prison sentences and fines ranging from 500 to 20,000 
pesetas for anybody facilitating a foreign power or its agents with information that 
could threaten Spain’s neutrality and could harm another foreign power.976 The Foreign 
Office assessed that the bill would have a more serious impact on Germany especially 
because of its anti-espionage clause.977 However, Germany also benefited from an 
enforcement of strict neutrality which now almost guaranteed that Spain would not join 
the war under any circumstances. The British were also concerned that a gagging of the 
press would prohibit further revelations about German espionage activity in Spain. 
Without being able to expose or defame a foreign power, which the bill now forbade, 
revelations such as the Pascual and the Bravo Portillo case would not be possible.978 
At the end of the war, in December 1918, the Spanish government, led by Count 
Romanones, established a special police unit, the Escuadra Volante Secreta. The unit 
consisted of fifty men who collaborated with the Allies as well as observing and 
controlling the movement of foreigners in Spain, reserving the right to detain suspects. 
The beginnings of this intelligence service highlight the lessons Spain had learned from 
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the First World War, during which it was left exposed to belligerent activity due to the 
lack of a national information or counter-espionage service.979 
Social unrest in Spain culminated in the summer of 1917 and continued until the 
end of the war and thereafter. After the defeat of the Central Powers, the German 
diplomatic corps in Spain could only try to use their connections in Spanish society to 
promote a favourable peace for Germany. Krohn, until his dismissal, was able to stay in 
close contact with the Spanish national workers union. When the union received a 
confidential request to participate in a peace congress of all European workers to take 
place in Russia, it contacted the German naval attaché to see whether he would be 
interested sending a participant or if he had any instructions for them.980  
Those contacts also benefited Germany during peace negotiations at the end of 
the war. In an attempt to influence the outcome at Versailles, the post-war German 
government tried to stress the differences between the new and the old German state 
while at the same time producing numerous publications on the origins of the war in the 
hope of more lenient peace terms.981 The Potsdam Reichsarchiv began to assemble 
documents based on information from the diaries and memoirs of key military and 
political figures. Those contributors, however, were primarily interested in showing 
Germany’s innocence in the events leading to the outbreak of war.982 Similarly the work 
of the Special Bureau led by legation secretary Bernhard von Bülow, which in 1920 
became the War Guilt Section of the Auswärtige Amt, tried to refute sole German 
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responsibility for the war and prove that the Allies had long wished for a war against 
Germany.983 
In Spain this official German post-war effort was supported by the diplomats at 
Madrid who carried out their work for the new socialist government with the same zeal 
as they had done for the old German empire. This remarkable continuity could be 
explained by a strong sense of patriotism and loyalty to nation and state felt by many 
German diplomats.984 Through union leaders and the press Krohn’s successor, Steffan, 
spread propaganda calling on Spanish workers to support the newly formed Weimar 
Republic and advocate for favourable peace conditions for Germany.985 News that 
France and Britain would press for harsher armistice conditions not only prompted 
German peace propaganda in Spain into action but also saw efforts to influence French 
socialists through their Spanish comrades and support them financially from time to 
time.986 For the international socialist congress in Bern held in January 1919 the 
German embassy successfully recruited three Spanish socialists, Angulo, Ovejero and 
Azorin, to do its bidding. Their aim was to persuade Spanish socialist leader Besteiro, 
who was seen as an idealist and possibly under the influence of the French government. 
For their work they received a payment of 50,000 pesetas and a further 50,000 pesetas if 
they succeeded. Angulo, who appears to have been the main contact, suggested to claim 
that money and instructions came from German socialists and not the embassy at 
Madrid.987   
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After the dismissal of the entire German embassy staff at the end of 1918, 
beginning of 1919,988 Hauptmann von Koos and information officer Nahrstedt officially 
took over army and navy matters in Spain in January 1919.989 Although the peace 
treaties after the First World War did not explicitly forbid the Central Powers to deploy 
military and naval attachés to their diplomatic missions, Germany did not appoint 
service attachés again until December 1932.990 Article 179 of the Versailles Treaty 
stated that it was forbidden to undertake any military, naval or aerial missions in foreign 
countries or send missions to other countries. Also, members of the Reich were to be 
prohibited from leaving German territory in order to help or facilitate the training or 
instruction of an army, navy and air force.991 
Although at the end of the war the Spanish government finally took action 
against espionage activity, this came too late to repair the damage that had been done. In 
January 1919 El Sol, referring to the intrigues of the German diplomatic corps in Spain, 
stated: 
If the whole of their [German diplomats] remaining lives were devoted to 
penitence, these gentlemen could never undo the enormous harm they have 
inflicted on Spain. The Prince [Ratibor] leaves us involved in a hundred 
problems which could be settled at this moment if the German embassy had not 
implanted a terrible corruption in our country. Let us hope that his departure will 
signify a radical change in German diplomatic methods in Spain.992 
While the official embassy staff including the service attachés got away lightly 
and were able to return to Germany unpunished for their deeds, Germany’s unofficial 
agents did not get away that easily. Against Kalle’s agent Captain Rüggeberg, who had 
controlled large parts of the German espionage network from Barcelona, an arrest 
warrant was issued at the end of 1919. Baron von Rolland [or Rollan], who allegedly 
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had been involved with Bravo Portillo, was also arrested in December 1919.993 After 
news surfaced he was actually a Greek of the name Errazti, the German administration 
distanced itself from Rolland and left him to his own fate.994  
On his return to Germany former military attaché Kalle became active in 
Weimar politics. In 1919 he joined the newly formed DVP (German people’s party) and 
in August 1923 he was made chief press officer in the government of Gustav 
Stresemann.995 Kalle’s political career in Germany after the war was not hindered by the 
revelations about his activity in Spain. Hinting at the effects of German intelligence 
operations in Spain, The Times in an article entitled ‘The Master German mind in Spain, 
Kalle's web of Spies’ wrote in January 1919: ‘… Kalle leaves behind him a complete 
system of underground working against the Allies, which, especially in the form of 
Bolshevist organisations, is today causing even the Spanish government the greatest 
anxiety.’996 
 
Conclusion 
 
The espionage network Germany built up in Spain during the First World War 
demonstrates the extent to which the German administration was able to permeate 
Spanish society. While the full scope of German covert activity will never be revealed 
and many German agents will remain unknown, we now have a much clearer picture of 
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the organisational structure of the German network and are also able to identify its key 
players. One of them, Wilhelm Canaris, who became the head of Abwehr – the Nazi’s 
military intelligence service, certainly benefited from his Spanish contacts build up 
during the First World War when Hitler decided to aid General Franco during the 
Spanish Civil War.  
Sabotage activity against Allied property in Spain shows how the war extended 
into neutral territory stressing its total aspect. The German service attachés, who before 
the war served in an advisory position to the embassy, were now transformed into active 
agents of war, further highlighting the growing strength of the German military during 
the First World War. The activity the attachés in Spain engaged in had the main aim to 
hinder the Allied war effort by sabotaging trade between Spain, France and Britain. This 
was done by promoting social unrest through the infiltration of workers organisations. 
Despite an economic boom created by the war, living conditions of the working classes 
worsened while successive governments failed to implement lasting reforms to stabilise 
social conditions. German diplomats and military personnel in Spain tapped into that 
discontent by fomenting strikes and spreading propaganda amongst Spanish workers 
which highlighted increased trade with the Allies while Spaniards had to suffer food 
shortages. On the other hand Germany also supported the conservative and monarchic 
elements in Spanish society as represented by the Spanish king and the military juntas 
for example. Thus German interference agitated opposing forces within Spain leading to 
instability which ultimately made the country a less reliable partner for the Allies, 
therefore ensuring Spanish neutrality and hindering the war effort of the Entente.  
Since appeals to the Spanish government to enforce strict neutrality and curb 
trade with the Entente fell on deaf ears, German diplomats and military personnel 
thought it necessary to resort to covert activity. Germany was unable to offer alternative 
trade links due to the blockade and her geographical situation. The enormous profits 
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reaped by Spanish business and industry during the war were also too great of a lure to 
reduce trade with France and Britain, despite the risks posed by the German submarine 
campaign. As shareholders or board members of large co-operations many Spanish 
government officials also profited personally from the war time boom making 
restrictions on trade unlikely. When attempts were made to impose any government 
control over exports or introduce a tax on wartime profits, they were quickly shot down 
by business and industry which proofed too strong of a lobby for the government to 
resist. While Germany pursued a ruthless strategy in Spain boycotting the trade of the 
Entente by violating the rights of a neutral country, accelerating the disintegration of 
social order and risking the lives of civilians, the Allies maintained their pressure on 
Spain to deliver exports vital for the war effort and benefited from the repression of 
social unrest. The internal and external pressures Spain was experiencing during the 
First World War clearly highlight that neutrality did not shield the country from the 
effects of war.  
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Conclusion 
 
The end of the First World War also spelled the end for the German autocratic 
monarchy. Under threat from labour protests and an ever growing socialist and 
communist movement, the Kaiser abdicated and a Republic was declared. In Spain 
workers in the cities and the countryside continued their protests. Instead of socialism, it 
was anarcho-syndicalism that the majority of the Spanish working classes turned to. 
However, much like in the failed uprising of the summer of 1917, the various protesting 
groups failed to stage a coherent effort to topple the regime. By 1919 Spain’s dynastic 
parties were completely divided in competing sections, making it yet again difficult to 
form any stable government. To protect their interest, the bourgeoise turned to the army 
for support which brutally supressed any civilian protest. Shortly after the assassination 
of Prime Minister Eduardo Dato at the hands of anarchists in March 1921, Spanish 
troops suffered a devastating defeat at Annual in Morocco1, resulting in a national crisis.  
Germany and Spain resumed their official diplomatic relations after Spain's 
recognition of the Weimar Republic. In January 1920 the German Ambassardor von 
Hoesch took up his business in Madrid, while Spain sent its first post-war ambassador 
to Berlin in October 1920.2 By 1921 the active wartime propagandist August Hofer was 
still managing his printing business in Barcelona and also publishing a small 
newspaper.3 The Barcelona-based German club Germania, which had been a focal point 
for Hofer and his German compatriots during the First World War, celebrated its 50th 
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anniversary in November 1921.4 However, the German communities in Madrid and 
Barcelona did not present a united front after the war but were divided by political 
differences. In order to achieve a coordinated effort similar to that of the war years, the 
German consul at Barcelona tried to establish societies for the promotion of German 
culture abroad.5 
During the inter-war years German diplomats also tried to keep German topics 
present in the Spanish press. This was undoubtedly part of the German propaganda 
effort to refute the war guilt clause of the Versailles treaty. When articles by British 
Prime Minister David Lloyd George and his French counterpart, Raymond Poincaré, 
appeared in the Barcelona newspaper Vanguardia in 1925, attempts were made to 
convince German politicians to do the same.6 In the inter-war period Germany and 
Spain also formed new economic relations, particularly in Spain’s Moroccan 
protectorate. Spain needed to improve its military power in order to gain control over 
the region and Germany was to facilitate the production and delivery of munition, 
weapons and transport vehicles to Morocco. The defeat at Annual in 1921 made it more 
urgent for Spain to break down the rebellion in the Rif and German chemical weapons 
technology was viewed as a possible solution. Ironically Germany, which had incited 
rebellion amongst the tribes in North Africa throughout the First World War, was now 
called upon to deal with those uprisings. Secret negotiations between Spain and 
Germany began in 1922 discussing the construction of a chemical weapons factory in 
Spain with the help of German expertise, personnel and technical equipment.7 This was 
of course in violation of the terms of the Versailles Treaty which, however, did not deter 
Germany. In addition to facilitating Spain’s weapons production, further attempts were 
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made by Germany to breach the conditions of Versailles by building submarines for 
Germany in Spain.8 
Despite this activity, the close economic and military contacts between both 
countries in the 1920s ceased to exist with the establishment of the Second Republic in 
1931.9 It was the advent of civil war in Spain in 1936 that saw a renewed intensification 
of Spanish-German relations. When Adolf Hitler decided to come to the aid of General 
Franco in 1936, links between the two countries had already been firmly established and 
Germany was able to call on an extensive network in Spain built up during the First 
World. When the Führer answered Franco’s call for assistance, he also appointed a new 
German ambassador to Spain. Eberhard von Stohrer, embassy secretary at Madrid from 
1913 to 1918, took up his new post in 1936.10  
Given the extensive connections that existed between Spain and Germany during 
the First World War, as highlighted in this study, Spain’s close ties to Nazi Germany 
now do not appear that surprising anymore. As this examination of the relationship 
between a neutral country and one of the main belligerent powers during the First World 
War has demonstrated, the total war waged by the belligerents did not leave the neutral 
nations unaffected. The violation of Belgian neutrality marked the outbreak of the war 
and the example of Spain shows how even more distant neutrals became the target of 
the belligerent’s war plans.  
The key objectives addressed in this study were to outline the official and 
unofficial links that existed between Spain and Germany during the First World War and 
establish how these links were set up and maintained throughout the conflict. The main 
protagonists on both sides were identified and their activity was reconstructed. In 
addition, the reasoning behind German strategy in Spain was examined and the 
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motivation of Spanish collaborators was explored. This examination then allowed for an 
analysis of the effects German activity had especially in regard to Spain’s domestic 
situation.  
The establishment and the maintenance of the official and unofficial links 
between Spain and Germany during the war, facilitated by a thorough investigation of 
German diplomatic files as well as military records and Foreign Office documentation, 
shows that the impetus for most German activity in Spain initially came from the 
diplomats in the country and was then subsequently sanctioned by Berlin. As the 
examination of the private propaganda effort has shown, the German community in 
Spain played an important role in establishing unofficial links between both countries, 
allowing for an even greater permeation of German influence on the Iberian Peninsula. 
This form of self-mobilisation, as evidenced in the German community in Spain, also 
demonstrates the willingness of German nationals abroad to participate in their 
country’s war effort. Therefore, it can be argued that German wartime mobilisation was 
not restricted to the country’s national boundaries but instead the patriotic call of duty 
also reached those living in neutral territories at the outbreak of war.  
The maintenance of the German network in Spain was facilitated by personal 
friendships and business relations which had already been established prior to the war 
and, as was sometimes the case in the Spanish publishing industry, was also aided by 
financial contributions. Germany’s support of pro-neutrality factions amongst Spanish 
political parties as well as oppositional movements also enabled many different types of 
collaboration. By portraying Germany as a defender of Spanish neutrality and accusing 
the Allies of pressuring Spain into the war, those Spaniards favouring non-intervention 
were pushed further away from the Entente. The economic pressure exerted by Britain 
and France on Spain also allowed German propaganda to exploit existing resentment 
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amongst Spaniards against those countries and motivated some to collaborate with the 
German administration in the hope that this was in Spain’s best interest.  
The key protagonists in Spanish-German relations during the First World War 
were identified by investigating German, Spanish and British diplomatic files as well as 
Spanish, British and American newspaper reports. As is evident from the examination, 
the main figure on the German side was Ambassador Ratibor. However, the embassy 
staff, as well as the network of German businessmen and residents in Spain, were of no 
lesser importance. Of equal significance to the ambassador were the German service 
attachés, Kalle and Krohn, who built up a large intelligence network and engaged in 
covert activity playing off opposing groups in Spanish society, contributing to the 
destabilisation of Spain’s domestic affairs. The attachés’ ‘web of spies’ relied on a 
number of middlemen, for the first time comprehensively identified in this study, the 
most important one being Wilhelm Canaris. He put in place a network of agents, not 
only responsible for gathering information on enemy activity in Spain and North Africa, 
but also engaged in the destruction of Allied property and active sabotage of the Allied 
war effort. This network was also reactivated in the inter-war period. Canaris visited the 
Canary Islands in 1927 with view to establish a Lufthansa base. The German supply 
service (Etappendienst) was reorganised in 1933 and became a branch of the Nazis 
military intelligence service, Abwehr.11  
A number of Spanish journalists from various publications, as well as writers 
and intellectuals, willingly collaborated with the German embassy in their propaganda 
effort. Some of them, like Enrique Dominguez Rodiño, who had reported for 
Vanguardia from Germany during the war, continued their work with the German 
                                                 
11Robert Whealey, ‘Hitler and the Spanish Civil War’ in Conrad Kent & Thomas Wolber & Cameron 
Hewitt (eds), The lion and the eagle. Interdisciplinary essays on German-Spanish relations over the 
centuries (New York, 2000), pp 313-324. 
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embassy after 1918.12 Collaborators Vincente Gay and Juan Pujol saw their careers on 
the rise when they were promoted to important press propaganda positions under the 
Franco regime.13 Gay was appointed head of the Press and Propaganda Ministry in 
1937.14 
Liberal and conservative Spanish politicians alike also chose to collaborate with 
the German administration. The Spanish ambassador in Belgium, the Marquis de 
Villalobar, was a key figure for Germany in obtaining information about Spanish public 
opinion as well as political developments in Spain. He was also used in attempts to 
influence the Spanish king, Alfonso XIII. Alfonso himself was always in close contact 
with the German diplomatic corps through his friendship with military attaché Kalle. 
The Spanish ambassador at Berlin, Polo de Bernabé, as well as his military attaché, 
Major Valdivia, were also important contacts for the German administration.  
Thanks to Spain’s position of neutrality, those official diplomatic contacts could 
be maintained openly without causing suspicion. However, Spanish diplomats and 
politicians had to carefully avoid showing any overt sympathies to either warring side. 
Spain’s effort on behalf of POW’s, as carried out by King Alfonso XIII and the Spanish 
ambassador in Belgium, further highlights the important role of neutrals during 
wartime. Spanish diplomats provided important links of communication between the 
belligerents. However, this did not stop them from pursuing their own goals, as can be 
seen in the examples of Spanish-German collaborations between diplomats and 
politicians during the war.  
In their support for Germany many of the Spanish collaborators were motivated 
by the belief that a German victory would give Spain an advantageous position in the 
                                                 
12P.A., R123011, Spanien 2, Bd. 3, Die Presse in Madrid, 1919-20, Bassewitz to Auswärtiges Amt, 
27.9.1919. 
13Albes, Worte wie Waffen, p. 401. 
14P.A., R123008, Die Presse in Spanien (auβer in Madrid) 1918-39, Faupel Embassy Salamanca to 
Auswärtiges Amt, 22.1.1937. 
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post-war world order. This belief was fuelled by a resentment against Allied economic 
dominance in Spain as well as the country’s subordinate position in the distribution of 
colonial territories. German diplomats and propagandists took advantage of this 
discontent and tried to win over Spaniards by making territorial promises or, in the case 
of Alfonso XIII, offering an important role in peace negotiations after the war. Some 
Spanish politicians worked with the German embassy in order to further their own 
agenda, namely ensuring a strict continuation of neutrality. Additional pressure to not 
deviate from a neutral course was put on Spain’s wartime governments by Spanish 
businesses and industries which profited from the war. The successful German 
infiltration of Spanish workers’ organisations was also owed to their pro-neutrality 
stance. Pro-German Spanish intellectuals and writers, spurred on by events of the war, 
continued the debates on a regeneration of Spain which had begun at the end of the 
nineteenth century. Many of those writers were ardent Spanish nationalists and the First 
World War proved to be a catalyst for them in developing their own ideas for reforming 
Spain. 
Germany manipulated various groups within Spanish society which were either 
already benevolent towards Germany or supporters of a strict neutrality. The overall aim 
of the German effort in Spain was to ensure that the country would maintain an absolute 
outward neutrality and not join the Entente. There were no considerations made for 
Spain to join the war effort of the Central Powers. However, German diplomats and 
propagandists worked hard on keeping Spanish public opinion favourable to the 
German cause. German activity in Spain during the war was evidently opportunistic 
and, while everything was done to keep Spain neutral, it tried to disrupt and sabotage 
the Allied war effort as much as possible.  
Germany’s strategy of playing off opposing groups within Spanish society 
caused further political instability in the country. On the one hand, Germany pledged its 
253 
support to the conservative elements of the Spanish ruling elite, and on the other hand, 
German agents agitated workers into strike action, undermining the status quo of the 
elite. This had the effect that Spain became a less reliable ally for the Entente. Political 
instability and ongoing civil unrest also impacted on Spain’s production output and its 
ability to continue trade with the Allies which in turn hindered the Allied war effort. 
Widespread German activity on the Iberian Peninsula and in North Africa forced the 
Entente to organise a counter-offensive, therefore diverting important resources and 
manpower away from the war fronts into neutral territory. While Germany had started 
its aggressive campaign in Spain right from the outset of the war, the Allies were slow 
to follow and only reacted when German activity was proving to be effective.  
While those Spaniards ideologically closer to the Allies were also often in 
opposition to the ruling regime and in favour of drastic political changes, the Allies, 
because of their economic dependence on Spain for their war effort, could not mobilise 
these sections of Spanish society but instead benefited from their repression and as little 
social upheaval as possible. Concessions that would have to be made to convince Spain 
to actively join the war effort of the Entente were deemed too great, especially by 
Britain which was reluctant to cede any territory to Spain in return for weak military 
support. 
Germany’s ability to actively interfere in Spanish internal affairs and its ongoing 
covert operations throughout the war also highlight the weakness of the various Spanish 
wartime governments which were unable to deal with these intrusions. This further 
undermined the regime’s authority and accelerated the process of political 
disintegration. The legacy of the Great War in Spain becomes particularly evident in the 
political instability it left behind due to the constant pressure from both belligerents. 
This is especially important with view to Spain’s tumultuous situation post-1918 and the 
eventual emergence of civil war and military dictatorship in the 1930s. As other 
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historians have argued, the origins of that strife can be found in the country’s experience 
of the First World War.15 The inclusion of neutral countries into the study of World War 
I, as can be seen in recent publications, not only stresses the global aspect of the war, 
allowing for comparative studies between the different neutral countries, but also 
enables historians to analyse how neutrals experienced the effects of war compared to 
the belligerents.  
A look at Spain’s situation during the First World War permits a better 
understanding of the importance of neutral states for the war aims of the belligerents. It 
also clearly demonstrates how a neutral country suffered the economic effects of war by 
experiencing inflation and subsequent political instability. While Spain was spared the 
fate of the belligerent countries which experienced a devastating loss of the lives of 
millions of men, the German submarine campaign did also target Spanish merchant 
ships, resulting in casualties. As this investigation has demonstrated, despite Spain not 
actively taking part in the conflict, the country nevertheless witnessed a form of cultural 
and intellectual mobilisation, as highlighted in the fierce public debates carried on in 
Spain throughout the war. In addition, the analysis of the relations between a belligerent 
and a neutral country also enable a better understanding of the belligerents war aims and 
strategic plans.  
In the case of Spanish-German relations, the links established between both 
countries during the First World War can be used to further examine the relationship 
between Spain and Germany during the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War. A 
particular intriguing aspect, touched upon in this study and worth further investigation, 
are the links between Spain and the Weimar Republic during the interwar years. This is 
especially interesting with view of Germany’s attempts to undermine the terms of the 
Versailles Treaty and given the country’s links with Spanish anarchist and workers 
                                                 
15See for example Romero Salvadó, The foundations of civil war.  
255 
organisation during the First World War. German economic activity in Spanish Morocco 
in the 1920s and Germany’s role as supplier of the Spanish army could provide some 
hints as to whether some of these links persisted until the time of General Franco’s coup 
d’état. The role of the Spanish Catholic Church during the First World War offers 
further possibilities of research and could be examined in view of the papal peace effort 
during the conflict. While the efforts of the German community in Spain have been 
extensively highlighted in this investigation, the role and activity of the Spanish 
community in Germany during the First World War and in the interwar period would 
provide an additional facet to the inter-cultural relations between both countries.  
Although a long neglected aspect in the field of First World War studies, the 
issue of neutrality has received more attention from historians in recent years. The 
centenary of the Great War has also generated some interest in Spain and has drawn the 
attention to the country’s experience of World War I. As many of the recent publications 
show, and as has been argued in this investigation, neutrality did not shield Spain from 
the effects of war. Germany’s aggressive behaviour from the outset of the war not only 
disregarded Belgian neutrality but also showed little respect for Spanish neutrality, 
highlighting its weakness as a political and diplomatic tool during a time of total war.   
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